Opinion
No. 3-050 / 02-0944
Filed March 26, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L. Stigler, Judge.
Jeremy S. Hudgins appeals from the judgments and sentences entered following his guilty pleas to willful injury, going armed with intent, and possession of marijuana, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.4(2), 708.8, and 124.401(5) (2001) respectively. AFFIRMED.
Brandon Adams of Clark Butler Walsh Hamann, Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda Hines, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Ferguson, County Attorney, and James Katcher, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Jeremy S. Hudgins appeals from the judgments and sentences entered following his guilty pleas to willful injury, going armed with intent, and possession of marijuana, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.4(2), 708.8, and 124.401(5) (2001) respectively. He contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence and that the court erred in determining there was a factual basis in the record for his guilty plea to the charge of going armed with intent. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The minutes of testimony show that on the night of July 3, 2001 Hudgins was at the same Waterloo McDonald's as Lincoln Brown, Brown's girlfriend, and their daughter. Hudgins apparently rubbed his body against Brown's girlfriend, touched her, and was breathing in her ear. She swore at Hudgins and told him to stop touching her. When Hudgins swore back at her Brown swore at him and Hudgins then asked Brown if he wanted to "take it outside." The two went outside and began to fight. Hudgins had a knife and cut and stabbed Brown in the chest. Once Brown noticed he was cut he went back inside the restaurant and an ambulance was called. Hudgins returned to the truck he had arrived in and was arrested when the police arrived. The police found a bloody knife in the truck and Hudgins later admitted he had cut or stabbed someone and demonstrated to an officer how he did it. A metal pipe was also found on Hudgins which was later determined to have marijuana residue in it. Hudgins was charged by trial information with willful injury in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(1) (2001) (a class C felony) and possession of marijuana, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5). Hudgins pled not guilty and filed a notice of his intent to rely on a defense of voluntary intoxication. Pursuant to a plea agreement the State amended the willful injury charge to willful injury under section 708.4(2) (a class D felony) and added a charge of going armed with intent, in violation of section 708.8 (also a class D felony). Hudgins entered an Alford Plea to the amended charges at a plea proceeding on January 14, 2002. The court ordered a presentence investigation report to be completed.
The marijuana charge remained unchanged.
A sentencing hearing was held on May 31, 2002. The court heard testimony from Brown, his girlfriend, and Hudgins's wife. The State recommended two concurrent five-year prison terms on the felony charges and a concurrent six-month term on the marijuana charge. Hudgins requested a deferred judgment. The court sentenced Hudgins to two five-year terms and one six-month term of incarceration, all to be served concurrently. The court informed Hudgins of the necessity of filing a motion in arrest of judgment in order to preserve any error in the plea proceeding. Hudgins did not file a motion in arrest of judgment.
Hudgins appeals from the judgments and sentences entered by the court, contending the court abused its discretion in imposing sentence and that the court erred in determining that a factual basis existed in the record for his guilty plea to the charge of going armed with intent.
II. SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Our review of sentencing decisions is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong presumption in their favor. State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 2000). A sentence will not be upset on appeal unless the defendant demonstrates an abuse of trial court discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure. Id.; State v. Gonzalez, 582 N.W.2d 515, 516 (Iowa 1998).
III. MERITS
Hudgins contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence by improperly focusing only upon Brown's injuries and Brown's desire for Hudgins to be punished. He argues the court did not comply with Iowa Code section 901.5 (2001) in sentencing him because it failed to consider what would provide him "maximum opportunity for rehabilitation" as well as what sentence was necessary for the "protection of the community." He goes on to list a number of factors he alleges the court failed to consider which he seems to claim would have mitigated against a prison term and favored a deferred judgment. Hudgins further claims the court also failed to examine the presentence investigation (PSI) report, as required under section 901.5. Finally, Hudgins argues the court erred in determining there was a factual basis in the record for his guilty plea to the charge of going armed with intent in violation of section 708.8. We address the sentencing and plea issues separately.
A. Sentencing.
Iowa Code section 901.5 provides that "[a]fter receiving and examining all pertinent information, including the presentence investigation report" the court shall determine which sentencing option is:
[A]uthorized by law for the offense, and of the authorized sentences, which of them or which combination of them, in the discretion of the court, will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and others.
Iowa Code § 901.5 (2001) (emphasis added). In applying its discretion, the court should weigh and consider all pertinent matters in determining proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant's age, character and propensities and chances of his reform. The courts owe a duty to the public as much as to defendant in determining a proper sentence. The punishment should fit both the crime and the individual.
State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999) (quoting State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979)). Our supreme court has stated that the above factors are some of the "minimal essential factors" to consider when exercising sentencing discretion. State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979). "The nature of the offense alone cannot be determinative of a discretionary sentence." State v. Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1982) (citing State v. McKeever, 276 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa 1979)).
The court must state on the record its reasons for selecting a particular sentence. Iowa R.Crim.P. 2.23(3)( d). The court, however, is generally not required to give reasons for rejecting particular sentencing options. State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996). In determining whether the trial court considered pertinent matters in imposing a particular sentence, we look to all parts of the record to find supporting reasons. State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). The sentencing court is not required, however, to specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant. Id.
Based on our review of the record as a whole, we find the court did not rely on a single factor in imposing sentence. In addition to considering the nature of the victim's injuries (a factor which bore on the nature of the offense) and the victim's desire for Hudgins to be punished, the district court properly considered Hudgins's family situation, his need to take responsibility for his actions (a factor which bore on his character), his relationship with his young son, and his financial situation. In fact, the court expressly decided not to sentence Hudgins to pay any fines due to his current family and financial situations. The trial judge's comment to Hudgins at sentencing, that "the intent issue is closed off" by the guilty pleas, appears to indicate the judge considered the fact the two felony offenses were specific intent crimes. Other comments by the sentencing judge show that he considered the facts that Hudgins initiated the incident and he stabbed or cut Brown not just once, but twice.
Furthermore, it is clear from the court's stated sentencing reasons that it had received and examined the PSI report. The court expressly stated it had read the PSI report, and some of the information mentioned by the court at sentencing is found solely in the PSI report. Based on the record before us, we conclude the court's stated reasons for imposition of sentence, if somewhat sparse, are nevertheless adequate to satisfy the requirements of section 901.5 and that the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Hudgins. The court properly considered the nature and circumstances of the crimes, Hudgins's family and financial situation, Hudgins's character, and the PSI report in determining the appropriate sentence for Hudgins.
B. Plea of Guilty to Going Armed With Intent.
Hudgins also claims the district court erred in accepting his guilty plea to the charge of going armed with intent under section 708.8 because no factual basis exists in the record for the charge or his guilty plea to it. Specifically, he contends the record does not establish that the pocketknife he had was a "dangerous weapon" or that he had the specific intent to use a dangerous weapon against another person, elements of going armed with intent. See Iowa Code § 708.8.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)( a) requires a defendant to file a motion in arrest of judgment if the defendant desires to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea on appeal. State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 19 (Iowa 2001); State v. Miller, 590 N.W.2d 724, 725 (Iowa 1999). Failure to do so precludes the right to assert the challenge on appeal. Iowa R.Crim.P. 2.24(3)( a). We read rule 2.24(3)( a) in conjunction with rule 2.8(2)( d) which requires the court to inform a defendant that the defendant's failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment will preclude the defendant from challenging defects in the guilty plea on appeal. Kress, 636 N.W.2d at 19.
Hudgins does not contend the court failed to inform him of the necessity to file a motion in arrest of judgment to preserve his challenge to the plea, and the record is clear the court did in fact inform him of this requirement. The record is equally clear that Hudgins entered an informed guilty plea to the charge of going armed with intent and he did not challenge the plea by motion in arrest of judgment. Accordingly, the error alleged by Hudgins has not been preserved for our review and he is precluded from now raising it on appeal. Iowa R.Crim.P. 2.24(3)( a); Kress, 636 N.W.2d at 19. We therefore reject his claim of trial court error and affirm Hudgins's conviction and sentence for going armed with intent.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, we conclude the court's stated reasons for imposing sentence are minimally adequate to satisfy section 901.5 and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Hudgins. The court properly considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character, and his family and financial situations. Furthermore, based on the statements by the court it is clear the court received and considered the presentence investigation report in compliance with section 901.5. Hudgins did not preserve error on his challenge to the factual basis for his guilty plea to the charge of going armed with intent.