Opinion
No. 3-189 / 02-1528
Filed April 4, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Todd A. Geer, Judge.
Defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence imposed following her plea of guilty to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.
Thomas Frerichs of Frerichs Law Office, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda Hines, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller, and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Linda Hubbard appeals from the judgment and sentence imposed following her plea of guilty to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c) (2001). She contends the district court abused it discretion in denying her a deferred judgment, and failed to sufficiently state its reasons for the denial.
We review the court's sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 62 (Iowa 1999). An abuse of discretion exists when the court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Privitt, 571 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Iowa 1997).
The district court should consider all pertinent matters in determining the proper sentence. State v. Cooley, 587 N.W.2d 752, 755-56 (Iowa 1998). This includes determining which sentence will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and others. Iowa Code § 901.5. In making a determination to defer judgment, the court shall consider:
the age of the defendant; the defendant's prior record of convictions and prior record of deferments of judgment if any; the defendant's employment circumstances; the defendant's family circumstances; the nature of the offense committed; and such other factors as are appropriate.
Hubbard contends the court erred in denying her a deferred judgment because it would provide her the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation. While rehabilitation is one factor the court must consider, it is not the only factor. The State requested the sentencing court follow the presentence investigative report recommendation that Hubbard's sentence be suspended, but argued judgment should not be deferred "due to the fact this does involve danger to the community," and because it was a conspiracy rather than a spur-of-the-moment crime. In sentencing Hubbard, the court cited the nature of the offense on several occasions, noting, "The more danger that has been posed to society as a result of the offense, the less likely someone would receive a deferred judgment, typically." Because its reasons for sentencing Hubbard were not clearly untenable, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hubbard a deferred judgment.
Hubbard also claims the court failed to adequately state its reasons for imposing her sentence. The sentencing court must state on the record its reasons for selecting a particular sentence. State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000). However, the explanations need not be detailed so long as they allow appellate review of the trial court's discretionary action. Id. Here, the court cited the nature of the offense, Hubbard's age, the degree of her participation, and the likelihood she would re-offend. The court adequately stated its reasons for imposing Hubbard's sentence.