Summary
finding that rule to show cause was improvidently granted and denying writ
Summary of this case from State ex Rel. Nat. Mut. v. MarksOpinion
No. 30878
Submitted: February 26, 2003
Filed: March 14, 2003 Concurring Opinion Added July 9, 2003.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION WRIT DENIED.
William R. Wooten, The Wooten Law Firm, Beckley, West Virginia, Attorney for the Petitioner.
Warren R. McGraw, II, McGraw Law Offices, Prosperity, West Virginia, Attorney for the Respondents.
The West Virginia Secondary Schools Activity Commission (hereinafter "the SSAC") seeks a writ of prohibition against the Honorable John S. Hrko, Judge of the Circuit Court of Wyoming County, based on an injunction he entered on behalf of the respondent, Jeremy Raymond Hedinger (hereinafter "Mr. Hedinger"). Having reviewed the parties' submissions and heard oral argument, we deny the writ. Further, we remand this case to the circuit court of Wyoming County for additional proceedings regarding the permanency of the injunction should either party seek to establish a meaningful record with respect thereto.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We take our facts from the sparse record submitted to us by the parties. Mr. Hedinger was a senior member of the Wyoming East High School football team. On September 20, 2002, he was ejected from a game for allegedly punching an opposing player. He denies throwing the punches. The SSAC suspended Mr. Hedinger from the next Wyoming East football game, scheduled for September 27, 2002, as required by W. Va. C.S.R. § 127-4-3.7.3 (2002). Prior to September 27, 2002, however, Mr. Hedinger filed a complaint for a temporary restraining order to allow him to play in that game. On September 26, 2002 Judge Hrko heard both the petition and the SSAC's motion to dismiss. Judge Hrko issued an injunction requiring the SSAC to provide Mr. Hedinger some type of hearing before imposing the prospective suspension. Additionally, Judge Hrko ordered Mr. Hedinger be allowed to play in the September 27th game. The SSAC then sought a writ of prohibition invoking this Court's original jurisdiction to prohibit Judge Hrko from enforcing the injunction. We granted a rule to show cause, but refused to stay the injunction.
The only exhibits before us were submitted by the SSAC and consist of a "SPECIAL REPORT to the School Principal and the WVSSAC" and the injunction order from which this proceeding arises.
Mr. Hedinger says that while his ejection was factually erroneous, this dispute was "not the emphasis of [his] claim in the Circuit Court of Wyoming County[.]"
II. DISCUSSION
"[T]he right to prohibition must be clearly shown before a petitioner is entitled to this extraordinary remedy." Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Maynard, 190 W. Va. 113, 120, 437 S.E.2d 227, 284 (1993). In the context of appeals we have said that "[w]hen an appeal has been granted and it appears from the face of the record that it was improvidently awarded, the case will be dismissed." Syl., Angelo v. Rodman Trust, Inc., 161 W. Va. 408, 244 S.E.2d 321 (1978) (per curiam). We think this reasoning applies to the instant case. Thus, we find that the rule to show cause in this matter was improvidently granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of prohibition is denied. This case is remanded for additional proceedings regarding the permanency of the injunction should either party seek to establish a meaningful record with respect thereto.
Writ Denied.
I join in the Court's opinion. I write separately to suggest that if the Secondary Schools Activity Commission in the future were to provide a form of due process for reviewing decisions of officials that have long-term consequences, such a process might serve to keep the SSAC out of court in cases like the instant one.
Where an official's ejection of a student from a game will have longer-term consequences beyond simply stopping the student from playing in the ongoing game, I believe that due process may require that a student who alleges serious error in the official's action can have access to some sort of forum or process in which the student can challenge the ruling and/or consequences.
In the instant case, the student claimed to have a videotape that categorically showed that he was innocent of the unsportsmanlike conduct charge. Although the record is not clear, this tape may have led to the circuit court's ruling in question in the instant case. If the SSAC had a provision that permitted the SSAC to consider such claims, the court system would not be the only place — as appears to be the case today — where a student who claims to have been treated unfairly can seek relief.