State v. Hoyt

14 Citing cases

  1. State v. Spears

    147 Wis. 2d 429 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 120 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Raising concerns to one specific element of the crime to which defendant pled

    Thus, the same act may constitute homicide by negligent use of a vehicle, sec. 940.08, Stats., reckless homicide, sec. 940.06, or second-degree murder, sec. 940.02. In deciding the offense-slot into which Spears's conduct fits it may be helpful to ask, as the court did in State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis.2d 310, 317n, 124 N.W.2d 47, 60 (1963) (opinion withdrawn for other reasons): "Why does the legislature make a grading between homicides? Why not simply hold that one who kills another should be subject to an invariant punishment?

  2. State v. Prober

    98 Wis. 2d 345 (Wis. 1980)   Cited 59 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding "emergency search may not extend to areas unrelated to the emergency"

    The suppression court found that "[t]he Officer asked Mr. Prober for the keys to his, to the trunk, telling him that since he was going to be taken in the ambulance that the car was going to be towed." Whether or not the defendant's surrender of the keys constitutes a "clear and unequivocal" expression of consent to a search of the car, State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis.2d 310, 317v, 124 N.W.2d 47 (1963), it is unclear whether the consent can be construed as extending to the purse found within the trunk. Compare: State v. Drake, 343 So.2d 1336 (Fla.App. 1977), with People v. Sanders, 44 Ill. App.3d 510, 358 N.E.2d 375 (1976).

  3. McAdoo v. State

    223 N.W.2d 521 (Wis. 1974)   Cited 42 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 596, 608-09, 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974), the examination and interview were "virtually seamless," Davis, 310 Wis. 2d 583, ¶ 31, and the statement was held to be admissible. Davis held that there was a discrete interview when the gap was merely five minutes.

    State v. Parker, supra. Any conflicts in the testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the confession must be resolved in favor of the trial court's finding. State v. Schneidewind (1970), 47 Wis.2d 110, 116, 176 N.W.2d 303; State v. Hoyt (1963), 21 Wis.2d 310, 317a, 124 N.W.2d 47. The determination as to whether a confession is voluntary, rather than the result of coercion, must be made in light of the "totality of the circumstances.

  4. State v. McCarty

    177 N.W.2d 819 (Wis. 1970)   Cited 13 times
    In State v. McCarty (1970), 47 Wis.2d 781, 786, 177 N.W.2d 819, and Warrix v. State (1971), 50 Wis.2d 368, 376, 184 N.W.2d 189, this court expressly reaffirmed its holding in Dombrowski.

    Although denied by defendant, the record amply supports the finding of the trial judge that the defendant requested to be taken to his motel room, and three detectives so testified. Defendant, on appeal, argues that certain inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses is such that their credibility must be seriously questioned with respect to the defendant giving consent for a search and cites State v. Hoyt (1963), 21 Wis.2d 310, 317v, 124 N.W.2d 47, wherein this court stated: "Under federal standards which now control the reasonableness of a search and seizure, consent to a search must be expressed in clear and unequivocal terms." However, the credibility of witnesses is a proper function for the trier of fact.

  5. State v. Klimas

    94 Wis. 2d 288 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 14 times
    In State v. Klimas, 94 Wis. 2d 288 (Ct. App. 1979), referenced in the Escalona-Naranjo decision, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decision on which Klimas based his § 974.06 motion had not issued at the time of Klimas's direct appeal. See Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 182 n.11.

    The supreme court has held that the "essential difference" between these two crimes lies "'in the state of mind with which the conduct is carried out.'" Citing State v. Hoyt, reh. 21 Wis.2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964), 21 Wis.2d 310, 124 N.W.2d 47 (1963). Kasieta v. State, 62 Wis.2d 564, 572, 215 N.W.2d 412, 416 (1974).

  6. People v. Davis

    442 Mich. 1 (Mich. 1993)   Cited 87 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a search need only fall under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement

    Prober was overruled on other grounds in State v Weide, 155 Wis.2d 537; 455 N.W.2d 899 (1990). See State v Pires, 55 Wis.2d 597; 201 N.W.2d 153 (1972); State v Hoyt, 21 Wis.2d 284; 124 N.W.2d 47 (1964); State v Davidson, 44 Wis.2d 177; 170 N.W.2d 755 (1969); La Fournier v State, 91 Wis.2d 61; 280 N.W.2d 746 (1979). The court needed to determine whether a belief that the defendant was overdosing on some drug justified a police search of the defendant's handbag that may have contained such a drug.

  7. Norwood v. State

    74 Wis. 2d 343 (Wis. 1976)   Cited 60 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that the time between the information and arraignment can be attributed "to the ordinary demands of the judicial system"

    On review, the standard is whether the findings of the trial court are contrary to the greater weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Any conflicts in the testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the statements must be resolved in favor of the trial court's findings. McAdoo, supra; Schneidewind, supra; State v. Hoyt (1964), 21 Wis.2d 310, 124 N.W.2d 47, rehearing (1964), 21 Wis.2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645. The defendant here contends that the statements could not have been voluntary because, in the totality of circumstances, his mental condition precluded a knowing, understanding and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.

  8. State v. Franks

    239 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1976)   Cited 5 times
    In State v. Franks, 239 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1976), defendant, who denied knowledge of a crime, was asked to take a polygraph.

    More recently, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), carried forward the Bram definition of compulsion in the course of holding applicable to the States the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.' "See State v. Mullin, 249 Iowa 10, 85 N.W.2d 598 (1957); People v. Brommel, 56 Cal.2d 629, 15 Cal.Rptr. 909, 364 P.2d 845 (1961); Kier v. State, 213 Md. 556, 132 A.2d 494 (1957); State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272, 123 N.W.2d 392 (1963); State v. Watson, 82 N.M. 769, 487 P.2d 197 (1971); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis.2d 284, 124 N.W.2d 47 (1963)." (emphasis supplied).

  9. Kasieta v. State

    215 N.W.2d 412 (Wis. 1974)   Cited 14 times

    The defendant argues that, at most, such conduct should be considered manslaughter. He further argues that such conduct did not evince a depraved mind but rather a crime committed in the heat of passion. In State v. Hoyt (1963), 21 Wis.2d 310, 124 N.W.2d 47, rehearing (1964), 21 Wis.2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645, this court drew the distinction between second-degree murder and manslaughter at pages 317m, 317n: "By definition, second-degree murder is an unintentional killing.

  10. Pontow v. State

    58 Wis. 2d 135 (Wis. 1973)   Cited 18 times
    In Pontow v. State, 58 Wis.2d 135, 205 N.W.2d 775 (1973), the court distinguished confession bargaining from plea bargaining.

    The totality of those factors was found to have produced a coercive atmosphere. See, State v. Hoyt (1963), 21 Wis.2d 310, 124 N.W.2d 47, rehearing (1964), 21 Wis.2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645; Haynes v. Washington (1963), 373 U.S. 503, 83 Sup. Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513; Lynumn v. Illinois (1963), 372 U.S. 528, 83 Sup. Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922. In the instant case, there is no evidence to show any coercive police practices, nor was the defendant interrogated for any considerable length of time.