The state also asserts that the defendant’s mitigation evidence was weak, further supporting a conclusion that use of the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.In reaching the determination of whether use of an invalid aggravating circumstance is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, our supreme court has concluded that,In order to guarantee the precision that individualized sentencing considerations demand and provide a principled explanation for our conclusion in each case, it is important, when conducting harmless error review, to completely examine the record for the presence of factors which potentially influence the sentence ultimately imposed. These include, but are not limited to, the number and strength of remaining valid aggravating circumstances, the prosecutor’s argument at sentencing, the evidence admitted to establish the invalid aggravator, and the nature, quality and strength of mitigating evidence.State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 260-61 (Tenn. 1993).Reviewing the four non-exclusive factors referenced in Howell, we conclude that the number (one) of remaining valid aggravating circumstances does not weigh in favor of harmless error.

The state also asserts that the defendant’s mitigation evidence was weak, further supporting a conclusion that use of the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.In reaching the determination of whether use of an invalid aggravating circumstance is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, our supreme court has concluded that,In order to guarantee the precision that individualized sentencing considerations demand and provide a principled explanation for our conclusion in each case, it is important, when conducting harmless error review, to completely examine the record for the presence of factors which potentially influence the sentence ultimately imposed. These include, but are not limited to, the number and strength of remaining valid aggravating circumstances, the prosecutor’s argument at sentencing, the evidence admitted to establish the invalid aggravator, and the nature, quality and strength of mitigating evidence.State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 260-61 (Tenn. 1993).Reviewing the four non-exclusive factors referenced in Howell, we conclude that the number (one) of remaining valid aggravating circumstances does not weigh in favor of harmless error.

The 1998 amendment directly impacts an aggravating circumstance that is "more qualitatively persuasive and objectively reliable than others" the prosecution may rely upon to seek the death penalty, i.e., the defendant's prior violent felony convictions under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(2). State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 261 (Tenn. 1993). Moreover, by providing that "such evidence shall not be construed to pose a danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury and shall not be subject to exclusion on the ground that the probative [*24] value of such evidence is outweighed by prejudice to either party," the 1998 amendment removes the right of the defendant to invoke the exercise of the trial judge's discretion on the issue of admissibility.

TENNESSEE: Tennessee proportionality review is mandated by statute, comparing only cases in which the death penalty was imposed. See State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn.1993). A small number of states decline to conduct any sort of proportionality review.

that we "shall" consider, inter alia, whether the death sentence was imposed arbitrarily and whether the evidence supports the jury's determination that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-13-206(c)(1)(A), (C) (1997). The errors present here are components of these questions and are therefore not beyond the scope of our review, notwithstanding the defendant's failure to raise them in the trial court. See State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 880-81 (Tenn. 1998) (under Code section 39-13-206, supreme court had jurisdiction to review appellate issues in capital case despite defense counsel's failure to file a motion for new trial), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S. Ct. 1359 (1999).Errors affecting the jury's consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance in a capital sentencing proceeding must result in reversal unless the reviewing court concludes that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 259 (Tenn. 1993). That is to say, the error is harmless only where the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentence would have been the same had the jury not considered the improper evidence in aggravation. See id. at 262. This standard likewise applies in situations where an aggravating circumstance has been proven in part by evidence which was erroneously admitted. See State v. Campbell, 664, S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tenn. 1984) (trial court erred in admitting defendant's prior convictions of grand larceny and second degree burglary to prove prior violent felony aggravator, but error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where two eligible prior convictions were also admitted and there were two additional aggravating circumstances).Moreover, multiple errors may require reversal of a capital sentencing, even if the errors when considered separately do not require relief. State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 812 (Tenn. 1994); see also State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1, 28 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1