Opinion
No. 4-841 / 04-0124
Filed February 9, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Thomas R. Hronek, District Associate Judge.
Kelly Anne Horton appeals from her conviction and sentence for Operating While Intoxicated, First Offense. AFFIRMED.
Aaron Hamrock of Hamrock Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, and Mary Howell Sirna, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Kelly Anne Horton appeals from her conviction and sentence for operating while intoxicated (OWI), first offense. We now affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On September 20, 2003, at approximately 1:36 am, Officer Jason Eaton of the Huxley Police Department observed Horton's vehicle traveling northbound on Highway 69, a two-lane road. Officer Eaton noted Horton's vehicle moving at 24 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. speed zone. Through his rear view mirrors, Eaton also observed Horton's vehicle's intermittent brake lights. As Horton's vehicle was already traveling well below the posted speed limit, Eaton's observation of Horton's intermittent brake lights prompted him to reverse direction and to follow and observe Horton's vehicle.
Horton subsequently signaled and made a right turn into a strip mall parking lot. Officer Eaton observed that Horton's vehicle, while making the right turn, moved three inches to the left of the center line. At this point, Officer Eaton activated his emergency lights and stopped Horton's vehicle.
Upon approaching Horton, Officer Eaton observed indications that Horton was intoxicated. Eaton then conducted field sobriety tests that evidenced Horton was under the influence of alcohol, and he proceeded to place Horton under arrest. Horton was taken to the police department and a breath test was administered. The test indicated a blood alcohol concentration of .178, well over the legal limit and in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2003). Horton was then charged with operating while intoxicated, first offense. Horton was also issued a citation for operating her vehicle left of the center line, in violation of section 321.297.
Horton filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, contending Officer Eaton's stop of her vehicle was illegal. After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court concluded the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop of Horton's vehicle provided Officer Eaton with a reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. Horton then waived her right to a jury and after a bench trial was convicted of operating while intoxicated, first offense.
Horton now appeals her conviction and sentence, contending that the district court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence of intoxication discovered as a result of the stop of her vehicle.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
This appeal implicates the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment against unlawful stop, search and seizure, and hence our review is de novo. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001); State v. Scott, 518 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Iowa 1994). In reviewing the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, we consider both the evidence presented at the suppression hearing as well as the evidence presented at trial. State v. Cook, 530 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1995). Any evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights is inadmissible, and should be suppressed regardless of its relevance and probative value. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961); State v. Schrier, 283 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Iowa 1979).
III. Discussion.
Horton contends the evidence of intoxication observed following the stop of her vehicle by Officer Eaton should have been suppressed as the fruits of an illegal search and seizure, a violation of Horton's Fourth Amendment rights. She contends specifically that Officer Eaton, based on the circumstances he observed prior to making the warrantless stop, could not articulate more than an inchoate, unparticularized suspicion that criminal activity was in progress. It is well settled that an inchoate or generalized suspicion will not serve to uphold a warrantless investigatory stop of a vehicle. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 308 (1990) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)).
However, it is likewise settled law that when a police officer observes a vehicle violate one of our traffic laws, however minor, that officer has probable cause to stop the vehicle. State v. Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Iowa 1993).
Probable cause exists if the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable and prudent person would lead that person to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing it.
State v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Iowa 1990).
Officer Eaton testified that he observed Horton's vehicle cross a distinct broken yellow line by approximately three inches prior to making the right turn into the strip mall. It was immediately after this observation that Officer Eaton activated his emergency lights and stopped Horton's vehicle. Iowa Code section 321.297 provides in relevant part:
1. A vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway upon all roadways of sufficient width, except as follows:
a) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement.
b) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center of the roadway, provided, any person so doing shall yield the right of way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the roadway within such distance as to constitute an immediate hazard.
c) Upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the rules applicable thereon.
d) Upon a roadway restricted to one-way traffic.
It is not argued, and this record would not support a finding, that Horton's driving across the center line fell under one of the enumerated exceptions to the rule requiring all vehicles to be operated on the right half of the roadway. Even if Horton's driving constituted only a momentary, minor violation of the statute, it served as a lawful reason to stop Horton's vehicle. Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d at 693. Accordingly, we conclude Horton's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The district court properly denied that portion of Horton's motion to suppress seeking exclusion of the evidence of intoxication that served as the basis for Horton's conviction for OWI, first offense. The conviction and sentence are therefore affirmed.