State v. Horrocks

4 Citing cases

  1. Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp.

    288 Conn. 392 (Conn. 2008)   Cited 35 times
    In Birnie, we determined that this standard "requires that the employment, or the risks incidental thereto, contribute to the development of the injury in more than a de minimis way."

    ); nor that the employment must be the sole contributing factor in development of an injury. Dixon v. United Illuminating Co., 57 Conn. App. 51, 61, 748 A.2d 300, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 908, 753 A.2d 940 (2000); see also J. Smith, supra, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 311 (describing "`[a] substantial factor'" as "[n]ot the sole factor, nor the predominant factor . . . [it is] [e]nough if it is a substantial part of the causative antecedents; if it is one of several substantial factors"). In accordance with our case law, therefore, the substantial factor causation standard simply requires that the employment, or the risks incidental thereto, contribute to the development of the injury in more than a de minimis way.

  2. Orzech v. Giacco Oil Co.

    208 Conn. App. 275 (Conn. App. Ct. 2021)   Cited 2 times

    In contrast, when an employee's death is found to be a suicide that is the sequelae of a compensable injury, the employee's conduct in carrying out the suicide cannot be regarded as a superseding cause defeating compensability; otherwise, the employee's suicide, by the mere virtue of the method by which the death occurred, would never be compensable under the workers’ compensation laws of our state, which would conflict with our appellate precedent. See Wilder v. Russell Library Co. , 107 Conn. 56, 61–62, 139 A. 644 (1927) ; Dixon v. United Illuminating Co. , 57 Conn. App. 51, 61–62 n.8, 748 A.2d 300, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 908, 753 A.2d 940 (2000). Here, the decedent's consumption of alcohol and medications, which, as the defendants note, the decedent knew to be contraindicated and which resulted in the acute intoxication constituting the physiological cause of the decedent's death, was the method by which the decedent died by suicide; it was not an act untethered to the decedent's compensable injuries and the depression he developed thereafter.

  3. Dinuzzo v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet Geo, Inc.

    99 Conn. App. 336 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 20 times
    In DiNuzzo, supra, the key witness's testimony was deemed "grounded in speculation or conjecture" when it was apparent that witness failed to consider such relevant issues such as the decedent's prescribed medication.

    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dixon v. United Illuminating Co., 57 Conn. App. 51, 60, 748 A.2d 300, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 908, 753 A.2d 940 (2000). "The commissioner is the sole trier of fact and [t]he conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. . . . On appeal, the board must determine whether there is any evidence in the record to support the commissioner's findings and award. . . . Our scope of review of the actions of the [board] is [similarly] . . . limited. . . . [However] [t]he decision of the [board] must be correct in law, and it must not include facts found without evidence or fail to include material facts which are admitted or undisputed."

  4. Evanuska v. Danbury

    99 Conn. App. 42 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 3 times

    We therefore are bound by that finding. See Dixon v. United Illuminating Co., 57 Conn. App. 51, 63, 748 A.2d 300, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 908, 753 A.2d 940 (2000). The commissioner's factual findings nevertheless indicate that the plaintiffs' participation was required as a condition of their employment with the hose company.