Opinion
No. 110,581.
2015-03-13
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Antonio HOPKINS, Appellant.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. Dexter Burdette, Judge.Rick Kittel, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.Shawn M. Boyd, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. Dexter Burdette, Judge.
Rick Kittel, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Shawn M. Boyd, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., McANANY and SCHROEDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Antonio Hopkins appeals his convictions of aggravated burglary and aggravated battery. Hopkins claims the district court erred when it refused to allow him to present evidence at trial that would have impeached his accusers and supported his theory of defense. He also claims the district court erred by denying his multiple motions for mistrial. We agree with Hopkins that the district court erred when it refused to allow him to present evidence at trial that would have supported his theory of defense. We also find that the State has failed to establish that the error was harmless. Accordingly, we reverse Hopkins' convictions and remand for a new trial.
Factual and Procedural Background
On September 30, 2009, Danny Buie and Ricardo Eakright got together to drink beer, play cards, and listen to music at Buie's house. The evening ended with assailants breaking into Buie's home, stabbing Eakright repeatedly, and Buie escaping by jumping through a closed, second-story window. The accounts of the day given by Buie and Eakright differed, so they are related here separately.
Buie's trial testimony
According to Buie's trial testimony, on September 30, 2009, he met Eakright around 2:30 or 3 p.m. They spent the rest of the afternoon at Eakright's home, and they began walking toward Buie's house at approximately 7 or 7:30 that evening. On the way, they stopped at a liquor store and purchased two 40–ounce containers of malt liquor. As they continued toward Buie's house, two men approached them; one of the men was Hopkins, whom Buie had known for several months as a friend of his fiancee's son. Hopkins asked Eakright for his beer and when Eakright refused, Hopkins grabbed it. Eakright got behind Hopkins, held a knife to his throat, and threatened to cut his throat. Buie diffused the situation and after a few minutes Eakright stepped away. Hopkins assured Buie that the conflict was over, and Eakright and Buie continued to Buie's house, where they listened to music, played cards, and drank.
Shortly after 8 p.m., Buie heard a “big knock” at the front door and a man he knew as Chuck said, “ ‘Danny, you are wrong. Send a mother fucker out.... [S]end the honky out.’ “ Buie looked out the window and saw Chuck and at least five other people, including Hopkins. Buie knew Chuck was talking about Eakright because he was the only white person in the house. Hopkins and the others outside were very upset, yelling at Buie to send Eakright out “or else.”
At that point, someone kicked the door and threw a brick through the front window. Buie and Eakright started moving toward the kitchen at the back of the house, but they heard people at the back door as well. Buie looked out the kitchen window and saw several people, including Hopkins, holding bricks and rocks. Hopkins stood behind Chuck, who was trying to open a sliding glass door into the house.
When several rocks were thrown through the sliding glass door, Buie began running toward the stairs, but Eakright refused to follow him. As Buie made it to the top of the stairs, he turned and saw people, including Hopkins, inside his house. Believing that his fiancee and her son, who were upstairs in the home, would be okay and the people would leave if he got out of the house, Buie jumped through a closed, second-story window. The next thing he remembered, he was in an ambulance; he had glass in his face, a fractured wrist, and pain in his knees, and was hospitalized for several days.
Eakright's trial testimony
Eakright's trial testimony about the night in question was much less detailed. He testified that he met up with Buie in the evening and they ended up walking to a liquor store and then to Buie's house. Stating that his memory of that night was “real fuzzy” because he had been drinking alcohol and taking Xanax, an anti-anxiety medication for which he had a prescription, Eakright testified that he did not recall anything specific happening between the liquor store and Buie's house. After being asked again, Eakright remembered that “[s]ome guy that [Buie] knew approached us and grabbed my bottle of beer out of my hand.” Eakright said he took it back and told the man not to “ ‘just grab somebody's stuff without asking.’ “ Eakright did not recall pulling out a knife but admitted that he had a knife with him at the time and might have taken it out if he had felt threatened. When asked if he ever saw the man again, he said he did not know because he could not recall what the man looked like.
Eakright testified that he and Buie arrived at Buie's house around 10 p.m. Buie talked with some friends of his and, approximately 15 to 20 minutes after Buie's friends left, the glass in the patio door shattered and Eakright saw five or six men standing inside the house by the broken door. Eakright pulled out his knife, but did not remember anything after that. Eakright believed he was hit in the head; the next thing he remembered was waking up 10 days later in the hospital with multiple stab wounds and a lump on the back of his head. Eakright remained hospitalized for 16 days and suffered post-traumatic stress disorder.
Law enforcement investigation and criminal prosecution
The night of the attack, Detective Tiffany Burgtorf of the Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department, spoke with Buie at the hospital. Buie identified one of the men who broke into his home as “Antonio .” Buie told Burgtorf he would be willing to give a statement later and look at photographs, so Burgtorf left Buie her business card so Buie could contact her when he left the hospital.
Burgtorf also spoke with Eakright several weeks after the attack in November 2009, but he could not remember much about what had happened. Buie did not contact Burgtorf immediately after he left the hospital, and Burgtorf was unable to locate Buie again until September 2011. At that time, Buie made a recorded statement and looked through photo lineups, from which he identified Hopkins as involved in the attack.
On April 10, 2012, the State charged Hopkins with one count of aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated battery. The preliminary hearing occurred in July 2012, and Hopkins pled not guilty to both charges. Because the preliminary hearing testimony is critical to Hopkins' first issue on appeal, it will be related in detail below.
Hopkins' jury trial began on April 1, 2013. The State presented testimony from Buie and Eakright. In addition, a crime scene technician who had collected evidence on the night in question testified, and the State submitted photographs of Buie's house, showing property damage, knives found at the scene, and blood. Burgtorf testified about her interactions with Buie and Eakright, and the paramedic who treated Eakright testified about his injuries. After the State rested, Hopkins moved for a directed verdict on the aggravated battery charge, but the district court denied his motion.
Hopkins called his mother, Debbie Hopkins, who testified that September 30 is Hopkins' birthday and that on September 30, 2009, they had a family dinner for 15 to 20 people to celebrate, which lasted until 9 or 10 p.m. Debbie further testified that when she went to bed at approximately 10:30 p.m., Hopkins, who lived with her, was still home. Hopkins testified on his own behalf. He stated that he remembered September 30, 2009, because it was his birthday and his family came over to celebrate around 4 p.m. and stayed until 9 or 9:30 p.m., after which Hopkins stayed home and went to sleep around 11 p.m. He acknowledged knowing Buie but denied ever being in Buie's house. After Hopkins' testimony, the defense rested. The jury found Hopkins guilty as charged.
On May 17, 2013, the district court sentenced Hopkins to consecutive sentences of 69 months' imprisonment for the aggravated battery conviction and 34 months' imprisonment for the aggravated burglary conviction. Hopkins timely appealed the district court's judgment.
Did the District Court Improperly Exclude Evidence Supporting Hopkins' Theory of Defense?
Hopkins first argues that the district court erred when it refused to allow him to present evidence at trial that would have impeached his accusers and supported his theory of defense. To fully understand Hopkins' argument, some additional background information is necessary. At the preliminary hearing, Eakright testified that while he and Buie were at Buie's house at approximately 10 p.m. on the night in question, they met two black men who wanted to buy Xanax. Eakright had four or five Xanax pills, but because he did not want to sell the medication, he told Buie that he would not sell the pills for less than $5 each, which Eakright testified was up to 5 times the street value of the medication. Buie communicated the price to the men, and they left the residence. But Eakright testified that on their way out the door, the two men said, “We'll be back.” Eakright testified that approximately 20 minutes later, someone broke down the patio door and five black men came inside, beginning the melee that led to Eakright's injuries.
Eakright could not identify anyone from that night or say whether the two men who had inquired about Xanax were among the men who subsequently came into the house. However, Eakright agreed that it stood to reason that the two men who tried to buy Xanax were involved in the subsequent attack. Eakright's preliminary hearing testimony did not include any description of an altercation earlier in the evening between Hopkins and Eakright over beer. But Buie's preliminary hearing testimony described the beer incident between Hopkins and Eakright. Buie also testified that he remembered Eakright talking to someone about pills, but he did not know the details of the conversation.
When the case proceeded to trial, defense counsel pointed out in the opening statement that Buie previously had testified about the beer incident but Eakright had never mentioned it. Defense counsel attempted to point out that Eakright had testified about two black men who wanted to purchase his Xanax. At that point, the State objected and the following colloquy occurred out of the hearing of the jury:
“MR. BOYD [the prosecutor]: Judge, I don't think it is going to be relevant in this case. What ended up happening, what Mr. Eakright testified to at prelim was that while they were at the home, two men came by, one to purchase Xanax from him, that he has a prescription, that he wasn't the one to sell it. He doesn't know if those were the same people or any involved here. [Buie] doesn't really remember that, but I don't believe it is relevant in this case whether or not somebody tried to stop by the house to buy Xanax from the victim in this case.
“MR. LAMB [defense counsel]: He never mentioned any type of evidence in the incident, and Mr. Buie described what he mentioned happening that evening was his dealing with the Xanax, that the two young men said when they were leaving, ‘We will be back.’ Right after that, that's when the window was busted in. What we have is two contradicting stories by two individuals. That brings a question of the validity of what they are saying.”
After sending the jury out, the judge heard further arguments. The State argued that the Xanax incident was not relevant in this case because there was no evidence that the two men asking about Xanax were involved in the later crimes. The State acknowledged that Eakright had not identified Hopkins as his assailant but pointed out that Buie had identified Hopkins as the person who tried to take Eakright's beer, as one of the people outside Buie's house throwing rocks, and as a person inside Buie's house.
In response, Hopkins argued that Eakright's testimony at the preliminary hearing was contradictory to Buie's because Buie testified about the beer incident but Eakright did not testify about the beer incident. Also, Eakright testified about the Xanax incident, but Buie had little recollection of it. Defense counsel argued that it was “a theory of the defendant's case” that the two men who tried to buy Xanax from Eakright were involved in the subsequent attack, as opposed to Hopkins.
The judge engaged in an extensive discussion with the parties and ultimately ruled:
“[T]his is a red herring; it is tangential; it is prejudicial, and has no relevance to the charges pending against your client, and I will not allow it to be used in your defense in chief, in your direct or cross-examination of questions. I don't think it has anything to do with the State's charges against your client. So that's my ruling and that's my order.”
The State proceeded to call witnesses, including Eakright. During direct examination, Eakright testified about the beer incident, but he did not remember threatening anyone with a knife. During cross-examination, out of the jury's hearing, defense counsel again asked the judge for permission to question Eakright about the Xanax incident, arguing that Hopkins had the right to attack Eakright's credibility through prior inconsistent statements. The State again argued that the Xanax incident was irrelevant. Defense counsel protested that “it feels like they are getting to try their facts and we are not getting to try our facts.” The district court again ruled that any testimony about the alleged Xanax incident was irrelevant and inadmissible.
The Xanax incident arose again later in the trial. During direct examination of Burgtorf, the State asked about the statements Eakright had given her regarding the events of that night. In a sidebar conference during cross-examination, Hopkins asserted that Eakright also had told Burgtorf that two black men had approached him and asked “if he had anything, and he said no.” Hopkins argued that the State questioning Burgtorf about Eakright's statements to her opened the door for Hopkins to question her about whether Eakright said anything to her about the Xanax incident. The district court again ruled that evidence about the Xanax incident was inadmissible.
On appeal, Hopkins argues that the district court erred in excluding the evidence about the Xanax incident. He contends the district court denied him the opportunity to impeach the credibility of witnesses and to present relevant evidence of third parties who might have perpetrated the crimes. Hopkins argues that the district court's rulings violated his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights to present a full and complete defense. The State argues that the district court correctly found that the Xanax incident was irrelevant because there was no evidence connecting the two men involved in that incident to the crimes. The State also argues that any error in excluding the evidence was harmless.
“A claim that a defendant was denied the constitutional right to present a defense raises a question of law subject to de novo appellate review. [Citation omitted.]
“A defendant is entitled to present his or her theory of defense. The exclusion of evidence that is an integral part of that theory violates a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial. But that right is subject to statutory rules and caselaw interpreting the rules of evidence and procedure. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Maestas, 298 Kan. 765, 780–81, 316 P.3d 724 (2014).
Generally, when considering the admissibility of evidence, the first consideration is relevance because all relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise prohibited. See K.S.A. 60–407(f); State v. Burnett, 300 Kan. 419, 427, 329 P.3d 1169 (2014). Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.” State v. Bowen, 299 Kan. 339, Syl. ¶ 5, 323 P.3d 853 (2014). The determination of whether evidence is relevant encompasses a materiality element and a probative element. Evidence is material when the fact it supports is in dispute in the case; review for materiality is de novo. 299 Kan. at 348. Evidence is probative if it has any tendency to prove any material fact. State v. Lowrance, 298 Kan. 274, 289, 312 P.3d 328 (2013). An appellate court reviews the district court's assessment of the probative value of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Huddleston, 298 Kan. 941, 960, 318 P.3d 140 (2014).
Although the district court did not explicitly state findings on whether evidence about the Xanax incident was sufficiently material or probative, it clearly was relevant to challenge the credibility of the State's two prime witnesses. As Hopkins points out, his trial essentially was a credibility contest between Hopkins on the one hand and Buie and Eakright on the other. Hopkins wanted to introduce Eakright's preliminary hearing testimony to show the lack of consistency between Eakright and Buie's statements, thereby undermining the credibility of the witnesses. Credibility of witnesses may be a material fact in dispute in a case, and it appeared to be a material fact in dispute in Hopkins' case. See State v. Lloyd, 299 Kan. 620, 639, 325 P.3d 1122 (2014).
The evidence about the Xanax incident also was clearly relevant to another material fact in question: the identity of the perpetrators of the crimes. Testimony that there was an attempted drug transaction at Buie's house that ended with would-be buyers leaving and saying, “We'll be back,” 20 minutes prior to a group of men breaking down the door to Buie's house and attacking Eakright has a tendency to prove the identity of the people who may have committed the charged crimes. Because the evidence was relevant to both identity and credibility, the district court erred in excluding it as irrelevant.
This does not mean, however, that the evidence was admissible. As our Supreme Court has noted, “[i]f the evidence is relevant, the court next applies the statutory provisions governing admission or exclusion of evidence. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Smith, 299 Kan. 962, 969–70, 327 P.3d 441 (2014). Moreover, in the context of a defendant's right to present his or her theory of defense, “that right is subject to statutory rules and caselaw interpreting the rules of evidence and procedure. [Citation omitted.]” Maestas, 298 Kan. at 780–81.
One such rule governing the admission or exclusion of evidence is known as the third-party evidence rule which, in some instances, prevents the defendant from introducing evidence that some uncharged third party committed the crime unless there is sufficient evidence connecting the third party to the crime. Our Supreme Court recently addressed the third-party evidence rule in Burnett. In that case, a jury convicted Burnett of felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building, and criminal possession of a firearm after shots fired into a home killed a man inside. 300 Kan. at 422–24. On appeal, Burnett claimed that the district court erred in excluding his proffered evidence that other shootings had occurred at the house over the course of several months before and after the events that led to his convictions. Burnett claimed that the evidence “was essential to his defense of innocence at trial because it would have controverted the State's evidence indicating that he was the only person who had the motive and means of committing the crime.” 300 Kan. at 427. In evaluating Burnett's claim, the court stated:
“ ‘While evidence of the motive of a third party to commit the crime, standing alone, is not relevant, such evidence may be relevant if there is other evidence connecting the third party to the crime.’ [Citation omitted.] In other words, without additional evidence showing that a third party could have committed the crime ( e.g., presence at the crime scene, the opportunity and means to commit the crime), evidence merely suggesting that someone other than the defendant had a motive to commit the crime has little probative value and can be properly excluded at trial.” 300 Kan. at 431–32.
The Burnett court further stated: “ ‘A district court judge must evaluate the totality of facts and circumstances in a given case to determine whether the defense's proffered evidence effectively connects the third party to the crime charged.’ [Citation omitted.]” 300 Kan. at 432. To help determine whether Burnett's proffered evidence about the other drive-by shootings effectively connected a third party to the crimes for which Burnett was charged, the Burnett court looked to prior caselaw for guidance:
“In State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 531, 102 P.3d 445 (2004), rev'd on other grounds by Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006), ... Marsh was accused of killing a mother and her child, but there was also evidence that a third party—the husband and father of the victims—might have been involved in the murders. The Marsh court found that Marsh had proffered more than mere evidence of the husband's motive—the husband's blood and the blood of one of the victims had been found on Marsh's shoes. As a result, this court held Marsh's right to a fair trial had been violated by the trial court's exclusion of the third-party evidence. [Citation omitted].
“In [ State v. Evans, 275 Kan. 95, 62 P.3d 220 (2003) ], the defendant tried to admit evidence that another person was seen holding the murder weapon immediately after the fatal shot was fired. There was also evidence that this person admitted to shooting the victim and later removing his body. In holding that the district court erred in not admitting the third-party evidence, this court stated: ‘Circumstantial evidence that would be admissible and support a conviction if introduced by the State cannot be excluded by a court when offered by the defendant to prove his or her defense that another killed the victim.’ [Citation omitted.]
“In both Marsh and Evans, the defendants, in addition to proffering evidence of a third party's motive for committing the crime, proffered evidence showing that the third party was present at the crime scene. In contrast, in [ State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 264 P.3d 81 (2011) ], and State v. Adams, 280 Kan. 494, 505–07, 124 P.3d 19 (2005), though the defendants in each case had identified a third party with a possible motive for committing the crime, neither defendant could produce evidence placing the third party at the scene of the crime during the relevant time period. Accordingly, in both cases, this court found that the district court had not abused its discretion in excluding the proffered third-party evidence. [Citations omitted.]” 300 Kan. at 432–33.
The Burnett court ultimately found that Burnett's proffered evidence of other drive-by shootings at the same house had little probative value as to whether a third party other than Burnett was responsible for the shooting in question. 300 Kan. at 433. Thus, the court held that the evidence was properly excluded at trial. 300 Kan. at 433–34.
Burnett and the cases it cites demonstrate that in order for third-party evidence to be admissible, there must be evidence that effectively connects a third party to the crimes charged. Here, according to Eakright's preliminary hearing testimony, the two men involved in the Xanax incident were inside Buie's house; they were unsuccessful in their efforts to buy Eakright's pills; and they left, saying, “We'll be back.” A mere 20 minutes later, a group of men broke down the door to Buie's house and attacked Eakright. While this is not as strong a connection as existed in Marsh, where the victim's blood was on the third-party's shoe, or Evans, in which the third party was seen holding a gun after the fatal shot was fired, it is stronger than the evidence in Inkelaar or Adams, in which the third party was not connected at all to the specific scene or timeframe of the crime.
The State argues strenuously that Buie's clear identification of Hopkins as being involved in the attack and his failure to so identify the two would-be Xanax purchasers renders the third-party evidence irrelevant and inadmissible. But the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are questions for the jury to decide. See State v. Lopez, 299 Kan. 324, 328, 323 P.3d 1260 (2014) (“appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations”). After all, Hopkins vigorously disputes Buie's identification of Hopkins as being involved in the attack. And perhaps Hopkins could have placed the would-be Xanax purchasers back at the house during the subsequent attack had he been given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on this point at trial. As our Supreme Court has stated, “neither the district judge in the first instance nor we on appeal should focus on the strength of the State's case against a defendant when deciding the relevance of any third-party evidence that he or she has offered.” State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 202, 331 P.3d 544 (2014).
Eakright's preliminary hearing testimony established that the two men involved in the Xanax incident had a motive to commit the crimes for which Hopkins was charged, and the two men also were placed at the scene of the crimes nearly at the same time of the crimes. This evidence effectively connected the two men involved in the Xanax incident to the crimes for which Hopkins was charged. Even Eakright testified at the preliminary hearing that it stood to reason that the men involved in the Xanax incident were among the men who came back to the house and attacked him.
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise prohibited by statutory rules or caselaw. See K.S.A. 60–407(f). Hopkins' proffered evidence about the Xanax incident was just as relevant to the charges as the State's evidence about the prior beer incident. The evidence about both prior incidents should have been presented at trial with the weight of the evidence to be determined by the jury. The evidence about the Xanax incident, which was effectively connected to the crimes for which Hopkins was charged, was not subject to exclusion under the third-party evidence rule.
Hopkins argues that the exclusion of the evidence violated his constitutional right to present a full and complete defense. The United States Supreme Court recently considered the constitutional right to present a complete defense, stating:
“ ‘[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,’ “ [citations omitted] but we have also recognized that “ ‘state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials,’ “ [citations omitted]. Only rarely have we held that the right to present a complete defense was violated by the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of evidence. [Citations omitted.]” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1990, 1992, 186 L.Ed.2d 62 (2013).
As it recognized in Carr, the Kansas Supreme Court has at times referred to this right as “fundamental” or “absolute” but at other times has stated that it is “ ‘not absolute and on occasion will be overridden by “other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’ “ [Citations omitted.]” 300 Kan. at 208–09. The Carr court concluded:
“The right is fundamental but its protection tempered by sensible control of the criminal trial process. A defendant is entitled to a ‘meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,’ but the right is subject to procedural rules and evidentiary rulings that serve legitimate interests. [Citations omitted.] The right, a critical component of a fair trial, is violated when a district judge excludes relevant, admissible, noncumulative evidence that is an integral part of a defendant's theory of defense. [Citations omitted.]” 300 Kan. at 209–10.
Here, Hopkins' proffered evidence about the Xanax incident was relevant, admissible, and integral to his defense, which was that a third party may have committed the crimes. The State has not asserted any legitimate interest sufficient to overcome Hopkins' right to present this defense. Thus, we conclude the district court's exclusion of the third-party evidence violated Hopkins' constitutional right to present his defense.
We next turn to the State's argument that any error in the exclusion of the evidence was harmless. Our Supreme Court recently noted:
“The United States Supreme Court has held that denial of a defendant's right to present a defense is subject to the constitutional harmlessness standard. [Citation omitted.]
“Under the constitutional harmlessness standard, again, we must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no impact on the trial's outcome, i.e., there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. [Citation omitted.]
“The State, as the party benefitting from the alleged error, must demonstrate harmlessness.” Carr, 300 Kan. at 211.
In arguing harmless error, the State points out that Buie testified at trial that Eakright and Hopkins had been in an altercation over beer, Buie testified that the beer altercation occurred the same day as the attack at Buie's home, and Buie identified Hopkins as one of the people in the angry crowd outside his home and one of the people inside his home after the crowd entered. On the other hand, as Hopkins points out to this court, introduction of Eakright's prior statements about the failed Xanax incident not only would have provided evidence that an uncharged third party may have committed the crimes, but the evidence also would have undermined the credibility of the State's two main witnesses. The strength of the State's case against Hopkins certainly was not overwhelming. Eakright never identified Hopkins as being his attacker or even as being one of the men at Buie's house on the night in question. Although Buie identified Hopkins as being at the house, this testimony was hotly disputed by Hopkins and his alibi witness. There was no physical evidence connecting Hopkins to the crimes charged.
Under the applicable constitutional harmless error standard, we conclude the State has failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the exclusion of the evidence at issue did not affect the outcome of the trial. Thus, we reverse Hopkins' convictions and remand for a new trial. Because our ruling on this issue is dispositive, we need not address the second issue that the district court erred in denying Hopkins' motions for mistrial.
Reversed and remanded.