Opinion
CR8833902 CR8833903
02-27-2018
State of Connecticut v. Anthony Hopkins
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
File Date: February 28, 2018
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Devlin, Robert J., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE
ROBERT J. DEVLIN, Jr., JUDGE
A jury convicted the defendant, Anthony Hopkins, in docket CR88-33902, of burglary first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101. Thereafter in a separate jury trial, he was convicted of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c. The same judge (G. Sarsfield Ford) presided over both trials. Following the guilty verdict on felony murder in the second trial, Judge Ford imposed sentence in both cases. On the burglary first degree conviction, Judge Ford imposed a twelve-year sentence and on the felony murder conviction the judge imposed a fifty-year consecutive sentence for a total effective sentence (TES) of sixty-two years. In the present motion, the defendant asserts that this sentence is illegal because Judge Ford imposed consecutive sentences as described above. At oral argument on the present motion, the defendant made three additional claims: (1) it was improper for Judge Ford to preside over both trials, (2) Judge Ford signed an arrest warrant for the defendant in a case for which he was ultimately released, and (3) the Department of Correction (DOC) is improperly administering his sentence with respect to time credits and parole.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion must be denied as to the consecutive sentences claim and dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction as to the other claims.
DISCUSSION
I
The defendant’s claim with respect to the imposition of consecutive sentences is unclear. On page one of his motion, he asserts that running sentences consecutive to one another for separate cases is illegal. On page two, however, he seems to suggest that the order of sentences renders the TES illegal. That is, it was illegal to run the felony murder sentence consecutive to the burglary case as opposed to the other way around. Regardless of how the claim is framed, it lacks merit.
Under Connecticut law, a court, in its discretion, is authorized to impose consecutive sentences. General Statutes § 53a-37 provides:
When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time ... the ... sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other ... in such manner as the court directs at the time of sentence.
Judge Ford acted within his discretion in imposing the felony murder sentence to run consecutively to the burglary first degree sentence. Of course, he could have run the burglary first degree sentence consecutive to the felony murder sentence. Either way, the total effective sentence would be sixty-two years which is a legal sentence.
II
The defendant’s other claims- that it was improper for Judge Ford to preside at both trials, Judge Ford had signed an arrest warrant for the defendant in a case where he was ultimately released and that the DOC is improperly administering his sentence- concern matters for which this court lacks jurisdiction.
Practice Book § 43-22 authorizes the judicial authority to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. This section provides an exception to the general rule that a sentence may not be modified once judgment enters. Our Supreme Court has explained this principle as follows: " A generally accepted rule of the common law is that a sentence cannot be modified by the trial court ... if the sentence was valid and execution of it has commenced." State v. Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 834 (2010). On the other hand, if a court imposes an invalid sentence, it retains jurisdiction to substitute a valid sentence. Id., 835. Stated differently, a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence. Id. Connecticut practice is consistent with the common-law meaning of illegality, permitting correction of both illegal sentences and sentences imposed in an illegal manner. Id., 837.
An " illegal sentence" is essentially one that exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant’s right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous or internally contradictory. Id., 839.
A sentence " imposed in an illegal manner" is one that (while within the relevant statutory limits) is imposed in a way that violates a defendant’s right to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment, or the right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely on the record or the right that the government keep its plea agreement promises. Id. The above examples are not exhaustive but rather illustrate the fundamental proposition that the defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence.
It is useful to bear in mind that " a challenge to the legality of a sentence focuses not on what transpired during the trial or on the underlying conviction. In order for the court to have jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal sentence after the sentence has been executed, the sentencing proceeding and not the trial leading to the conviction, must be the subject of the attack." State v. Lawrence, 281 Conn. 147, 158 (2007).
The defendant’s claims concerning Judge Ford presiding over both trials and signing an arrest warrant have nothing to do with his sentence but rather concern his underlying conviction. As such, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider them.
The same situation applies with respect to the defendant’s claims regarding how the DOC is administering his sentence. Again, our Supreme Court has made clear that the superior court only has jurisdiction to consider the merits of a motion to correct illegal sentence where the sentencing proceeding itself is the subject of the attack. Id.
This limitation on the court’s jurisdiction is evident from the case of State v. Carmona, 104 Conn.App. 828, 832 (2007). In Carmona, the defendant claimed that the DOC had improperly added 177 days to his sentence based on a change in the law regarding the application of presentence confinement credit. The Appellate Court ruled that there was no jurisdiction to consider this claim under a motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22. Id. The defendant’s assertion in the present motion is the functional equivalent of the claim found to be outside the court’s jurisdiction in Carmona .
For the reasons set forth above, to the extent that the present motion is based on a claim that the consecutive sentences imposed render the sentence illegal, the motion is denied. To the extent the motion is based on the other claims described above the motion is dismissed based on a lack of jurisdiction.
So Ordered.