As long as the court considers the appropriate statutory factors and there is some rational basis in the record to support the court's findings when applying those factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction. See R.C. 2152.12(B); Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d at 95-96, 547 N.E.2d 1181; State v. Douglas (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 36-37, 20 OBR 282, 485 N.E.2d 711; State v. Hopfer (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 535-536, 679 N.E.2d 321. The appropriate test is not whether we would have reached the same result; rather, the question is whether the court abused the discretion that the legislature has provided it.
The determination of what constitutes custody does not depend upon the subjective feelings of the accused or the unarticulated subjective goals of law enforcement. Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 442; State v. Hopfer (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 545-546. Rather, the focus is upon the perception a reasonable person would have under the circumstances.
A view of a crime scene is not considered evidence, nor is it a crucial step in the criminal proceedings. State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 367, 595 N.E.2d 915, 927(1992), overruled on other grounds State v. McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 1997-Ohio-335, 686 N.E.2d 1112; Accord State v. Smith, 90 Ohio App.3d 177, 180, 628 N.E.2d 120, 121(12th Dist.1993); State v. Hopner, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 542, 679 N.E.2d 321(2nd Dist.1996). The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to authorize a view of the crime scene.
See State v. Maranda, 94 Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038 (1916), paragraph two of the syllabus. The rule "requires some evidence that a crime was, in fact, committed." State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 561, 679 N.E.2d 321 (2d Dist.1996). While the burden on the state to provide evidence of the corpus delicti is minimal, it is well established that there must be "some evidence outside of the confession that tends to prove some material element of the crime charged." (Emphasis added.)
"In reviewing circumstances suggesting juror misconduct, we must employ a two-tier analysis: (1) determine whether there was juror misconduct and (2) if juror misconduct is found, determine whether it materially affected the defendant's substantial rights." State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 543, 679 N.E.2d 321 (2d Dist.1996). It is well established that "the party complaining about juror misconduct must establish prejudice."
Id.; State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 548 (2d Dist.1996), quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 653 (4th Dist.1994). Consequently, this Court accepts a trial court's findings of fact if supported by competent, credible evidence.
{¶40} "As long as the court considers the appropriate statutory factors and there is some rational basis in the record to support the court's findings when applying those factors, we cannot conclude that the [juvenile] court abused its discretion in deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction." State v. West, 167 Ohio App.3d 598, 2006-Ohio-3518, 856 N.E.2d 285 (4th Dist.), ¶ 10, citing R.C. 2152.12(B); State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 95-96, 547 N.E.2d 1181(1989); State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 36-37, 485 N.E.2d 711 (1985); and State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 535-536, 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist. 1996). In this broad assessment, any one particular circumstance may carry more weight than other circumstances.
{¶ 48} “As long as the court considers the appropriate statutory factors and there is some rational basis in the record to support the court's findings when applying those factors, we cannot conclude that the [juvenile] court abused its discretion in deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction.” State v. West, 167 Ohio App.3d 598, 856 N.E.2d 285, 2006-Ohio-3518, ¶ 10, citing R.C. 2152.12(B) ; State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 36–37, 485 N.E.2d 711 (1985) ; and State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 535–536, 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996). In this broad assessment, any one particular circumstance may carry more weight than other circumstances.
{¶ 3} When ruling on a motion to suppress, "the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses." State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 548, 679 N.E.2d 321 (2d Dist.1996), quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 653, 645 N.E.2d 831 (4th Dist.1994). In reviewing a trial court's decision on the motion to suppress, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact as true, if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.
{¶ 12} In regards to a motion to suppress, "the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses." State v. Hopfer (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 548, quoting State v. Venham (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 653. The court of appeals must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.