State v. Hooper

36 Citing cases

  1. State v. Baker

    No. COA15-600 (N.C. Ct. App. May. 3, 2016)

    (Emphasis added.) The State argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction over defendant's appeal, citing State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 591 S.E.2d 514 (2004). In Hooper, the Supreme Court held that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-272(d), which allows appeal directly to the Court of Appeals, applies only to appeals from guilty pleas and does not apply to appeals from decisions in district court revoking probation.

  2. State v. Giese

    900 S.E.2d 881 (N.C. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Because the State has an "elevated responsibility to seek justice above all other ends," a DA—as its mouthpiece—does too. State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 127, 591 S.E.2d 514 (2004). Thus, the State and DAs alike "win[ ] [their] point whenever justice is done."

  3. State v. Pennell

    746 S.E.2d 431 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 5 times

    Following Caudle, our Supreme Court addressed appeals from revocation of probation concerning: whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold revocation hearing in a certain county and, if not, whether statute determining where probation revocation hearing could take place violated the United States Constitution, State v. Braswell, 283 N.C. 332, 335, 196 S.E.2d 185, 186–87 (1973); the amount of credit for time served applied after probation has been revoked, State v. Farris, 336 N.C. 552, 553, 444 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1994); whether N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1347 vested jurisdiction for appeal from district court probation revocation in superior court or Court of Appeals, State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 122–24, 591 S.E.2d 514, 514–16 (2004); and whether the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke probation after the probationary period had ended, State v. Bryant, 361 N.C. 100, 105, 637 S.E.2d 532, 536 (2006) (“we can reach no conclusion other than that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation due to its failure and inability to make the statutorily mandated finding of fact”).

  4. State v. Mangum

    713 S.E.2d 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011)

    A defendant's appeal of a district court's revocation of his probation is properly to the superior court division rather than to the Court of Appeals. State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 127, 591 S.E.2d 514, 517-18 (2004); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1347 (2009) ("When a district court judge, as a result of a finding of a violation of probation, activates a sentence . . ., the defendant may appeal to the superior court for a de novo revocation hearing."). In this case, Mangum's appeal seems to have completely bypassed the superior court. Although Judge Holcombe ordered a hearing in the superior court "for determination as to whether appeal is timely," there is no evidence of such a hearing in the record on appeal. Further, despite the finding on the Appellate Entries form that Mangum had given notice of appeal to this Court, there is no notice of appeal in the record.

  5. State v. Jenkins

    No. COA09-1347 (N.C. Ct. App. Jul. 1, 2010)

    Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that, "when the district court revokes a Defendant's probation, that defendant's appeal is to the superior court." State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 122-23, 591 S.E.2d 514, 515 (2004). In this instance, Defendant's probation was revoked by the district court. As a result, Defendant's appeal lay to the Johnston County Superior Court rather than this Court, depriving us of jurisdiction to hear Defendant's challenge to the revocation of his probation.

  6. Bernard v. Davis

    NO. 5:09-HC-2092-FL (E.D.N.C. Sep. 29, 2010)   Cited 1 times

    In North Carolina, a party is not permitted to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. In re Crawford, 134 N.C. App. 137, 142, 517 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1999); N.C.R.App.P. 10(b)(1);State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 322, 372 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1988) (holding that a defendant may not raise a constitutional issue on appeal not presented to the trial court), abrogated on other grounds recognized by, State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122,591 S.E.2d 514 (2004); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465,496,356 S.E.2d 279, 298, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987) (finding that theory not presented to trial court and first raised on appeal not properly before appellate court). Petitioner did not raise his theory regarding the affidavits from Denise Bailey or Alethea Crawford in the trial court.

  7. Moore v. Stirling

    436 S.C. 207 (S.C. 2022)   Cited 5 times
    Clarifying State v. Copeland , 278 S.C. 572, 591, 300 S.E.2d 63, 74

    Unlike the path taken by this Court over the years, the North Carolina Supreme Court has found at least eight death sentences disproportionate during the modern era.SeeState v. Roache , 358 N.C. 243, 595 S.E.2d 381, 435 (2004) (listing the eight cases where a death sentence was determined to be disproportionate); see alsoState v. Benson , 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517, 523 (1988) (vacating a death sentence after noting the vast majority of robbery-murders end with life sentences and of those that end with death sentences, the vast majority involve multiple victims), abrogated on other grounds byState v. Hooper , 358 N.C. 122, 591 S.E.2d 514 (2004). Moreover, state supreme courts in Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Utah have all vacated at least one death sentence pursuant to comparative proportionality review.

  8. State v. Langley

    371 N.C. 389 (N.C. 2018)   Cited 17 times
    Recognizing that "[w]hen a defendant is indicted for a criminal offense, he may be convicted of the charged offense or a lesser included offense when the greater offense charged in the bill of indictment contains all of the essential elements of the lesser"

    Id . at 258, 794 S.E.2d at 792 (quoting Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson , 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001) ). "Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning." State v. Hooper , 358 N.C. 122, 125, 591 S.E.2d 514, 516 (2004) (quoting Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc. , 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990) ). "[I]t is our duty to give effect to the words actually used in a statute and not to delete words used or to insert words not used." Lunsford v. Mills , 367 N.C. 618, 623, 766 S.E.2d 297, 301 (2014) (citations omitted).

  9. State v. Lebedev

    895 S.E.2d 455 (N.C. Ct. App. 2023)

    Both the plain language of section 15A-146 and this Court’s precedent preclude defendant’s arguments to the contrary. See State ?. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 125, 591 S.E.2d 514, 516 (2004) ("Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning."). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders on grounds that each petition for expunction only listed one charge to be expunged, not multiple, and that section 15A-146(al) plainly does not provide defendant with relief.

  10. N.C. Citizens for Transparent Gov't v. The Vill. of Pinehurst

    No. COA23-69 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2023)

    However, when determining what claims the 45-day statute of limitations period in N.C. G.S. § 143-318.16A applies to, we must adhere to well-established principles of statutory construction which dictate that, "[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning." State v. Langley, 371 N.C. 389, 395 (2018) (quoting State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 125 (2004)). N.C. G.S. § 143-318.16A, entitled "Additional remedies for violations of Article," states: