Opinion
(December Term, 1864.)
Buying of and receiving from a slave corn or other forbidden article on the slave's own account, the owner of the slave being present and knowing what is done, and giving no written permission, the buyer and the slave being unaware of his presence, is indictable under section 85, ch. 34, Rev. Code.
INDICTMENT against the defendant for buying of and receiving from a slave belonging to F. B. Moore, a certain quantity of corn, against the act of the General Assembly (Rev. Code, ch. 34, sec. 85), tried before Heath, J., at IREDELL Fall Term, 1864.
On the part of the State there was evidence tending to show that the slave, in the night-time, carried a bag of corn near to the defendant's house and threw two stones on the roof of the house, and the defendant came out of the house on the second stone being thrown, and received the corn. The master of the slave and the witness for the State, suspecting that the slave was carrying the corn to the defendant for the purpose of selling it to him, followed the slave, and was near him when the corn was sold and delivered, and saw the sale and delivery. When the corn was delivered to the defendant, he handed something to the slave, but the witness did not know what. The defendant did not know of the master's presence.
The defense was that as the master was present at the sale and delivery, they were his acts, and not those of the slave.
The judge charged the jury that if the sale and delivery, one or both, were made by the slave as described by the witness, and the defendant did not know at the time that the master was present, the presence of the master made no difference, and the defendant was guilty; and from the judgment accordingly, he appealed.
Attorney-General for the State.
No counsel for defendant. (447)
The principle assumed by the counsel in the court below, that the master may sell and deliver corn by the hands of his slave, he (the master) being present and directing it, is too plain to admit of contradiction; but this is not the case presented upon the record.
The master was, indeed, within view of the transaction between his slave and the defendant; but there is no evidence that either defendant or the slave knew of his being there; much less is there any evidence that the master authorized the act. All the case states, bearing upon this point, is that the master followed the slave because he suspected that he was going to trade with the defendant, and was in view of the trading when it occurred.
The delivery of the corn was made in the night-time, by the slave, upon a private interview procured by unusual signals, and may be presumed, under the circumstances, to have been on the slave's own account, unless the contrary appear. Such a delivery, without a written permission, is against the criminal law, although the owner or manager was cognizant of it and consenting to it. This is decided in S. v. Hart, 26 N.C. 246, and is now approved.
Without impugning, therefore, the position that a slave may lawfully, without a written license, deliver corn in his master's name and on his master's account, provided his master constitutes him his agent for such purpose, and it so appears on the proofs; yet it is clear that all other trading with or acceptance from a slave of corn or other forbidden article, without permission in writing, is unlawful.
The point, then, presented is whether a delivery of corn by a slave, on his own (the slave's) account, the owner being present and observing the transaction, but giving no permission in writing, is a (448) violation of the criminal law. The judge below instructed the jury it was, and in this we concur.
PER CURIAM. No error.