Opinion
2014-UP-319
08-06-2014
State of South Carolina, Respondent, v. Lauri Danielle Hollis, Appellant.
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Attorney General Kaycie Smith Timmons, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Submitted July 1, 2014
Appeal From Spartanburg County Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge No. 2012-213139
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Attorney General Kaycie Smith Timmons, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM
Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648 ("If there is . . . substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, [this c]ourt must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Moore, 374 S.C. 468, 476, 649 S.E.2d 84, 88 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Robbery is defined as the felonious or unlawful taking of . . . personal property of any value from the person of another . . . by violence . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Muldrow, 348 S.C. 264, 267, 559 S.E.2d 847, 849 (2002) (defining armed robbery as the commission of robbery plus the additional element "that the robber was armed with a deadly weapon"); State v. Thompson, 374 S.C. 257, 261-62, 647 S.E.2d 702, 704-05 (Ct. App. 2007) (stating that "under the hand of one is the hand of all theory [of accomplice liability], "presence at the scene of a crime by pre-arrangement to aid, encourage, or abet in the perpetration of the crime constitutes guilt as a [principal]" (alterations by court) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
WILLIAMS, KONDUROS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.