Summary
In Holliday, the police broadcast that there was a hit-and-run accident involving a red Ford Mustang. The Officer responded to the dispatch and within minutes pulled over Defendant, who was driving a red Mustang. The Officer knew the color, make, and model of the car, a red Ford Mustang, involved in the hit and run and found Defendant's car less than one-tenth of a mile from the location of the hit and run.
Summary of this case from State v. BakerOpinion
No. COA12–1401.
2013-07-16
STATE of North Carolina v. Casey Branton HOLLIDAY.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General J. Joy Strickland, for the State. The Robinson Law Firm, P.A., by Leslie S. Robinson, for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 29 May 2012 by Judge Cy A. Grant in Pitt County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 April 2013. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General J. Joy Strickland, for the State. The Robinson Law Firm, P.A., by Leslie S. Robinson, for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, JR., ROBERT N., Judge.
Casey Branton Holliday (“Defendant”) appeals from a judgment entered 29 May 2012 following his plea of guilty after the denial of his motion to suppress on 23 April 2012. Defendant contends incriminating evidence seized pursuant to a traffic stop should have been suppressed. He argues that critical findings of fact lack evidentiary support and therefore the trial court erred in concluding the officer had a reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant. We disagree and affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.
I. Factual & Procedural History
At approximately 3:30 a.m. on 20 November 2009, Hannah Jessup stopped her car for a red light at the intersection of Tenth Street and Greenville Boulevard in Greenville. A burgundy Ford Mustang hit the back right corner of Ms. Jessup's car, backed up, went around Ms. Jessup's car, and left the scene. Ms. Jessup called 911, telling the operator that a red Mustang had hit her car and fled.
Defendant inserts quotation marks around “red Mustang” and “burgundy Mustang” in his brief. To the extent Defendant is suggesting that there is a difference between “red” and “burgundy” and that this distinction should impact our analysis, we disagree. Burgundy is defined as “[a] dark grayish or blackish red to dark purplish red or reddish brown.” Am. Heritage College Dictionary (3d ed. Houghton Mifflin 1993) (emphasis added). It is clear that burgundy is a shade of red and there is no significance to the usage of either word in place of the other in the record and transcript.
The police dispatcher broadcast that there was a hit-and-run accident involving a red Ford Mustang. Officer Allen Roebuck of the Greenville Police Department responded to the dispatch in the area of East Tenth Street and Greenville Boulevard. Within minutes, Officer Roebuck observed a red Mustang exiting the SunChase Apartment complex, which is one-tenth of a mile from the intersection. Officer Roebuck pulled over Defendant, who was driving this red Mustang. Officer Roebuck testified that there was not a lot of traffic that morning and that he saw no other red or burgundy Mustangs.
Following the traffic stop, Defendant was charged with driving while impaired based on information obtained by Officer Roebuck during the stop. On 30 December 2011, Defendant filed a motion to suppress with the Superior Court based on there being “no reasonable or articulable suspicion to stop defendant's motor vehicle.” On 23 April 2012, the Superior Court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. After preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, Defendant entered a guilty plea on 29 May 2012. Defendant was sentenced to 60 days imprisonment, suspended for 12 months of unsupervised probation. Defendant gave timely notice of appeal to this Court.
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
As Defendant appeals from the final judgment of a superior court, an appeal of right lies with this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A–27(b) (2011).
Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge's underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). “A trial court's findings of fact ... are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.” State v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 745, 445 S.E.2d 917, 926 (1994). “The trial court's conclusions of law ... are fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that critical findings of fact were not supported by competent evidence and that the trial court erred in finding there was reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Defendant's Mustang. We disagree.
“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence. Only some minimal level of objective justification is required.” State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614, 618, 669 S.E.2d 564, 567 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A court considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion. Id.
There is clear evidence for the findings of fact that Officer Roebuck: (1) knew the color, make, and model of the car involved in the hit-and-run (red Ford Mustang); (2) was in close proximity physically to the hit-and-run (less than one-tenth of a mile); and (3) stopped Defendant's vehicle within minutes of the dispatch at a time where there was not a lot of traffic and there were no other vehicles of that description in the area. In fact, Defendant does not challenge these findings of fact.
Defendant relies on State v. Cooper, 186 N.C.App. 100, 649 S .E.2d 664 (2007), for the proposition that Officer Roebuck lacked reasonable suspicion. In Cooper, the report heard by the officer was that there was a convenience store robbery committed by a black male. Id. at 101, 649 S.E.2d at 665. The officer knew that there was a path running from the convenience store to a road a quarter mile away. Id. at 102, 649 S.E.2d at 665. The officer found the defendant on that road, stopped him, and frisked him. Id. at 102, 649 S.E.2d at 666. This Court found that there was only a “hunch or a generalized suspicion” based on the officer's limited knowledge. Id. at 107, 649 S.E.2d at 669 (finding that to do otherwise would be to hold that “police, in the time frame immediately following a robbery committed by a black male, could stop any black male found within a quarter of a mile of the robbery”). The Court also noted that the defendant was walking on a public street in April at 6:30 p.m. Id. at 107, 649 S.E.2d at 664.
The present case is not analogous to Cooper. Unlike the description in Cooper of a black male, the description in the present case was much more narrow, that of a car's specific color, make, and model. Unlike Cooper, which occurred at 6:30 p.m., the hit-and-run accident in the present case happened around 3:30 a.m. in an area with very little traffic. Defendant was found less than one-tenth of a mile from the accident within minutes of the dispatch. We find it reasonable that police would stop a car matching the color, make, and model described in the dispatch in very little traffic considering the time frame and distance in the present case. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Roebuck had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant.
Defendant challenges a number of findings of fact on the basis that the only information Officer Roebuck had at the time of the stop was that a burgundy Mustang was involved in a hit-and-run at Tenth Street and Greenville Boulevard. Defendant argues that there is no evidence of Officer Roebuck receiving any other information prior to the stop and that any information obtained following the stop is not relevant to the determination of whether Officer Roebuck had reasonable suspicion.
We agree with Defendant that any information received after the stop is not relevant to our inquiry. However, the trial court's additional findings of fact based upon information obtained following the stop, including that Defendant was in fact the driver of the vehicle which hit Ms. Jessup and that Ms. Jessup later identified the vehicle, are surplusage. As stated above, the undisputed facts support the conclusion that Officer Roebuck had reasonable suspicion to stop the Mustang.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is
Affirmed. Judges BRYANT and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).