State v. Hodges

32 Citing cases

  1. State v. Alexander

    729 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 5 times
    Holding the rules regarding whether a spouse is allowed to testify under section 546.260 to be procedural

    Danaher v. Smith, 666 S.W.2d 452, 456 [3, 4] (Mo.App. 1984). Though State v. Hodges, 586 S.W.2d 420, 425[6] (Mo.App. 1979), refers to the question as one of privilege, in this case there was no privileged husband-to-wife communication in issue. Rather, the question is one of what class of person is competent to testify, and therefore the statute deciding that question vested no substantive rights.

  2. State v. Walker

    616 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1981)   Cited 22 times
    In State v. Walker, 616 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. banc 1981) the Missouri Supreme Court sets out the standards to be used in determining if a decision creating a new rule of law is to be applied retrospectively or prospectively, in the event the Supreme Court fails to so indicate in the opinion.

    However, if the Court fails to indicate in the decision creating the new rule whether that rule is to be applied retrospectively or prospectively, then this determination hinges on whether the new rule of law is procedural or substantive. Shepherd v. Consumers Cooperative Association, 384 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo. banc 1964); Barker v. St. Louis County, 340 Mo. 986, 1001, 104 S.W.2d 371, 377-78 (Mo. 1937); Koebel v. Tieman Coal Material Co., 337 Mo. 561, 570-71, 85 S.W.2d 519, 524 (Mo. 1935); State v. Hodges, 586 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Mo.App. 1979); Durham v. State, 571 S.W.2d 673, 676-77 (Mo.App. 1978). If the new rule is procedural, it is given prospective application only. Moore v. Ready Mixed Concrete Company, 329 S.W.2d 14, 24 (Mo. banc 1959). If the new rule is substantive, it is given both retrospective and prospective application. Dietz v. Humphreys, 507 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Mo. 1974); Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659, 671-72 (Mo.App. 1978).

  3. State v. Alexander

    505 S.W.3d 384 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 37 times
    Finding intent can be inferred from use of deadly weapon on a vital part of victim’s body

    It is not error for a prosecutor to refer to evidence in an opening statement, even if that evidence is later excluded, if the evidence mentioned is arguably admissible and the prosecutor acts in good faith—with reasonable grounds for believing he will be able to introduce such evidence. McFadden , 391 S.W.3d at 430 ; State v. Debler , 856 S.W.2d 641, 656 (Mo. banc 1993) ; State v. Hodges , 586 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Mo. App. E.D. 1979). In contrast, a prosecutor commits error if he acts in bad faith by deliberately promising proof of evidence which is altogether inadmissible.

  4. State v. Grayson

    668 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 6 times

    The trial court sustained appellant's objection to this line of argument and instructed the jury to disregard the comment. What this court stated in State v. Hodges, 586 S.W.2d 420 (Mo.App. 1979) regarding a claim that only a mistrial would cure an improper argument applies with equal force here: The trial court, however, has broad discretion in deciding whether improper argument necessitates a mistrial.

  5. State v. Hurt

    668 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 23 times
    In State v. Hurt, 668 S.W.2d 206 (Mo.App. 1984), a case remarkably similar to this one, a penitentiary inmate was found stabbed to death in his cell seconds after his cellmate had departed for "evening yard."

    The state should not apply personal epithets to a defendant or otherwise abuse him in such a manner to inflame the jury or appeal to prejudice. State v. Hodges, 586 S.W.2d 420 (Mo.App. 1979). However, what may appear to be an epithet, may constitute the expression of a conclusion urged upon the basis of the evidence.

  6. Norman v. Bowersox

    No. 14-3089-CV-S-DGK (W.D. Mo. Jan. 12, 2015)

    Motive can be important in a murder case based on circumstantial evidence, but it is not an element of the crime. State v. Hodges, 586 S.W.2d 420, 429 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). Further, there was evidence from which the jury could have inferred motive.

  7. State v. Brooks

    618 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1981)   Cited 97 times
    Holding that prosecutor's statement in oral argument that confidential informants had told police officers that the defendant had been selling narcotics out of his house was permissible because evidence of that fact would be "arguably admissible" at trial to explain the police officer's surveillance of the defendant's house

    When the issue concerns the trial court's exercise of discretion relative to opening statements, no error requiring reversal will be found if a challenged statement refers to arguably admissible evidence and the reference was made in good faith with a reasonable expectation the evidence will be produced. State v. Browner, 587 S.W.2d 948, 952-53 (Mo. App. 1979); State v. Hodges, 586 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Mo.App. 1979); State v. Thomas, 526 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Mo.App. 1975). Here evidence as to the informant's observations was "arguably admissible", as the officer's testimony was offered not to prove that the information received was true but rather to explain his surveillance of the house.

  8. State v. Shafer

    609 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1980)   Cited 20 times
    In Shafer, the court applied the decision prospectively-only not because Euell used the words "should no longer be followed", but because Euell worked a procedural change in the law.

    Rules proscribing testimony because of privilege are not considered substantive but rather procedural rules of evidence pertaining to exclusion of particular testimony. State v. Hodges, 586 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Mo.App. 1979). Such procedural changes are given prospective effect only, Barker v. St. Louis County, 340 Mo. 986, 104 S.W.2d 371, 377-78 (1937); Dietz v. Humphreys, 507 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Mo. 1974), and in appropriate cases substantive changes too may be made prospective.

  9. State v. Norman

    243 S.W.3d 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 19 times
    In Norman, 243 S.W.3d at 470, the Southern District noted the little prejudicial effect of the weapons admitted as evidence by explaining that defense counsel had asked during voir dire if anyone would hold the defendant's gun ownership against him, and that no one responded.

    Motive can be important in a murder case based on circumstantial evidence, but it is not an element of the crime. State v. Hodges, 586 S.W.2d 420, 429 (Mo.App. 1979). Further, there was evidence from which the jury could have inferred motive.

  10. State v. George

    921 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 18 times
    Refusing to apply the rule to conflicts between the victim's testimony and the victim's out-of-court statements

    However, a prosecutor can refer to a defendant as a bum if the facts of the case show that he was in fact, an indigent transient, State v. Gartrell, 171 Mo. 489, 71 S.W. 1045 (1903), brandish a butcher knife alleged to be defendant's, State v. Luallen, 654 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo.App. 1983), employ a degree of dramatics, State v. Edmonds, 347 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. 1961). Although generally speaking the use of the word "monster" in the context of an opening statement is erroneous, State v. Hodges, 586 S.W.2d 420, 427 (Mo.App. 1979), it was not so prejudicial as to require reversal under plain error review. See Rule 30.20.