Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3351-12T1
08-15-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DARTANIAN M. HOAGLAND, a/k/a MILAN D. HOAGLAND, DARTANIAN MILAN HOAGLAND, DARELLE JONES, MILAN HOAGLAND, DARTANION HOAGLAND, CLARENCE HOAGLAND, DARTANYA HOAGLAND, JEFFREY HOAGLAND, VICTOR HOAGLAND, WILLIAM D. HOAGLAND, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Charles H. Landesman, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Andrew C. Carey, Acting Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Brian D. Gillet, Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Lihotz and Guadagno. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment Nos. 08-06-1091 and 08-09-1492. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Charles H. Landesman, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Andrew C. Carey, Acting Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Brian D. Gillet, Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Dartanian M. Hoagland appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) and his request for an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, he argues counsel was ineffective in providing legal advice regarding his guilty plea. We have considered the arguments presented in light of the record and applicable law. We affirm.
These facts are found in the motion record. In December 2007, defendant kicked out a window of his residence at the University Behavioral Health Care facility at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ). When UMDNJ police officers arrived, defendant "appeared to be agitated and uncooperative." He resisted police efforts to subdue him. Defendant was charged under Indictment No. 08-06-1091, with third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5) (count one), and third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3) (count two).
On June 8, 2008, defendant stabbed his sister-in-law five times with a large steak knife during a service at the Friendship Christian Church in New Brunswick. The victim was taken to the hospital to treat stab wounds to her right tricep and upper right body area. Defendant fled the area and was subsequently found and arrested by police. Defendant admitted he stabbed his sister-in-law, but asserted he was under the influence of drugs and suffered from mental health problems.
Defendant was charged under Indictment No. 08-09-1492 with second-degree aggravated assault, purposely or knowingly attempting to cause serious bodily injury (SBI) to another, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (count one); fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(3) (count two); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count three); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count four), and fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-13 (count five).
Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement disposing of all charges in both indictments. On June 18, 2009, defendant pled guilty to third-degree resisting arrest on Indictment No. 08-06-1091 and second-degree aggravated assault and fourth-degree aggravated assault on Indictment No. 08-09-1492. The remaining counts set forth in the two indictments were dismissed. On August 21, 2009, the judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of seven years subject to the 85% parole ineligibility period of the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Further, the judge imposed three years parole supervision and applicable fines and assessments.
Defendant filed an appeal, raising a challenge to the sentence imposed, which was reviewed on our Excessive Sentence Oral Argument calendar. We affirmed the sentence, but remanded for reconsideration of applicable jail credits. Certification was denied. State v. Hoagland, 208 N.J. 336 (2011).
Defendant then filed a pro se petition for PCR. After counsel was appointed, a brief in support of defendant's petition was filed. Another supplemental submission sought to vacate defendant's guilty plea. The matter was reviewed by Judge Alan A. Rockoff, who denied defendant's PCR petition and his request for an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL WHEN HE ADVISED DEFENDANT TO PLEAD GUILTY TO SECOND DEGREE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WHEN THE FACTS OF THIS CASE DID NOT CONSTITUTE SERIOUS BODILY INJURY[;] AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING SHOULD BE HELD AS TO THIS CLAIM. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT II
THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS TO TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO RAISE A DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSE FOR DEFENDANT.
"'Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus.'" State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 593 (2002) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). "A petitioner must establish the right to such relief by a preponderance of the credible evidence." Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 459.
New Jersey has adopted the two-prong test handed down by the United States Supreme Court in the companion cases of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 608, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984). State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
[Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693.]
Under the first prong, a defendant must demonstrate "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Ibid. Thus, "th[e] test requires the defendant to identify specific acts or omissions that are outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance . . . ." State v. Jack, 144 N.J. 240, 249 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "'Reasonable competence' does not require the best of attorneys, but certainly not one so ineffective as to make the idea of a fair trial meaningless." State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 351 (1989).
To meet the second prong, "[a] defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Ibid.
For the first time, defendant argues PCR is warranted because the facts fail to establish the SBI element necessary to sustain a conviction of second-degree aggravated assault. We reject this argument.
First, defendant failed to raise this issue on direct appeal. "Rule 3:22-4 imposes a procedural bar to prevent claims from being raised on PCR that reasonably could have been raised on direct appeal." State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 483 (1997). See also State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 327 (2005) (stating an appellate court generally will not consider issues not previously presented to the trial court, absent a finding of plain error, R. 2:10-2.). Second, considering the merits of defendant's claim, we dispel the notion SBI was not established beyond a reasonable doubt to support defendant's conviction. During the plea colloquy, defendant admitted he stabbed the victim numerous times on her right side and that she escaped possible death because she was able to break free and received almost immediate medical attention. Also, defendant acknowledged the stab wounds required his sister-in-law receive stitches and stated she suffered serious bodily injury, which "create[d] a substantial risk of death or which cause[d] serious, permanent disfigurement." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b).
Defendant next argues the judge erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. We conclude an evidentiary hearing was not required, in light of the absence of a threshold evidential dispute to establish a basis for PCR.
Evidentiary hearings are not automatically held to consider a request for PCR. If a defendant presents a prima facie case for PCR, an evidentiary hearing should be conducted when necessary to resolve evidentiary disputes. Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 462. See also R. 3:22-10(b) (noting a defendant's entitlement to an evidentiary hearing upon establishing "a prima facie case in support of post-conviction relief, a determination by the court that there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record, and a determination that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief.").
Defendant also contends a plenary hearing was required to consider his claim that trial counsel failed to address the issue of his diminished capacity. We disagree. As Judge Rockoff pointed out, defendant's history of mental illness "was exhaustively outlined in the proceedings leading up to the sentencing[,]" dispelling the argument trial counsel was unaware of or ignored defendant's psychiatric history and failed to consider a diminished capacity defense. Judge Rockoff also found the record reflected a strategic decision to negotiate a sentence in a plea agreement, rather than attempt the more difficult diminished capacity strategy negating the element of intent. Counsel secured an agreement for a term of seven years, not the more than sixteen years for which defendant could have been sentenced.
Having considered the record, we agree defendant failed to present a factual dispute outside the record requiring a hearing. State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 158 N.J. 72 (1999). We have no basis to interfere with the "pragmatic dimension to the PCR court's determination" to deny the request for a hearing as no basis established counsel's representation was ineffective. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997). See also State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006) (holding PCR relief requires a defendant must establish trial counsel's actions extend beyond sound trial strategy).
Finally we reject defendant's assertion he established a basis to withdraw his guilty plea. See State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009) (establishing four factors to consider when a defendant seeks to vacate a guilty plea after imposition of sentence). We conclude the argument lacks merit, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), substantially relying on Judge Rockoff's oral opinion, which determined defendant's contention was merely a design to receive a lesser sentence.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION