Dean filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but on appeal challenges the denial of that motion "for the first time on appeal [on the basis] that the trial court failed to inform him of his right[s] to a speedy trial" and an impartial jury. State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ¶ 5, 47 P.3d 101. Thus, he "must show [that the trial court committed] plain error. To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.
Hittle then appealed to the court of appeals, where he argued for the first time that the district court's failure to inform him of his right to a "speedy" trial under rule 11(e)(3) rendered his subsequent guilty plea unknowing and involuntary.See State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ¶ 1, 47 P.3d 101. The court of appeals agreed, holding that the district court's omission of the word "speedy" satisfied the three-part test for plain error. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7, 9, 11. As such, it reversed the district court's denial of Hittle's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remanded the case.
"It is well established under Utah law that we will presume harm . . . when a trial court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11." State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ¶ 9, 47 P.3d 101 (applying plain error test to rule 11 violation), cert. granted, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002); see also State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, ¶ 12, 57 P.3d 1106 (same), cert. granted, 2003 Utah LEXIS 19, No. 20020952 (Utah Feb. 12, 2003); State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, ¶ 11, 5 P.3d 1222 (same). We presume harm because, "by not knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot make a fully informed decision."
Rather, it held that “ ‘when a trial court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11,’ ” harm will be presumed. Id. (quoting State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ¶ 9, 47 P.3d 101). ¶ 68 In a footnote to its decision, the court of appeals expressed uncertainty about the scope of harmless error application.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court of appeals "decline[d] to determine whether the harmless error doctrine applies to rule 11 violations." Id. ¶ 22. Rather, it held that "`when a trial court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11,'" harm will be presumed.Id. (quoting State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ¶ 9, 47 P.3d 101). ¶ 68 In a footnote to its decision, the court of appeals expressed uncertainty about the scope of harmless error application.Id. ¶ 22 n. 4. It stated that before our decision inGibbons, the record as a whole test applied to rule 11 violations, and that "[a]s long as the `record as a whole' test was used, the harmless error doctrine clearly applied."Id. It then went on to state that following Gibbons, "it is not clear whether the harmless error doctrine continues to apply to rule 11 violations."
"To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ¶ 5, 47 P.3d 101 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted). After reviewing the record of the plea hearing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its rule 11 colloquy with Defendant. Additionally, even if an error had existed in the trial court's questioning about Defendant's understanding of the plea agreement, "such error would not have been obvious to the court when considering the motion to withdraw guilty plea."
In State v. Hittle, we concluded that omitting the word "speedy" constituted plain error because "the constitutional right to a speedy trial is a distinct right of criminal defendants, separate from the right to a trial before an impartial jury." 2002 UT App 134, ¶ 8, 47 P.3d 101. "If the defendant is not fully informed of his [or her] rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary."
The Millers assert that the trial court committed plain error in three instances. For their claims to succeed, the Millers have "`the burden of showing (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.'" State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, ¶ 3, 57 P.3d 1106 (quoting State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ¶ 5, 47 P.3d 101). The Millers first argue that the trial court erred because the State failed to prove jurisdiction, and absent proof of jurisdiction the court should have acquitted the Millers.
There is simply no mandate that a federal defendant be advised of their speedy trial rights. Cf. State v. Hittle, 47 P.3d 101, 103 (Utah App. 2002), reversed 94 P.3d 268 (2004), (finding strict compliance required with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure mandating advise of waiver of "the right to a speedy public trial".)
¶ 17 In this context and on these facts, we find that any error committed by the trial court was not obvious at the time the court denied Dean's motion to withdraw. First, we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the trial court's alleged error should have been obvious in light of the decisions in State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 1222, and State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, 47 P.3d 101. As the dissent in the court of appeals' decision pointed out, both of these cases were decided after Dean pled guilty and made his motion to withdraw. Dean entered his guilty plea on March 8, 2000, and sought its withdrawal on April 10, 2000; however, the Tarnawiecki and Hittle opinions were not issued until June 15, 2000, and April 25, 2002, respectively.