State v. Hinsey

30 Citing cases

  1. State v. Martin

    385 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 1986)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that error is preserved where issue raised on appeal is considered and ruled on by the district court

    In fairness, we will not review a ruling on objections or grounds for reversal the trial court never had the opportunity to consider. See Nepple v. Weifenbach, 274 N.W.2d 728, 732 (Iowa 1979); State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa 1972). Consequently, we have held a defendant "cannot announce at trial the specific reason for his cross-examination and then rely upon an entirely different one to upset an adverse ruling."

  2. State v. Hall

    235 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1975)   Cited 75 times
    Approving recall procedure upon the defendant's agreement

    Secondly, the State need not call every witness who testifies before the grand jury. State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1972); State v. Christ, 189 Iowa 474, 483, 177 N.W. 54, 58 (1920). Defendant does not claim the State suppressed the exculpatory evidence.

  3. State v. Jensen

    216 N.W.2d 369 (Iowa 1974)   Cited 40 times
    In State v. Jensen, 216 N.W.2d 369, 373-4 (Iowa 1974) the Iowa court described an overruled motion in limine as a "red flag" whose primary purpose is to avoid disclosing to the jury prejudicial matters which may compel declaring a mistrial.

    We have discussed motions in limine many times. Lewis v. Buena Vista Mutual Insurance Association, 183 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1971); State v. Johnson, 183 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa 1971); State v. Garrett, 183 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 1971); State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1972). See also Sullins, Preservation of Error: Providing a Basis for Appellate Review, 22 Drake L.Rev. 435, 445. An explanation we have previously quoted appears in State v. Johnson, supra:

  4. Cunha v. Brewer

    511 F.2d 894 (8th Cir. 1975)   Cited 36 times

    They, too, were found guilty and their convictions affirmed. State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 1972); State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1972); State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1972). On July 9, 1973, petitioner, acting prose, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Since filing this action, petitioner has been represented by court-appointed attorneys associated with the University of Iowa Law School.

  5. State v. Doolin

    942 N.W.2d 500 (Iowa 2020)   Cited 24 times
    Finding record adequate to decide that counsel had no duty to raise meritless objection

    The fact that he did not identify Doolin before trial or give police a detailed description of his assailant "raises a question of credibility, not admissibility." State v. Hinsey , 200 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1972). These cases preceded the development of much academic research on the fallibility of eyewitness testimony.

  6. Vorthman v. Keith E. Myers Enterprises

    296 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1980)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that because liability was definitely established, it would be unfair to require a new trial on all issues

    No objection to this testimony was made at the trial and thus no error is preserved for review here. State v. Judkins, 242 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Iowa 1976); Rush v. Sioux City, 240 N.W.2d 431, 438 (Iowa 1976); Twyford v. Webber, 220 N.W.2d 919, 922-24 (Iowa 1974); State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 817-18 (Iowa 1972). III.

  7. State v. Jackson

    259 N.W.2d 796 (Iowa 1977)   Cited 7 times

    We have stated that the scope of permissible cross-examination is "largely" within the trial court's discretion. State v. Everett, 214 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Iowa) ("The scope and extent of cross-examination is largely within trial court discretion."); State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa) (same). See McCormick, Evidence, ยง 29 at 59 (2nd ed.) ("Consequently, the trial judge has a recognized discretionary power to control the extent of examination.

  8. State v. Davis

    240 N.W.2d 662 (Iowa 1976)   Cited 10 times
    In Davis, a prosecution witness gave an answer during cross-examination which, we assumed arguendo, violated the trial court's ruling on a prior motion in limine.

    We have consistently said the primary purpose of a motion in limine is to avoid disclosing to the jury prejudicial matters which may compel declaring a mistrial. Twyford v. Weber, supra, 220 N.W.2d at 923; State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1972); State v. Johnson, 183 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Iowa 1971). Assuming, arguendo, Frisbie's cross-examination testimony fell within the prohibition of the limine motion ruling, we hold defendant was obligated to afford trial court an opportunity to act.

  9. State v. Bean

    239 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa 1976)   Cited 25 times
    Noting "accumulation of evidence" less likely to disappear

    There is a grave threshold question of whether the assignment of error urged on appeal was adequately preserved. It is well settled a party cannot announce one reason for an objection at trial and then, on appeal, rely upon a different one to challenge an adverse ruling. State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa 1972). The reason for the rule serves also to test the sufficiency of the objection.

  10. State v. Monroe

    236 N.W.2d 24 (Iowa 1975)   Cited 83 times
    In Monroe, 236 N.W.2d at 38-39, the Iowa Supreme Court also held that the accused's right to a jury determination in an accommodation proceeding would apply only prospectively.

    The scope and extent of cross-examination are largely within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Everett, 214 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Iowa 1974); State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Iowa 1972); State v. Harrington, 178 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Iowa 1970). Cross-examination may cover fully and fairly all matters raised on direct examination.