At the conclusion of the state’s case, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state’s evidence proved that he was not in La Grande at various times, and may have been in Medford and Salem, but that "nothing has been introduced as evidence in this record of any particular new residence by [defendant]." He relied on our decision in State v. Hiner , 269 Or. App. 447, 345 P.3d 478 (2015), in which we held that the statute required the state to prove not only that a person has left a previous residence, but that the person acquired a new one. He explained that "we have a circumstance very like that here.

MOONEY, J. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count of failure to report as a sex offender, ORS 163A.040(1)(d) (2015), contending that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. On appeal, he argues that the state failed to prove that he had established a new residence as required by State v. Hiner , 269 Or. App. 447, 450, 345 P.3d 478 (2015) ("[D]uty to report is triggered only after a sex offender has both left the former residence and acquired a new one."). In light of our recent decision in State v. Lafountain , 299 Or. App. 311, 327, 451 P.3d 246 (2019) (the term residence "refers to a place where a person is settled beyond just a transient visit or sojourn"), we agree with defendant and reverse.

Whether a woman is pregnant at a given time is a question of fact. If the only evidence is that someone was pregnant on a given date and was not pregnant six weeks later, it is speculation, not inference, to say that she was pregnant every day in between. Cf. Statev. Hiner , 269 Or. App. 447, 448, 345 P.3d 478 (2015) (error to deny motion for judgment of acquittal on charge of failure to register as a sex offender, where the defendant was required to register within 10 days of moving to a new residence, and there was evidence that he left a homeless shelter on a certain date and was arrested 16 days later, but there was no evidence of his whereabouts in between).The state’s second argument seeks, in effect, to create a legal fiction, by which a woman with a confirmed pregnancy remains pregnant until, as the state puts it, something "compels" a finding of the cessation of pregnancy (such as medical confirmation of termination)—regardless of when the woman in fact ceased to be pregnant.

See State v. Gonzalez , 188 Or.App. 430, 431, 71 P.3d 573 (2003) (explaining that, in a bench trial, when a defendant argues during closing argument that the state failed to adduce sufficient evidence for conviction, that argument is “the equivalent of a motion for judgment of acquittal”). The state concedes that, in light of State v. Hiner , 269 Or.App. 447, 345 P.3d 478 (2015), “there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find defendant guilty of failure to report as a sex offender.” We agree, accept the concession and, accordingly, reverse defendant's conviction.

In this appeal, defendant challenges two of his convictions for failure to register as a sex offender, former ORS 181.812 (2013), renumbered as ORS 163A.040 (2015): the single count in Case Number 13CR2380FE; and Count 2 in Case Number 14CR0522FE.Former ORS 181.812(1)(d) (2013) requires that, when a person required to report as a sex offender "[m]oves to a new residence," that person must "report the move and the person's new address." The basis for defendant's appeal is that the facts of his case are indistinguishable from the facts in State v. Hiner, 269 Or App 447, 452, 345 P3d 478 (2015), in which we held that "the reporting requirement is triggered when the defendant has both left his former residence and acquired a new residence." That is, as in Hiner, the state failed to prove that defendant had acquired a new residence after he left previous residences and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal.

Defendant did not argue to the trial court, and does not argue on appeal, that the legal effect of the version of former ORS 181.599 that applies to him, former ORS 181.599(1)(d) (2011), is to require that he must report only when he had acquired a new residence. See State v. Hiner, 269 Or App 447, ___ P3d ___ (2015) (construing former ORS 181.599(1)(d) (2011) to that effect). Accordingly, any argument about the state's failure to prove when defendant acquired a new residence is not preserved.