¶ 6 “Our primary purpose in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent.” State v. Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 621, 623 (App.2010). “ ‘We look first to the statute's language because we expect it to be the best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning.’ ”

When interpreting statutes, we strive to "give effect to the legislature's intent" and consider the statute's language "'the best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning.'" State v. Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 621, 623 (App. 2010), quoting State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 100, 854 P.2d 131, 133 (1993). "[I]f the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, we look no further."

"Our primary purpose in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent." State v. Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 621, 623 (App.2010). The best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the statute's language and, if it is plain and unambiguous, we will "look no further."

In interpreting a statute, our primary purpose is to give effect to the legislature's intent. State v. Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508, 510, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 621, 623 (App. 2010). To that end, we first consider the statute's language because it is "the best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning."

¶11 Relying on State v. Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508, 233 P.3d 621 (App. 2010), Satovich argues that the property he had entered was no longer a commercial yard because the metalizing business had been sold and the purchaser had moved the business to a different site and, as a result, there was no business actively in operation at the time he entered the property. In Hinden, we reversed the third degree burglary conviction because the evidence established that "no person had been seen working on the property for at least four years, and the business had not been in operation for eighteen years" when that defendant entered onto the property.

As noted above, "[o]ur primary purpose in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent." State v. Hinden , 224 Ariz. 508, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 621 (App. 2010). We begin with the text of a statute, and only if the plain text of the statute is ambiguous do we resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature's intent.

The regulation's use of the present tense—"is in compliance"—means that an applicant must submit documentation confirming that the dispensary would comply with local zoning restrictions in effect at the time of the application. See State v. Hinden , 224 Ariz. 508, 510, ¶ 10, 233 P.3d 621, 623 (App. 2010) ; see also Shella H. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 239 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 12, 366 P.3d 106, 109 (App. 2016) (use of present tense in a statute implies intent to focus on "the circumstances existing at the time"). Because "the present tense generally does not include the past," Carr v. United States , 560 U.S. 438, 448, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010), whether a proposed dispensary location complied with zoning restrictions in the past is irrelevant.

¶8 When interpreting statutes, our duty "is ‘to give effect to the legislature's intent.’ " State v. Miller , 226 Ariz. 190, ¶ 12, 245 P.3d 454 (App. 2011) (quoting State v. Hinden , 224 Ariz. 508, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 621 (App. 2010) ). In doing so, we first consider the language of the statute, State v. Derello , 199 Ariz. 435, ¶ 21, 18 P.3d 1234 (App. 2001), giving "every word and phrase its ‘usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning,’ " State v. Randles , 235 Ariz. 547, ¶ 8, 334 P.3d 730 (App. 2014) (quoting Bilke v. State , 206 Ariz. 462, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269 (2003) ); see alsoState v. Pena , 235 Ariz. 277, ¶ 6, 331 P.3d 412 (2014) (we may look to dictionaries for common meanings). "When the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, we must follow the text as written."

Unless a statute clearly states to the contrary, we read statutes as referring to the present tense. See, e.g. , State v. Hinden , 224 Ariz. 508, ¶¶ 8-10, 233 P.3d 621 (App. 2010) (property must be currently being used for commercial purpose to be deemed commercial yard for criminal statute); State v. Taylor , 216 Ariz. 327, ¶¶ 20, 23, 166 P.3d 118 (App. 2007) (concluding present tense use in statute and rule means only defendant’s current financial resources relevant to determining amount of reimbursement for public defender representation); Town of Wickenburg v. State , 115 Ariz. 465, 468, 565 P.2d 1326 (App. 1977) (deciding present tense use in declaratory judgment statute means rights must currently be affected for justiciable controversy to exist). Indeed, because spousal maintenance is modifiable in amount and duration after it is awarded, courts need not look down the road to changing circumstances at the time of the award.

The offense recognizes the “heightened expectation of privacy and possessory rights of individuals in structures and conveyances” and penalizes violation of the victim's property, possessory, and privacy rights within his or her home. State v. Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508, 511, ¶ 13, 233 P.3d 621 (App.2010) (quoting 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 1, at 53 (2004)); see also Gill, 235 Ariz. at 421, ¶ 13, 333 P.3d 36; Minturn T. Wright, III, Note, Statutory Burglary—The Magic of Four Walls and A Roof, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 411, 427 (1951) (characterizing common law burglary as an “offense against the habitation”). ¶ 23 The victim's interest in protecting his or her space does not vary depending on how the perpetrator invades that space.