State v. Hilling

30 Citing cases

  1. State v. Carmody

    253 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1977)   Cited 10 times
    In State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1977), we reaffirmed State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 172 (N.D. 1974), in which this court adopted the harmless error test enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reh. den. 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967).

    ". . . before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." We have specifically approved this rule for North Dakota. State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1974). We have gone farther: We have held that we are committed to fair trials, even where the evidence is ample for conviction. State v. Jensen, 251 N.W.2d 182 (N.D. 1977); State v. Haakenson, 213 N.W.2d 394 (N.D. 1974); State v. Ghylin, 222 N.W.2d 864 (N.D. 1973); State v. Schlittenhardt, 147 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1966).

  2. State v. Eugene

    340 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1983)   Cited 29 times
    Concluding the defendant was only entitled to credit for time served from incarceration as a direct result of the immediate charge and not for time served as a result of probation revocation

    In Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218, the Supreme Court announced the rule that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Accord State v. Anderson, 336 N.W.2d 123, 129 (N.D. 1983); State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 785 (N.D. 1982); State v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750, 753 (N.D. 1981); State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 168-170 (N.D. 1974). The petitioner in Brady, supra, and a companion were found guilty of first degree murder.

  3. State v. Demery

    331 N.W.2d 7 (N.D. 1983)   Cited 26 times
    Stating "[i]t is the established rule in this State that a prior inconsistent statement may be used to impeach a witness"

    It is the established rule in this State that a prior inconsistent statement may be used to impeach a witness, but may not be used substantively in a criminal case as direct evidence of the facts contained in the statement unless the prior statement was made under oath. See Rules 613 and 801(d)(1)(i), N.D.R.Ev.; Allery, supra, 322 N.W.2d at 232; State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1982); State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1974). But see State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1973), decided prior to the adoption of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.

  4. State v. Schneider

    270 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978)   Cited 23 times
    In Schneider, supra, we explained the foundational requirements necessary to prove that a Breathalyzer test was "fairly administered."

    We must determine whether the error was "(1) harmless error" or "(3) obvious error". In State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1977), we reaffirmed State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 172 (N.D. 1974), in which this court adopted the harmless error test enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reh. den. 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967). In Chapman, supra 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, it was held that federal constitutional errors do not automatically require reversal if it is shown that they were harmless, and "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt".

  5. State v. Hendrickson

    240 N.W.2d 846 (N.D. 1976)   Cited 15 times
    Discussing effects of alcohol consumption

    But the quoted phrase in the North Dakota instruction is followed immediately by an alternative: "or if, from the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the presumed fact, in which case the presumption is rebutted and ceases to operate." This saving phrase, absent in Hansen, seems to us to have been designed to let the jury deem the presumption inoperable because any of the evidence, regardless of its source, raises a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the presumed fact. Since we conclude that the instruction was not erroneous. we need not apply the Chapman rule, fn. 1, supra, as adopted by us in State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 172 (N.D. 1974). In State v. Hutton, 207 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973), another trial court was reversed.

  6. State v. Stevens

    238 N.W.2d 251 (N.D. 1975)   Cited 22 times
    In Stevens at 258, this Court stated, "We regret that the arguments of counsel were not reported and transcribed, so that we could examine the arguments of counsel to see what use was made in argument of evidence which we hold inadmissible."

    We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not affect the verdict, and we therefore must reverse. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967); State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 172 (N.D. 1974); State v. Ghylin, 222 N.W.2d 864 (N.D. 1974). If there were any substantial evidence that the defendant had exhibited a tendency toward child abuse, or if there were any direct evidence of his commission either of the act charged or of his having caused the prior injuries intentionally, or even if he were the only logical suspect, we might be more inclined to uphold the verdict, and on the authority of the cases cited by the State, infra, we might be able to do so.

  7. State v. Ness

    2009 N.D. 182 (N.D. 2009)   Cited 14 times
    In Ness, at ¶ 18, the defendant claimed his failure to immediately tag a deer after it was killed was excused because "it was late in the deer hunting season, he had not had a chance to shoot any deer, and the deer population was large and needed to be reduced."

    This Court has said, " ‘ [t]he right (to cross- examine) is absolute and the denial of the right as to material evidence is prejudicial error requiring a new trial.’ " State v. Bartkowski, 290 N.W.2d 218, 219 (N.D.1980) (quoting State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 171 (N.D.1974)). We have also said, " [o]rdinarily, the complete denial of cross-examination ‘ would be constitutional error of the first magnitude.’

  8. State v. Muhle

    2007 N.D. 131 (N.D. 2007)   Cited 11 times
    In State v. Muhle, 2007 ND 131, ¶¶ 10-18, we addressed the district court's decision in this case to admit S.M.'s and K.E.'s prior out-of-court statements into evidence and concluded the court did not abuse its discretion.

    The Brady rule, it must be emphasized, creates a duty of constitutional dimensions immediately upon the making of the demand, regardless of the stage of the proceedings at which the demand is made. State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 170 (N.D. 1974) (noting the distinctiveness of four methods of document discovery in a criminal case). [¶ 27] During the August 2005 interview, G.E. said nothing about having had sexual contact of any kind with Shannon Muhle.

  9. State v. Velasquez

    1999 N.D. 217 (N.D. 1999)   Cited 9 times

    It includes not only being allowed to confront the witnesses physically, but to cross-examine the witnesses as well. State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 171 (N.D. 1974). Defense counsel is given wide latitude to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. Haugen, 458 N.W.2d at 291.

  10. Clark v. State

    1999 N.D. 78 (N.D. 1999)   Cited 24 times
    Discussing misuse of process

    We also conclude this type of credibility issue, namely that Jalbert and Eiden are friends with Mary Ann Braun, who is Girodengo's cousin, does not rise to such a level such as to cast serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses. See State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 169 (N.D. 1974). IV