State v. Hill

5 Citing cases

  1. State v. Winot

    294 Conn. 753 (Conn. 2010)   Cited 68 times
    Noting that cases appealed subsequent to prior decision of this court establishing new rule required reversal and remand for new trials in order to have correct instruction read to jury and to permit party opportunity to present evidence and arguments under new rule

    uphold kidnapping convictions that involved movement of the victim for a rather brief distance and/or confinement of the victim for quite a short period of time. See, e.g., State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 503, 594 A.2d 906 (1991) (movement of victim throughout her apartment during robbery, sexual assault); State v. Jones, 215 Conn. 173, 182, 575 A.2d 216 (1990) (movement of victim across and off of road); State v. Vass, 191 Conn. 604, 606, 614-15, 469 A.2d 767 (1983) (movement of victim from front of store to back stockroom during sexual assault); State v. Bell, 188 Conn. 406, 409, 416, 450 A.2d 356 (1982) (confinement of victims in freezers for two to fifteen minutes during robbery); State v. Lee, 177 Conn. 335, 344, 417 A.2d 354 (1979) (movement of victim from stairway to bedroom and detention there for fifteen minutes during robbery); State v. Hill, 58 Conn. App. 797, 802-803, 755 A.2d 919 (movement of victim down driveway and under stairwell during sexual assault), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 936, 761 A.2d 763 (2000). At times, however, we allowed that there conceivably could be "factual situations in which charging a defendant with kidnapping based [on] the most miniscule [movement or duration of confinement] would result in an absurd and unconscionable result. . . ."

  2. State v. Chance

    147 Conn. App. 598 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 5 times

    has applied these principles to uphold kidnapping convictions that involved confinement of the victim for short periods of time and/or involved movement of the victim of a rather brief distance. See, e.g., State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 503, 594 A.2d 906 (1991) (moving victim throughout her apartment during robbery, sexual assault); State v. Jones, 215 Conn. 173, 182, 575 A.2d 216 (1990) (moving victim across and off of road); State v. Vass, 191 Conn. 604, 606, 614–15, 469 A.2d 767 (1983) (moving victim from front of store to back stockroom during sexual assault); State v. Bell, 188 Conn. 406, 409, 416, 450 A.2d 356 (1982) (confining victims in freezers for two to fifteen minutes during robbery); State v. Lee, 177 Conn. 335, 344, 417 A.2d 354 (1979) (moving victim from stairway to bedroom and detention there for fifteen minutes during robbery); State v. Hill, 58 Conn.App. 797, 802–803, 755 A.2d 919 (moving victim down driveway and under stairwell during sexual assault), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 936, 761 A.2d 763 (2000).At times, however, our Supreme Court has acknowledged that there conceivably could be “factual situations in which charging a defendant with kidnapping based [on] the most miniscule [movement or duration of confinement] would result in an absurd and unconscionable result....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

  3. State v. Sanseverino

    98 Conn. App. 198 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 8 times

    "In the other cases that have addressed this claim, some type of unlawful movement or restraint of the victim preceded the commission of the sexual assault. For example, in [ State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 289, 677 A.2d 917 (1996)], the victim was held against her will in the defendant's apartment, even after she had attempted to break free. . . . Similarly, in [ State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 503, 594 A.2d 906 (1991)], the defendant blocked the victim's escape from her own apartment and forced her to remain in certain rooms while he committed other criminal acts. . . . Likewise, the defendants in [ State v. Jones, 215 Conn. 173, 175, 575 A.2d 216 (1990)] and [ State v. Hill, 58 Conn. App. 797, 799, 755 A.2d 919, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 936, 761 A.2d 763 (2000)] forced their victims off the street so that they could facilitate further criminal activity. None of those circumstances appears in the second assault in 2000.

  4. State v. Winot

    95 Conn. App. 332 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 15 times
    In Winot, the "act" was a forcible pull on the victim's arm, and in Schriver, the defendant's "act" was to grab the waist of a fully clothed thirteen year old girl while saying something sexually suggestive.

    Those facts, we held, "do not support the defendant's contention that these actions comprised a 'minuscule movement . . . .'" Id., 159-60; see also State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 289, 677 A.2d 917 (1996) (preventing victim from leaving apartment); State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 493-94, 594 A.2d 906 (1991) (using gun to force victim to move from one place to another); State v. Hill, 58 Conn. App. 797, 799, 755 A.2d 919 (forcing victim from street, into parking lot, and under stairwell, and onto ground), cert. denied. 254 Conn. 936, 761 A.2d 763 (2000). We have, indeed, recognized the distinction between assault and kidnapping.

  5. State v. Dejesus

    91 Conn. App. 47 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 21 times
    In DeJesus, with respect to a 2000 incident separate from the 2001 incident, "[t]he victim was told to enter an isolated room with the defendant.

    The defendant's claim of vagueness as it relates to our kidnapping statute has been raised on several occasions in the appellate courts of this state. See, e.g., State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 313-15, 677 A.2d 917 (1996); State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 502-504, 594 A.2d 906 (1991); State v. Jones, 215 Conn. 173, 177-80, 575 A.2d 216 (1990); State v. Ortiz, 83 Conn. App. 142, 156-61, 848 A.2d 1246, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 915, 853 A.2d 530 (2004); State v. Hill, 58 Conn. App. 797, 799-802, 755 A.2d 919, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 936, 761 A.2d 763 (2000); see also State v. Luurtsema, 262 Conn. 179, 204-206, 811 A.2d 223 (2002) ( Borden, J., concurring), 208-13 ( Katz, J., dissenting in part). Although neither our Supreme Court nor this court has held the kidnapping statute to be unconstitutionally vague as applied, it has been stated often that a factual scenario could exist in which charging a defendant with kidnapping on the basis of the most minuscule restraint would produce an absurd and unconscionable result.