Opinion
I.D. No. 9707009603.
Submitted: April 26, 2000.
Decided: May 11, 2000.
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF. SUMMARILY DISMISSED, Cr. A. No. IN97-08-0952-R2, and IN97-08-0953-R2.
ORDER
This 11th day of May, 2000, upon consideration of the defendant's motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) On March 8, 1998, Defendant, Thomas J. Hill, pleaded guilty to Assault, First Degree and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. On May 1, 1998, the Court sentenced Hill to a total of nine years Level 5 incarceration, to be followed by one year Level 4 supervision, followed by three years, six months Level 3 probation.
(2) On September 8, 1998, Hill filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief in this Court pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. In that petition, Hill argued that his defense counsel was ineffective because counsel did not apprize him of the consequences of the terms of his plea agreement and that the Court breached the negotiated plea agreement by sentencing him to a longer period of incarceration than the plea agreement specified. The Court summarily dismissed Hill's motion. See State v. Hill, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN97-08-0952, Goldstein, J. (Apr. 9, 1999) (ORDER).
(3) On April 17, 2000, Hill filed the above-captioned motion for postconviction relief. In his current motion, Hill lists as grounds for relief ineffective assistance of counsel, "unfulfilled plea agreement," and illegal sentence. Hill argues that his defense counsel changed his plea agreement without Hill's knowledge after he signed it. Hill also argues that the Court never clearly explained the terms of the agreement and sentenced him to a longer period than the plea agreement specified.
(4) Before addressing the merits of Hill's claims, the Court must determine whether any procedural bars prevent consideration of the merits. Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990). The Court finds that Hill's petition is procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4) because those claims were raised and adjudicated in Hill's prior motion or, alternatively, the petition is barred under Rule 61(i)(2) because the claims were not raised in Hill's prior motion.
(5) The Court determined in its decision dismissing Hill's first motion that the Court did not sentence Hill in excess of the plea agreement. Therefore, any claims in his current petition claiming illegal sentencing have been raised and adjudicated. Also, the Court determined that Hill voluntarily entered into the plea agreement. Rule 61(i)(4) provides that "any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated . . . is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice." In order to satisfy the "interest of justice" exception, the defendant must show that the trial court lacked the authority to punish him. State v. Wright, Del. Super., 653 A.2d 288, 298 (1994). Hill has made no such assertion in his current petition.
(6) The Court finds that Hill's remaining claims are procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(2), which provides that "any ground for relief not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding as required by subdivision (b)(2) of this rule, is thereafter barred, unless consideration is warranted in the interest of justice." Again, Hill has not asserted that the Court lacked the authority to punish him so that reconsideration of the claims is warranted in the interest of justice.
(7) In addition, the Rule 61(i)(5) provides that the procedural bar set forth in Rule 61(i)(2) shall not apply "to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity, or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." The exception is very narrow and is applied only where the movant proves that he has been deprived of a "substantial constitutional right." Younger, 580 A.2d at 555. The record in Hill's case, specifically, the plea colloquy and sentencing transcripts and the documents Hill signed prior to his guilty plea, do not support such a finding.
Therefore, because the Court finds that it is plain from the Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record in this case that Hill is not entitled to relief, the motion is hereby SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
oc: Prothonotary pc: Thomas Hill