Opinion
I.D. No. 0507018489.
Date submitted: February 3, 2006.
Date decided: March 10, 2006.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Motion to Suppress GRANTED.
Karin M. Volker, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Joseph A. Hurley, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant William Hignutt ("Defendant") moves to suppress evidence which was seized from his person after a traffic stop commenced on June 26, 2005. He argues that the evidence should be suppressed because: 1) there was no reasonable suspicion to warrant the stop based upon the alleged reckless driving and muffler violations; and 2) even if the stop was valid the arresting officer was not justified in conducting the pat-down search that led to the discovery of the illegal contraband. A suppression hearing was held before this Court on February 7, 2006.
Following the completion of the testimony and after reviewing Defendant's Motion and Plaintiff's response, the Court finds, based upon the totality of the circumstances, that reasonable and articulable suspicion did not exist as to warrant a "Terry" stop. Based upon the facts gleaned from Officer Peden ("Peden"), Officer Aguilar ("Aguilar") lacked reasonable suspicion to suspect that the Defendant was traveling at an excessive rate of speed or that his motorcycle muffler was in violation of the law. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED.
II. FACTS
At approximately 7:00 a.m. on June 26, 2005, Delaware State Police Officer Peden was parked on a median on Route 1 near Smyrna. Peden testified that he had stopped here in order to finish his coffee and to demonstrate police presence in order to deter unlawful speeding. However, he did not turn on his radar. Soon after he was stopped at this location Peden allegedly heard the Defendant and another individual before he observed them traveling southbound on Route 1. The two motorcyclists were traveling abreast of one another. Peden stated that in his opinion the motorcycles were traveling unusually fast considering the foggy weather and that Defendant's motorcycle was excessively loud. He estimated that the Defendant was going 65 miles per hour which was the posted speed limit on Route 1. However, no radar or any other speed-measuring devices were used to determine the defendant's exact rate of speed. The Defendant, however, testified that he was traveling at a speed of 58 miles per hour. Peden also testified that he had noticed that the Defendant was flying the colors of the Pagans.As a result of his observations, Peden radioed in that he intended to stop the motorcycles, one flying pagan colors. Two other officers, Aguilar and Penrod, responded over the radio that they would assist. Once Peden approached the motorcyclists with his siren and lights on the Defendant immediately pulled over. Peden pursued the second motorcycle which continued southbound while Officers Aguilar and Penrod stopped to detain the Defendant. Aguilar testified that he did not know why he was stopping the Defendant and did not initially see anything out of the ordinary. Approaching on foot, Aguilar saw a knife in a sheath attached to the Defendant's belt. He conducted a pat-down search of Defendant which revealed a blackjack placed under the Defendant's clothing. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of the knife and blackjack and two counts of possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited. Defendant was also cited for having unlawfully-placed handlebars on his motorcycle.
III. DISCUSSION
In a Motion to Suppress, the State bears the burden of proving that the search and seizure comported with federal and state constitutional rights and state statutory law. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that individuals will be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 560 (Del. 2001).
U.S. Const. amend. IV. See Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution makes the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states).
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a detention could only be lawful where it was premised on reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Articulable suspicion "does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities." Delaware has defined reasonable suspicion as "the officer's ability to `point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.'" In determining if there is reasonable suspicion, a court looks at the totality of the circumstances, coupled with "inferences and deductions that a trained officer could make which `might well elude an untrained person.'" With these principles in mind, we now examine whether Aguilar possessed reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the Defendant.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 22.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
Coleman v. State, 562 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 861 (Del. 1999).
Harris v. State, 806 A.2d 119, 127 (Del. 2002).
Based upon the totality of the circumstances and the facts gleaned from Peden, Aguilar did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that the Defendant was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a crime. In the present case, the facts are debatable as to the Defendant's exact speed since no speed detection device was employed. Peden testified that the Defendant was traveling at an excessive rate of speed considering the foggy weather conditions. However, since his radar was not turned on he estimated that the motorcycle was traveling 65 miles per hour which was the posted speed limit on Route 1. Neither Peden or Aguilar testified that the Defendant was traveling in excess of the 65 miles per hour posted speed limit. The Defendant also testified that after seeing the officer's car he looked down and saw that he was traveling 58 miles per hour. The Court finds it questionable as to whether the weather conditions required driving at a speed less than the posted speed limit. Although Peden testified that the Defendant was traveling at an excessive rate of speed considering the foggy conditions, Aguilar stated that the weather was merely "cloudy" at the time of the stop. He also stated that he did not know why he stopped the Defendant, did not notice anything unusual, and did not cite him for speeding. Based upon these facts and circumstances, the Court concludes that Aguilar did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that the Defendant was driving recklessly.
In addition, there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the Defendant based upon an alleged muffler violation. To investigate a suspicious muffler on a vehicle, officers must rely on their sensory perception to determine whether a muffler is in violation. Although an officer may rely on his sensory perception and experience to stop a vehicle suspected of having an unlawful muffler, doing so under the present circumstances when two motorcycles were traveling in a pair would be unreasonable. This Court is unpersuaded that Peden could differentiate the sounds coming from the two motorcycles riding in tandem and determine that it was Defendant's motorcycle that was unlawfully loud. Moreover, the Defendant testified that the motorcycle had passed inspection in May of 2005. Aguilar also testified that he did not notice anything unusual nor did he cite the Defendant for a muffler violation. Based upon the totality of these circumstances, the Court finds that Aguilar lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion that the Defendant's muffler was in violation of the law. Therefore, the Court finds that the stop was not justified. Since there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion present to justify the initial stop, the seized evidence resulting from that stop is excluded and the Court need not consider whether the pat-down search was justified.
21 Del. C. § 4311(a) reads, in pertinent part: No person shall drive a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, on a highway, including residential streets, unless such motor vehicle or motorcycle is equipped with a muffler in good working order and in accordance with manufacturer's specifications and in constant operation to prevent excessive or unusual noise.
See generally State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 1997).
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that reasonable and articulable suspicion did not exist as to warrant the stop. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby GRANTED.