{7} We need not decide in this case whether the State is correct that any time a warrant is issued for a failure to appear at a fixed time and place pursuant Section 31-3-2(A), that circumstance automatically invokes the provisions of Rule 5-604(B)(5), and therefore we need not address the dissent's explanation of the distinctions between failure to appear for court proceedings and failure to abide by conditions of release. In fact, in State v. Hicks, 2002-NMCA-038, ¶¶ 10, 13, 19, 132 N.M. 68, 43 P.3d 1078, we injected some uncertainty into the law governing failure to appear in that we noted, in that criminal prosecution for failure to appear contrary to Section 31-3-9, that the defendant conceded that his failure to post bond might have violated Section 31-3-2(A). Hicks, 2002-NMCA-038, ¶ 10, 132 N.M. 68, 43 P.3d 1078.

It is for the Legislature alone to define statutory criminal acts, and when it does not do so clearly, the rule of lenity compels judicial restraint. See State v. Hicks, 2002–NMCA–038, ¶ 11, 132 N.M. 68, 43 P.3d 1078. {38} The Rodriguez Court focused on giving the term “vehicle” its plain meaning, but in doing so failed to consider how that might effect the meaning of the statute as a whole.

It is for the Legislature alone to define statutory criminal acts, and when it does not do so clearly, the rule of lenity compels judicial restraint. See State v. Hicks, 2002-NMCA-038, ¶ 11, 132 N.M. 68, 43 P.3d 1078. {38} The Rodriguez Court focused on giving the term "vehicle" its plain meaning, but in doing so failed to consider how that might effect the meaning of the statute as a whole.

We also noted that this Court has recognized that a magistrate court may enforce lawful conditions of release by holding a defendant in contempt. [CN 4-5] See State v. Hicks, 2002-NMCA-038, ¶ 21, 132 N.M. 68, 43 P.3d 1078 (explaining that to compel compliance with conditions of release, the magistrate court has several options, including the authority to revoke the defendant's conditions of release, to change or add to the existing conditions of release, and it also has the authority to hold a defendant in contempt for failing to comply with conditions of release, citing to Rule 6-111). {¶4} Defendant's response to our notice complains that our citation to Hicks relies on dicta [MIO 1-2], and claims that pretrial release rules provide the sole remedy for violations of conditions of release [MIO 2-4], but does so without reliance on any supporting, mandatory language in the rules.

We also noted that this Court has recognized that a magistrate court may enforce lawful conditions of release by holding a defendant in contempt. [CN 4-5] See State v. Hicks, 2002-NMCA-038, ¶ 21, 132 N.M. 68, 43 P.3d 1078 (explaining that to compel compliance with conditions of release, the magistrate court has several options, including the authority to revoke the defendant's conditions of release, to change or add to the existing conditions of release, and it also has the authority to hold a defendant in contempt for failing to comply with conditions of release, citing to Rule 6-111). {¶4} Defendant's response to our notice complains that our citation to Hicks relies on dicta [MIO 1-2], and claims that pretrial release rules provide the sole remedy for violations of conditions of release [MIO 2-4], but does so without reliance on any supporting, mandatory language in the rules.

The district court did not identify any mandatory reinstatement of Defendant's liberty interest after ATP, but instead simply stated that it would "see how things go at that time." See State v. Hicks, 2002-NMCA-038, ¶ 14, 132 N.M. 68, 43 P.3d 1078 ("If the magistrate judge wanted to regard this situation as a limited release of [the d]efendant on his own recognizance, it was incumbent on the judge to say so in clear, cogent language."). The district court's ruling only provided a potential opportunity to revisit revocation of bail and the incarceration of Defendant if he completed ATP. {16} This case is properly viewed as an appeal of the district court's order revoking Defendant's conditions of pretrial release and bail.

The district court did not identify any mandatory reinstatement of Defendant's liberty interest after ATP, but instead simply stated that it would “see how things go at that time.” See State v. Hicks, 2002–NMCA–038, ¶ 14, 132 N.M. 68, 43 P.3d 1078 (“If the magistrate judge wanted to regard this situation as a limited release of [the d]efendant on his own recognizance, it was incumbent on the judge to say so in clear, cogent language.”). The district court's ruling only provided a potential opportunity to revisit revocation of bail and the incarceration of Defendant if he completed ATP.

We give such language its ordinary and plain meaning unless the legislature indicates a different interpretation is necessary. State v. Hicks, 2002-NMCA-038, ¶ 11, 132 N.M. 68, 43 P.3d 1078. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.

To the extent there is any ambiguity in the statute, we are required to construe that ambiguity strictly against the State, because it is also the common law in New Mexico that penal statutes must be resolved in favor of lenity. State v. Hicks, 2002-NMCA-038, ¶ 11, 132 N.M. 68, 43 P.3d 1078. This serves the function of giving clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally understand concerning actions that expose them to criminal penalties.