(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hickey , 80 Conn. App. 589, 593, 836 A.2d 457 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 917, 841 A.2d 1192 (2004). "Habitual criminal statutes increase the punishment for an offense because of previous convictions for other offenses.
The state also asserted that there is no ex post facto violation of a defendant's rights when a law is amended to enhance penalties for a defendant's prior convictions, as the defendant was put on notice of the changes to the law upon its passage. In State v. Hickey, 80 Conn.App. 589, 591, 836 A.2d 457 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 917, 841 A.2d 1192 (2004), the defendant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss because as applied to him, General Statutes § 14-227(h)(3) resulted in a violation of the ex post facto clause. Section 14-277(h)(3) had been amended to enhance the penalty for repeat offenders and to allow consideration of prior offenses occurring ten years prior to a subsequent offense.
Decided February 11, 2004 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 80 Conn. App. 589 (AC 22847), is denied. Alice Osedach-Powers, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
1983); State v. Pratt, 286 Mont. 156, 951 P.2d 37 (1997); State v. Levey, 122 N.H. 375, 445 A.2d 1089 (1982); City of Akron v. Kirby, 113 Ohio App.3d 452, 681 N.E.2d 444 (1996); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 339 Pa.Super. 32, 488 A.2d 293 (1985). In this appeal, the State adds more cases to this line of authority: State v. Hickey, 80 Conn.App. 589, 836 A.2d 457 (2003); Botkin v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. 1994); State v. Bennett, 870 So.2d 447 (La.Ct.App. 2004); Dixon v. State, 103 Nev. 272, 737 P.2d 1162 (1987); State v. Marshall, 81 P.3d 775 (Utah Ct.App. 2003); City of Richland v. Michel, 89 Wash. App. 764, 950 P.2d 10 (1998). Lamb cites no contrary authority from any jurisdiction.
Even if the Court were to find that credible, which it does not, his failure to be aware of the opportunity for habeas relief is no excuse. State v. Hickey, 80 Conn.App. 589, 596, 836 A.2d 457, 462 (2003). Additionally, even if the Court were to accept his claims of intentional isolation, he has had the opportunity to be represented by counsel no less than three times since his 2008 conviction, at least one of which also involved a violation of this special parole.
This court would not conclude, given the foregoing, that attorney Dow's advice regarding parole eligibility at 85% versus 50% would rise to the level of being deficient performance. State v. Hickey, 80 Conn.App. 589, 597, 836 A.2d 457 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 917, 841 A.2d 1192 (2004); Larkin v. Commissioner of Correction, 45 Conn.App. 809, 819, 699 A.2d 207 (1997) (attorneys generally cannot be held accountable for failure to counsel clients regarding future changes in the law). "The writ of habeas corpus indisputably holds an honored position in our jurisprudence.
Failure of trial counsel to predict the future does not constitute deficient performance. See State v. Hickey, 80 Conn.App. 589, 597, cert. denied, 267 Conn. 917 (2004); Larkin v. Commissioner of Correction, 45 Conn.App. 809, 819 (1997). Thus McDonough was not deficient when he failed to object to D.M.'s testimony on this ground.
Atlas Realty Corp. v. House, 123 Conn. 94, 101, 192 A. 564 (1937)." State v. Hickey, 80 Conn. App. 589, 596 (2003). The defendant also claims that the plaintiff should be estopped from applying the regulations as to him, as the town officials either should have informed him regarding the regulation, or should not have allowed him to construct the garage.