Opinion
No. 61528-9-I.
May 4, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-1-09245-1, Deborah D. Fleck, J., entered March 11, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Dwyer, A.C.J., concurred in by Agid and Becker, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Carlos Hernandez appeals an order of restitution entered more than 180 days after sentencing, contending the trial court imposed it beyond the deadline contained in RCW 9.94A.753(1). We disagree, and affirm.
FACTS
On May 11, 2007, Hernandez and an accomplice viciously attacked another man during which the victim was stabbed in the chest with a screwdriver. Although originally charged with assault in the second degree, Hernandez pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of assault in the third degree. As part of the plea agreement, Hernandez agreed to pay restitution in an amount to be later determined.
On August 10, 2007, the court imposed a standard range sentence of six months. The judgment and sentence indicated that restitution would be set at a future hearing. Hernandez waived his presence at any upcoming restitution hearing.
A restitution hearing was held on January 17, 2008. At that hearing, the State described the efforts undertaken by the parties to reach an agreement on the amount of restitution to be imposed. Based on concerns previously expressed by defense counsel, the State submitted additional documentation, including a letter from a medical assistance specialist of the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) dated January 15, 2008. The State sought over $23,000 in restitution to reimburse DSHS for medical payments it made on behalf of the assault victim to Harborview Medical Center and Highline Community Hospital. Defense counsel objected, claiming that the amount of restitution should not cover expenses incurred after May 15, 2007, the date the assault victim was discharged from Harborview, and any other medical expenses that were unclear and unexplained. Defense counsel went on to dispute whether the two largest entries in the hospital bills contained an adequate description of what the charges were for. One charge was from Harborview for $4,945.05. The other was from Highline Community Hospital for $15,524.80.
It is undisputed that the assault victim was hospitalized at Harborview Medical Center from May 11, 2007, to May 15, 2007, and at Highline Community Hospital from May 17, 2007, to May 25, 2007.
In response, the State asked the court not to "blind itself to the reasonable interpretation of what [the charges] mean." The State pointed out that, as the assault victim had been stabbed in the chest with a screwdriver, it could reasonably be inferred that the expenses were necessary to treat the trauma to the victim's chest and lung. The State also argued that the court could reasonably infer that the two large, undifferentiated sums represented the general costs of hospitalization that did not lend themselves to individualized billing.
The court, although finding the January 15 letter from DSHS "helpful in connecting things up," was concerned that the letter was not reliable enough because it was not presented as a statement "under penalty of perjury." The State was granted a brief continuance in order to obtain additional documentation.
The court reconvened the restitution hearing on January 29, 2008. The State discussed the problems it was having in obtaining the additional billing information:
This matter was set over until today for the state to attempt to obtain additional information from DSHS. Unfortunately, the state was not able to obtain that information. The type of information that was requested is only procured by request and by one individual at Harborview and that individual only does it on the weekends and was not in yesterday, and I'm not sure why, whether it was weather-related or ill. Unfortunately, the state does not have any additional information for the court to make its determination.
Defense counsel again complained that the State had failed to provide the information necessary to justify the amount of restitution requested. The court indicated that it would "set this over one last time" for the State to "provide additional information on the two large hospitalization charges." The court also entered a "partial" restitution order in the amount of $2,518. Defense counsel objected to any continuance beyond 180 days of sentencing.
On March 10, 2008, the parties appeared before the court to continue the restitution hearing. The State mentioned that DSHS had provided additional information on February 21, which summarized the charges from both hospitalizations of the victim and outlined exactly what those charges were for. The court, over defense objection, thereafter entered an "Additional Order Setting Restitution" in the amount of $20,378.13. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
The sole issued presented is whether the trial court exceeded its authority in entering the second restitution order. "The power to impose restitution is derived solely from statutes." State v. Enstone, 89 Wn. App. 882, 884, 951 P.2d 309 (1998), aff'd, 137 Wn.2d 675, 974 P.2d 828 (1999). We begin our analysis by looking to the applicable restitution statute. RCW 9.94A.753(1), which specifically governs the timeliness of the restitution order challenged here, provides in pertinent part:
When restitution is ordered, the court shall determine the amount of restitution due at the sentencing hearing or within one hundred eighty days except as provided in subsection (7) of this section. The court may continue the hearing beyond the one hundred eighty days for good cause.
In interpreting RCW 9.94A.753(1) we must attempt to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the legislature, as expressed in the act. See State v. Eilts, 94 Wn.2d 489, 493, 617 P.2d 993 (1980):
Next, if the legislature employs words of common meaning, that meaning must be applied to the statutory language unless it results in absurd or incongruous results. Finally, if a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, judicial construction or interpretation is unnecessary.
Eilts, 94 Wn.2d at 493 (citations omitted).
Hernandez contends that the court lacked authority to enter the second restitution order because he "had a right to have the full amount of restitution determined by the 180 day deadline where there is no good cause to extend the deadline." Because more than 180 days had elapsed between the time of sentencing and entry of the second restitution order, Hernandez argues that order must be vacated. We disagree.
The State in its response claims that RCW 9.94A.753(1) is satisfied so long as the first restitution hearing is held prior to the 180-day deadline. It relies on cases interpreting criminal statutes of limitations and speedy trial rules to support its argument. Those cases, however, are inapposite. They focus on the date an action is commenced, not the date it is finally determined, which is precisely what is contemplated in RCW 9.94A.753(1). Perhaps more importantly, the State's argument flies in the face of not only the plain language of the restitution statute, but well-established Washington law as well. RCW 9.94A.753(1) unambiguously requires the trial court to determine the amount of restitution within 180 days of sentencing. Except under certain limited circumstances, this imperative language does not permit restitution to be determined after the statutory deadline has passed. A sentencing court is without authority to impose restitution after the specified time period. State v. Tetreault, 99 Wn. App. 435, 437, 998 P.2d 330 (2000).
Courts have held the statutory time limits for imposing restitution operate like statute of limitations. See State v. Duvall, 86 Wn. App. 871, 875, 940 P.2d 671 (1997).
Hernandez argues that "there was no good cause to extend the period for setting restitution beyond the 180-day limit." A trial court may continue the restitution hearing beyond 180 days for good cause if the request is timely made. State v. Johnson, 96 Wn. App. 813, 816, 981 P.2d 25 (1999). The term "good cause" requires a showing of some external impediment not resulting from a self-created hardship, which prevents a party from complying with the time requirements. Johnson, 96 Wn. App. at 817; State v. Reed, 103 Wn. App. 261, 265 n. 4, 12 P.3d 151 (2000). Inadvertence or attorney oversight is not good cause for a continuance. Johnson, 96 Wn. App. At 817 (citing State v. Tomal, 133 Wn.2d 985, 989, 948 P.2d 833 (1997)).
Here, there was good cause to continue the restitution hearing. The State moved expeditiously in attempting to resolve the disputed issue of restitution, requesting a hearing well in advance of the 180-day deadline. After the trial court expressed its desire for additional documentation, the State attempted to locate more documents. And while the State was unable to obtain any additional documentation prior to the second hearing held January 29, its failure to do so was not the result of inadvertence, attorney oversight, or lack of due diligence. Under the circumstances, the trial court properly granted the continuance and entered the second restitution order. The trial court did not act without authority when it ordered Hernandez to pay restitution in the amount of $20,328.13.
In view of our holding, we find it unnecessary to address the State's alternative argument that another section of the restitution statute, RCW 9.94A.753(4), provided the trial court with the authority it needed to enter the second restitution order.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR.