Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2019-0007
12-06-2019
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. MICHAEL ANDRES HERNANDEZ, Appellant.
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel By Heather A. Mosher, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Joel Feinman, Pima County Public Defender By Michael J. Miller, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. CR20173516001
The Honorable Michael Butler, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel
By Heather A. Mosher, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Joel Feinman, Pima County Public Defender
By Michael J. Miller, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Judge Espinosa concurred. ECKERSTROM, Judge:
¶1 Michael Hernandez appeals from his convictions and sentences for preparatory molestation of a child, sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen, and second-degree burglary. Specifically, Hernandez argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to a Pima County Sheriff's Department detective because a prior brain injury rendered him unable to validly waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A), and we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we consider only evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and we view that evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the ruling below. State v. Moran, 232 Ariz. 528, ¶ 2 (App. 2013). In July 2017, Hernandez was arrested after five-year-old L.C. reported a man had entered her room, taken off her pajama pants, and licked her genitals and buttocks. Finger and palm prints collected from L.C.'s mother's bedroom window matched those of Hernandez. During an interview, Hernandez admitted to a Pima County Sheriff's Department detective that he had entered the residence to get a drink of water and that he was under the influence of drugs at the time. He also admitted to taking clothing from the residence. However, he denied touching L.C. with his mouth.
¶3 A jury found Hernandez guilty of preparatory molestation of a child, sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen, and second-degree burglary. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment, including a life term with the possibility of parole after thirty-five years. Hernandez now appeals his convictions on the ground that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the contents of that interview during trial.
Discussion
¶4 We review a trial court's admission of a defendant's statement for abuse of discretion. State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, ¶ 25 (2006). As in his motion to suppress, Hernandez argues he "did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights because he did not understand them, or the repercussions of his statements, because of his diminished capacity."
¶5 A waiver of Miranda rights must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. "The inquiry has two distinct dimensions." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). First, the waiver must be voluntary. Id. "[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' . . . ." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). Second, "the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Moran, 475 U.S. at 421; see also State v. Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233, ¶ 7 (2014) ("A knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights occurs when the suspect understands those rights and intends to waive them."). Both parts of the inquiry must be satisfied for a waiver to be valid. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (even if state establishes uncoerced statement, it "must make the additional showing that the accused understood these rights").
¶6 In assessing the validity of Hernandez's waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances, "including the defendant's background, experience, and conduct." Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233, ¶ 7 (quoting State v. Montes, 136 Ariz. 491, 495 (1983)). "Mental illness, by itself, will not invalidate an otherwise knowing and intelligent waiver." Id. ¶ 8. "The test is whether a suspect's mental disabilities 'render him unable to understand the meaning of his statements.'" Id. (quoting State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335, 342 (1984)).
¶7 At the suppression hearing, Hernandez submitted as evidence the transcript of his interview at the Pima County Sheriff's Department, the three competency evaluations from the Rule 11 proceedings in this matter, and several medical documents dating several years before the incident with L.C. Before the detective conducting the interview administered the Miranda warning, Hernandez disclosed his brain injury. In response, the detective confirmed that Hernandez had been read his rights on a previous occasion, in relation to a prior conviction. The detective then requested that Hernandez summarize what he thought each right meant after the detective read the right, to ensure that Hernandez understood his rights. Hernandez now asserts that his summaries demonstrated his lack of understanding of several of these rights.
Although a video recording of the interview was made, Hernandez did not submit it for consideration at the suppression hearing.
¶8 Specifically, Hernandez argues the following colloquy demonstrates he did not understand that his statements could be used against him:
Q: Okay. Um, anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.He also argues the following exchange demonstrates he did not understand that he had the right to assistance by appointed counsel:
A: So, whatever I, whatever I say the courts can tell me, say I ___ that.
Q: Okay. You have the right to the presence of an attorney to assist you prior to questioning and to be with you during questioning if you so desire.
A: That I get to talk to anyone or whatever, for no reason.
Q: Okay. Basically, what that means is that if you would like to have an attorney here, that you can have an attorney here.
A: All right.
Q: Okay? Um, if you cannot afford an attorney, you have the right to have an attorney appointed to you prior to questioning. What does that mean?
A: That if I have, uh, I don't know that one.
Q: Okay. That one means if you want an attorney but you can't afford one 'cause you don't have the money . . .
A: They still give me one.
Q: . . . then they'll still give you one.
A: Yeah.
¶9 Hernandez has made no contention that he waived his rights involuntarily. His argument rests solely on the claim that his brain injury rendered him incapable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver. He suggests the trial court's initial finding that he was incompetent to stand trial supports a conclusion that he was likewise incompetent to waive his Fifth Amendment rights. In analyzing the Miranda exchange between himself and the detective who conducted the interview, Hernandez urges us to apply the mental health expert's recommendations for how counsel could ensure his understanding of trial proceedings. These recommendations included speaking slowly and simply, asking open-ended questions, and providing explanations when Hernandez appeared to misunderstand information. But our jurisprudence does not hold a defendant's understanding under Miranda to the standards outlined by the mental health expert evaluating Hernandez's competency. See State v. Tapia, 159 Ariz. 284, 287 (1988) (defendant's agreement that he understood his rights under Miranda and failure to ask clarifying questions constituted valid waiver even if he did not actually understand those rights); State v. Olquin, 216 Ariz. 250, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (due process does not dictate that police must advise suspects of Miranda rights in particular manner, so long as advisement "sufficient to make him aware of his rights"). The trial court therefore had no duty to give the expert's recommendations dispositive weight. At any rate, the detective arguably utilized some of the same techniques later recommended by the expert.
Although Hernandez briefly cites Sixth Circuit case law for the proposition that a lower standard for coercion may apply to suspects with diminished mental capacities, our jurisprudence does not so hold, and we decline to address that question here. In any event, Hernandez's argument centers on the knowing and intelligent quality of his waiver, "assuming he waived his rights voluntarily," i.e., absent police coercion. --------
¶10 Viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the ruling below, the trial court had ample reason to conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, Hernandez understood the Miranda warnings and validly waived his Fifth Amendment rights. As the court reasoned, the interview transcript supports the conclusion that each time Hernandez demonstrated a lack of understanding, the detective re-explained the right and received confirmation from Hernandez that he had achieved understanding. And, as the court noted, Hernandez's invocation of his rights to silence and counsel at the end of the interview strongly indicate his understanding of those rights. See State v. Carrillo, 156 Ariz. 125, 131 (1988) (defendant may not "simultaneously claim his rights and, without fear of contradiction, claim that he did not understand the rights he claimed"). Further, Hernandez had prior experience with the judicial system, although, as he correctly points out, that experience occurred prior to his brain injury. See Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233, ¶ 7 ("defendant's prior interactions with law enforcement" relevant to evaluation of whether waiver knowing and intelligent). However, as the court noted, Hernandez's difficulty with short-term memory arising from his brain injury would not necessarily have affected his long-term memory of his prior encounter with the judicial system, nor would it necessarily have affected his understanding of the Miranda warnings.
¶11 Furthermore, Hernandez appeared generally coherent, responsive, and aware of the importance of his statements both when he engaged in the discussion of his rights under Miranda and throughout the interview. See Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233, ¶¶ 10-11; Clabourne, 142 Ariz. at 342. Therein, Hernandez admitted to entering the residence, taking various items of clothing, and doing so under the influence of drugs. And, he corrected the detective several times, denying that he had stolen only children's clothes or entered the residence through a window. Hernandez also repeatedly denied the more serious offenses the detective accused him of committing, specifically sexually assaulting L.C., as well as having a prior conviction for public sexual indecency. This consistent denial indicates that he "was clearly able to reason, comprehended what he was saying, and in fact resisted" the narrative the detective was offering. State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 446 (1988).
Disposition
¶12 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in concluding that Hernandez knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Miranda. We therefore affirm his convictions and sentences.