Opinion
A23-1401
10-30-2024
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Michael Joseph Hennum, Appellant.
Anoka County District Court File No. 02-CR-23-171
Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Wheelock, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Sarah I. Wheelock, Judge.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Michael Joseph Hennum challenges his convictions and sentences for violating two city ordinances that prohibit storing a semi-truck on residential property. East Bethel, Minn., Code of Ordinances (EBCO) § 70-29 (2010), App'x A § 22, subd. 3(C)(2)(a) (2021).
2. Hennum's arguments, which he presents in a three-sentence informal brief and as a list of issues in his statement of the case, are cursory and not supported by any argument or legal authority. "An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in [an] appellant's brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection." State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015) (quotations omitted) (declining to consider, in a criminal appeal, a constitutional argument that was inadequately briefed). Although we could affirm on this basis alone, we have reviewed the record and concluded that none of Hennum's assertions prevail. See Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 540 n.3 (Minn. 2007) (stating that "in the past we have indicated that it may be appropriate to read the pleadings of pro se appellants with an understanding eye"); Thomale v. State, 261 N.W.2d 353, 353 (Minn. 1977) (disregarding the appellant's "failure to file a proper brief" under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128 because the appellant "is a nonlawyer acting as his own attorney" and stating that the supreme court "reviewed the entire file on appeal in an attempt to understand the issues raised in [the] brief and determine whether they have any merit").
3. Hennum appears to assert that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the district court violated his right to due process by depriving him of his right to confrontation when it interrupted him during his cross-examination of the prosecution witness, and (3) the district court imposed a cruel and unusual punishment by conditioning his probation on his committing no same or similar offenses because he could have his probation revoked for continuing to park the semi-truck on his property.
4. First, Hennum asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The first ordinance provides:
Unless the property owner obtains an interim use permit for a home occupation, it is unlawful for any person owning, driving or in charge of any bus, motor truck, truck-tractor or commercial vehicle to cause or permit the same to be parked or stand longer than 24 hours continuously on, in front of, or
beside any property in the rural residential district, except for the purpose of loading or unloading.EBCO § 70-29. The second ordinance provides: "Parking of buses, motor trucks, semi-tractors and/or semi-trailers on individual properties longer than 24 hours continuously is prohibited" in "[r]ural residential (RR) zoning district[s]." EBCO App'x A § 22, subd. 3(C)(2)(a). Respondent State of Minnesota charged Hennum with violating both ordinances. The complaint identified the offense date as December 3, 2021, and the district court submitted that date to the jury as the date of the violations. Hennum argues that the state failed to prove that the semi-truck was present on his property for longer than 24 hours.
5. When evaluating a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim based on direct evidence, "we conduct a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict." Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017) (quotations omitted). To evaluate the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we apply a two-step standard of review. Id. First, we identify the circumstances proved at trial, resolving all factual disputes in favor of the verdict. Id. Second, we independently examine the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those circumstances "to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt." Id. (quotation omitted). If we conclude that the only reasonable inferences from the circumstances proved support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the conviction. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 330 (Minn. 2010).
6. The evidence in the record includes (1) notices the city sent to Hennum in 2017 stating that he was prohibited from storing the semi-truck on his property; (2) numerous photographs taken by the city's code-enforcement officer of the semi-truck parked on Hennum's property from 2017 to 2023, including one photograph dated December 3, 2021; (3) temperature records from a period in January 2019 when the officer took photographs showing that there were no tire tracks in the snow around the semi-truck for a period of three days; (4) a citation Hennum received in July 2021; and (5) the officer's testimony. The officer testified as follows: Hennum parked the semi-truck on his property whenever he was not using it for work and had done so for several years; Hennum admitted to the officer that, on numerous occasions, he parked the semi-truck on his property for longer than 24 hours; and Hennum told the officer that he had no plans to store the semi-truck anywhere other than where it was parked on his property. Because Hennum's admission is not specific to the date of the offenses, December 3, 2021, we apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the semi-truck had been present on Hennum's property for longer than 24 hours on that date.
7. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, we conclude that the state proved that Hennum parked the semi-truck on his property for longer than 24 hours on numerous occasions, that he did so on a regular basis when he was not driving the semi-truck, and that the semi-truck was parked on his property on
December 3, 2021. It is reasonable to infer from these circumstances that the semi-truck was parked on Hennum's property for longer than 24 hours on the date of the offenses. Hennum argues that the evidence was insufficient because the officer testified that he had never observed Hennum's property for a continuous, uninterrupted period of longer than 24 hours to develop personal knowledge that the semi-truck was parked there for that length of time. But the state need not present direct evidence as to every element of a crime in order to obtain a conviction. See State v. Weber, 137 N.W.2d 527, 531, 536 (Minn. 1965) (affirming a conviction even though "[n]o eyewitnesses testified to any phase of the crime"). Hennum does not present any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt, and we do not discern one.
8. Second, Hennum asserts that he was "denied effective cross-examination by the Court and due process." The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that a criminal defendant has a right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6. The right of confrontation guarantees defendants the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses for the purpose of showing "bias, prejudice, interest[,] or disposition of the witness to tell the truth." State v. Pride, 528 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). However, the confrontation clause does not guarantee "cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." State v. Tran, 712 N.W.2d 540, 551 (Minn. 2006) (quotations omitted). District courts possess "wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination of a prosecution witness." Id. at 550 (quotation omitted). And the Minnesota Rules of Evidence direct district courts to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, [and] (2) avoid needless consumption of time." Minn. R. Evid. 611(a).
9. We review alleged violations of the confrontation clause de novo, State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 505 (Minn. 2006), and we review a district court's evidentiary rulings and exercise of its authority to manage a trial for an abuse of discretion, id. (evidentiary rulings); State v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d 864, 874 (Minn. 2016) (trial management). "A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).
10. The district court limited Hennum's cross-examination of the officer in four ways. The first limitation occurred when Hennum asked the officer to read one of the ordinances aloud and the district court interjected and stated that it would provide the jury with the ordinance in the jury instructions. We conclude that this limitation did not violate Hennum's confrontation right and was within the district court's discretion to manage the trial because presenting the ordinance in the form of testimony would have been inefficient, improper, and not helpful to the jury.
11. The second limitation occurred when Hennum questioned the officer about the content of the January 2019 photographs and the district court instructed Hennum to wait for the officer to answer his questions before asking further questions. We conclude that this limitation also did not violate Hennum's confrontation right and was within the district court's discretion to manage the trial because allowing Hennum to ask multiple questions at once would have made the officer's testimony confusing to the jury.
12. The third limitation occurred when Hennum asked the officer about whether snow could have melted on the dates the January 2019 photographs were taken, presumably to support an argument that the absence of tire tracks in the snow did not prove that the semi-truck did not move on those dates, and the district court directed the officer not to answer because the officer was not an expert witness. We conclude that this limitation did not violate Hennum's confrontation right and was within the district court's trial-management discretion because allowing the officer to testify about when snow can melt may have exceeded the scope of permissible lay-witness testimony. See Minn. R. Evid. 701 (prohibiting testimony by lay witnesses "based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge"), 702 (requiring foundation for expert opinion evidence).
13. The fourth limitation occurred when Hennum questioned the officer about whether he had observed the semi-truck on Hennum's property for a continuous period of longer than 24 hours and the district court halted the questioning because that question had been asked and answered. This court has upheld a district court's denial of "another opportunity to explore" an issue that "was revealed earlier" in the cross-examination of the witness. State v. Reed, 398 N.W.2d 614, 617 (Minn.App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1987); see also State v. Jones, 381 N.W.2d 44, 47 (Minn.App. 1986) (concluding that the right to confrontation was not violated when the witness's recollection and credibility had been "fully tested"). We conclude that this limitation did not violate Hennum's confrontation right and was within the district court's discretion because the officer had already testified twice that he had not stayed at Hennum's property for a period of time longer than 24 hours and that, when he took photographs at Hennum's property, he was present only for the time it takes to capture a photograph.
14. Moreover, even if the district court erred in limiting the cross-examination, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleged violations of the right to confrontation are subject to a harmless-error analysis. State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2015). To determine whether a violation of the confrontation clause constitutes reversible error, we consider "whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 13. Factors bearing on this determination include "the importance of the testimony to the prosecution; whether the testimony was cumulative; the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony on material points; the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted; and the overall strength of the prosecution's case." Id.
15. Hennum does not describe what further testimony he planned to elicit from the officer or what "damaging potential" it may have had on the state's case. Id. Although Hennum's defense was unsuccessful, the officer's testimony that he had not personally observed the semi-truck for longer than 24 hours was favorable to Hennum's case, and further testimony on that subject would have been cumulative. Regarding the weather and potential snowmelt, the record contained other evidence of those facts in the form of the photographs and temperature records from the dates the photographs were taken. And to the extent the January 2019 photographs were material to the state's case, the state offered other strong evidence to support Hennum's convictions.
16. We therefore conclude that the district court's limitations on Hennum's cross-examination of the officer did not violate his right to confrontation and that the district court acted within its discretion to control the questioning under Minn. R. Evid. 611(a). We further conclude that any error was harmless.
17. Third, Hennum asserts that the district court imposed a cruel and unusual punishment. The district court imposed concurrent sentences of 30 days in jail for each offense, stayed for one year of probation on the condition that Hennum not commit any same or similar offenses, and ordered Hennum to pay a $50 fine for each offense. Hennum argues that his sentences are cruel and unusual because he could violate his probation conditions by parking the semi-truck on his own property.
18. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit "cruel or unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VII; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 5. "Statutes are presumed constitutional, and a person challenging a sentence as cruel or unusual bears the heavy burden of showing that our culture and laws emphatically and well nigh universally reject the sentence." State v. Heden, 719 N.W.2d 689, 698 (Minn. 2006) (quotations omitted). Hennum has not met this burden. As to whether the punishment is cruel, Hennum does not explain why the severity of his sentences is "out of all proportion to the nature of" his offenses. See State v. Juarez, 837 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). As to whether the punishment is unusual, Hennum "has failed to come forward with any evidence that other states reject" similar sentences for similar offenses. Id. And because no prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection, see Andersen, 871 N.W.2d at 915, we decline to consider Hennum's argument that his sentence was cruel and unusual.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's judgments of conviction are affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.