In the course of our decision, we reversed holdings from Court of Appeals cases to the contrary. See Cleppe , 96 Wash.2d at 377, 635 P.2d 435 (citing State v. Weaver , 24 Wash. App. 83, 600 P.2d 598 (1979) ; State v. Smith , 17 Wash. App. 231, 562 P.2d 659 (1977) ; State v. Hennings , 3 Wash. App. 483, 475 P.2d 926 (1970) ). And, again, more recently in State v. Bradshaw , 152 Wash.2d 528, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004), we rejected an argument to overrule Cleppe (and implicitly those many cases consistent with Cleppe ’s holding).

§§ 775.082 (3)(d), 775.083 (1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995). See In re Gorman, 269 Ind. 236, 379 N.E.2d 970 (1978) (holding, in context of attorney discipline action, possession of drugs is crime involving moral turpitude); State v. Hennings, 3 Wn. App. 483, 475 P.2d 926, 930 (1970) (holding that under contemporary community standards and in light of peripheral evils associated with narcotics traffic, possession and sale of narcotics, unless authorized by law, is a crime which by its nature involves moral turpitude and this is categorized as a crime mala in se); see also 28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics, § 209 (Supp. 1974) ("In a prosecution for unlawful possession of narcotics or dangerous drugs, the state must prove by sufficient evidence that accused had either actual or constructive possession of the narcotic and that he had knowledge of its presence and of its narcotic character."); 25 Am.Jur.2d Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons, § 21 (1966) ("[I]t is generally held that the accused must be shown to have been aware of the presence and character of the drug and to have been intentionally and consciously in possession of it."); see generally B. Finberg, Annotation, What Constitutes "Possession" of a Narcotic Drug Proscribed by § 2 of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, 91

Division One holds that simple possession of a controlled substance is a crime mala in se and that "guilty knowledge" is a necessary element of the crime. See State v. Hennings, 3 Wn. App. 483, 475 P.2d 926 (1970); State v. Smith, 17 Wn. App. 231, 562 P.2d 659 (1977); State v. Weaver, 24 Wn. App. 83, 600 P.2d 598 (1979). Division Three, on the other hand, has declined to follow Division One and holds that after establishing the nature of the substance and jurisdiction, possession alone, actual or constructive, is the sole element to be proved to convict of the crime of possession of a controlled substance under RCW 69.50.401(c).

In Zimmerlee, this court also ( 261 Or at 53) went on to quote from 2 Wigmore, supra at 202, § 304, to the effect that in order to qualify under that exception there must also be "such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations." See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 366 F.2d 575, 579 (10th Cir 1966), cited by the Court of Appeals ( 16 Or App at 542 n. 1). See also State v. Aragon, 82 N.M. 66, 475 P.2d 460, 462 (1970), and State v. Hennings, 3 Wn. App. 483, 475 P.2d 926, 929 (1970). But see, to the contrary, State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756, 761 (1960).

A number of other jurisdictions have similarly read intent requirements into criminal statutes that were silent as to mens rea. See State v. Krug, 96 Ariz. 225, 393 P.2d 916, 918 (1964); State v. Hennings, 3 Wn. App. 483, 475 P.2d 926, 930-931 (1970). Finally, it should be emphasized that the judge correctly instructed the jury that it could not find Tarnef guilty under the arson statute unless it found he possessed the requisite criminal intent.

" See also Morissette v. United States, supra; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628; City of Seattle v. Jones, 3 Wn. App. 431, 475 P.2d 790 (1970); State v. Hennings, 3 Wn. App. 483, 475 P.2d 926 (1970). All of the above cases strongly militate against this court's present gratuitous elimination of the element of intent from flag desecration cases.

Under contemporary community standards, the evil of narcotics trafficking is well known and accepted. See State v. Hennings, 475 P.2d 926 (Wash. App. 1970). We have no problem with concluding it is a crime involving moral turpitude.

See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 302 (3d ed. 1940). See also State v. Hennings, 3 Wn. App. 483, 489, 475 P.2d 926 (1970). In any event, in the present case the court did instruct the jury on intent, therefore, that issue was specifically in this case.

See State v. Stewart, 73 Wn.2d 701, 440 P.2d 815 (1968). In State v. Hennings, 3 Wn. App. 483, 489, 475 P.2d 926 (1970), the court stated: This basic ingredient or element of most crimes has not always been clearly conceived. It is variously called "scienter," "guilty knowledge," "willfulness," or "evil" or "felonious" intent.

Following the standard employed in State v. Boyer, 91 Wn.2d 342, 344, 588 P.2d 1151 (1979), we believe that "absent express legislative language to the contrary," and within "the context of this statute, its history and language," neither intent nor guilty knowledge is intrinsic to the definition of the crime itself. State v. Sainz, supra.State v. Weaver, supra, reasoning by analogy from State v. Boyer, supra; State v. Smith, 17 Wn. App. 231, 562 P.2d 659 (1977), review denied, 89 Wn.2d 1022 (1978); and State v. Hennings, 3 Wn. App. 483, 475 P.2d 926 (1970), held the legislature did not intend to eliminate a general intent, usually denoted as "willful guilty knowledge," as a necessary element of the crime of possession of a controlled substance. State v. Hennings, supra at 489.