We agree. Pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-49(o)(5), a hearing is mandatory within the 60-day period after service of the complaint, unless "continued for good cause." See State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508 ( 436 S.E.2d 209) (1993). A hearing on the forfeiture action originally was timely scheduled.
(Emphasis supplied)State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510, 436 S.E.2d 209 (1993) (noting that, “the plain meaning of ‘must’ is a command, synonymous with ‘shall’ ” and “[i]f the [60] day requirement were directory, rather than mandatory, there would be no need for a “good cause” continuance”); see also The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 1137 (2d ed. 1991) (defining “must” as, inter alia, “a necessity ... [e]ssential, mandatory, obligatory....”).Henderson, 263 Ga. at 511, 436 S.E.2d 209.
(Emphasis supplied) State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510 (436 SE2d 209) (1993) (noting that, "the plain meaning of 'must' is a command, synonymous with 'shall'" and "[i]f the [60] day requirement were directory, rather than mandatory, there would be no need for a "good cause" continuance"); see also The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 1137 (2d ed. 1991) (defining "must" as, inter alia, "a necessity . . . [e]ssential, mandatory, obligatory . . . ."). Henderson, 263 Ga. at 511.
" (Citations omitted.) State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 509 ( 436 S.E.2d 209) (1993). Following these rules, we find that Carr, supra, the case relied on by the appellant, interpreted this statute too narrowly.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the requirement in § 16-13-49 (o) (5) regarding the time for hearings in forfeiture proceedings is mandatory or directory. 1. Shortly after certiorari was granted in this action, this court decided State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508 ( 436 S.E.2d 209) (1993), in which we held that if an answer is filed the language of § 16-13-49 (o) (5) mandated a hearing within 60 days after service of the complaint unless the hearing is continued for good cause. We, therefore, affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion that is consistent with Henderson.
"Because it is a special statutory proceeding, we are required to strictly construe the forfeiture statute." State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 509 (436 S.E.2d 209) (1993
(Emphasis supplied.).263 Ga. 508, 510–511, 436 S.E.2d 209 (1993)..Id. at 510–511, 436 S.E.2d 209 (citations omitted).
(Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510-511 ( 436 SE2d 209) (1993), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that use of the word "must" in OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) renders the requirement of a hearing within 60 days mandatory, absent a continuance for good cause. See also Blanks v. State of Ga., 240 Ga. App. 175, 176 (1) ( 522 SE2d 770) (1999) ("Pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5), a hearing is mandatory within the 60-day period after service of the complaint, unless `continued for good cause.'"
This court has held that, for the purposes of statutory construction, the word "shall" is to be generally construed as a mandatory directive. State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510 ( 436 SE2d 209) (1993). However, the word "shall" need not always be construed in that fashion.
Barton v. Atkinson, 228 Ga. 733, 739 (1) ( 187 SE2d 835) (1972). Compare State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510, fn. 6 ( 436 SE2d 209) (1993) (recognizing a rejection of this proposition in cases construing the time requirements in the forfeiture statute). "[I]n such instances `shall' denotes simple futurity rather than a command.