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State v. Henderson

45 Citing cases

  1. Blanks v. State

    522 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 12 times
    In Blanks, supra, we relied on Henderson to reverse a forfeiture judgment because the hearing was untimely, and we unequivocally held that "the outermost limits of a continuance would be another 60-day period before either the matter is heard or another continuance is granted."

    We agree. Pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-49(o)(5), a hearing is mandatory within the 60-day period after service of the complaint, unless "continued for good cause." See State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508 ( 436 S.E.2d 209) (1993). A hearing on the forfeiture action originally was timely scheduled.

  2. Goodwin v. State

    321 Ga. App. 548 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 4 times

    (Emphasis supplied)State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510, 436 S.E.2d 209 (1993) (noting that, “the plain meaning of ‘must’ is a command, synonymous with ‘shall’ ” and “[i]f the [60] day requirement were directory, rather than mandatory, there would be no need for a “good cause” continuance”); see also The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 1137 (2d ed. 1991) (defining “must” as, inter alia, “a necessity ... [e]ssential, mandatory, obligatory....”).Henderson, 263 Ga. at 511, 436 S.E.2d 209.

  3. Goodwin v. State

    A12A2100 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013)

    (Emphasis supplied) State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510 (436 SE2d 209) (1993) (noting that, "the plain meaning of 'must' is a command, synonymous with 'shall'" and "[i]f the [60] day requirement were directory, rather than mandatory, there would be no need for a "good cause" continuance"); see also The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 1137 (2d ed. 1991) (defining "must" as, inter alia, "a necessity . . . [e]ssential, mandatory, obligatory . . . ."). Henderson, 263 Ga. at 511.

  4. Rabern v. State

    221 Ga. App. 874 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 14 times
    In Rabern, this Court found that forfeiture of some portion of the appellant's real property was warranted even though no actual marijuana transaction occurred and less than four ounces of marijuana, in the form of 450 small marijuana plants, was confiscated, where the State established that the property was being used to facilitate the growth of the plants as part of a marijuana manufacturing operation.

    " (Citations omitted.) State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 509 ( 436 S.E.2d 209) (1993). Following these rules, we find that Carr, supra, the case relied on by the appellant, interpreted this statute too narrowly.

  5. State of Ga. v. Alford

    264 Ga. 243 (Ga. 1994)   Cited 38 times
    In Alford, the answer at issue was an amended one. The Supreme Court analyzed the adequacy of that answer for purposes of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5), but did not address whether the amendment itself was proper.

    We granted certiorari to determine whether the requirement in § 16-13-49 (o) (5) regarding the time for hearings in forfeiture proceedings is mandatory or directory. 1. Shortly after certiorari was granted in this action, this court decided State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508 ( 436 S.E.2d 209) (1993), in which we held that if an answer is filed the language of § 16-13-49 (o) (5) mandated a hearing within 60 days after service of the complaint unless the hearing is continued for good cause. We, therefore, affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion that is consistent with Henderson.

  6. Smith v. State

    No. A22A1455 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2025)

    "Because it is a special statutory proceeding, we are required to strictly construe the forfeiture statute." State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 509 (436 S.E.2d 209) (1993

  7. Bourassa v. State

    746 S.E.2d 815 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)

    (Emphasis supplied.).263 Ga. 508, 510–511, 436 S.E.2d 209 (1993)..Id. at 510–511, 436 S.E.2d 209 (citations omitted).

  8. Sims v. State of Georgia

    683 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 1 times

    (Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510-511 ( 436 SE2d 209) (1993), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that use of the word "must" in OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) renders the requirement of a hearing within 60 days mandatory, absent a continuance for good cause. See also Blanks v. State of Ga., 240 Ga. App. 175, 176 (1) ( 522 SE2d 770) (1999) ("Pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5), a hearing is mandatory within the 60-day period after service of the complaint, unless `continued for good cause.'"

  9. Lewis v. State

    283 Ga. 191 (Ga. 2008)   Cited 28 times
    Finding Edge violation where trial court, in response to specific jury question regarding distinction between murder and voluntary manslaughter, charged that voluntary manslaughter may be found only if “ ‘all the elements of malice murder and felony murder do not exist’ ”

    This court has held that, for the purposes of statutory construction, the word "shall" is to be generally construed as a mandatory directive. State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510 ( 436 SE2d 209) (1993). However, the word "shall" need not always be construed in that fashion.

  10. Wesley Education Foundation v. State Elect. Bd.

    282 Ga. 707 (Ga. 2007)   Cited 20 times
    Finding that dismissal of the complaint before 30 days passed “was nevertheless proper if it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as evidence was not required for the trial court to make that alternative determination”

    Barton v. Atkinson, 228 Ga. 733, 739 (1) ( 187 SE2d 835) (1972). Compare State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510, fn. 6 ( 436 SE2d 209) (1993) (recognizing a rejection of this proposition in cases construing the time requirements in the forfeiture statute). "[I]n such instances `shall' denotes simple futurity rather than a command.