The evidence does no more than raise a suspicion or conjecture, strong perhaps, of defendant's guilt as charged, but that is not sufficient to carry the case to the jury. S. v. Love, 236 N.C. 344, 72 S.E.2d 737; S. v. Heglar, 225 N.C. 220, 34 S.E.2d 76; S. v. Kirkman, 224 N.C. 778, 32 S.E.2d 328; S. v. Carter, 204 N.C. 304, 168 S.E. 204; S. v. Johnson, supra. There was error in the denial of Carver's motion for judgment of nonsuit.
The bus driver did not see the defendant open the compartment, did not see him place anything in the compartment, and could not identify the bag as the one he had seen in the possession of the defendant. Evidence which does no more than raise a strong suspicion is not sufficient. S. v. Carter, 204 N.C. 304, 168 S.E. 204; S. v. Watts, 224 N.C. 771, 32 S.E.2d 348; S. v. Kirkman, 224 N.C. 778, 32 S.E.2d 328; S. v. Murphy, 225 N.C. 115, 33 S.E.2d 588; S. v. Heglar, 225 N.C. 220, 34 S.E.2d 76. Substantial evidence, more than a scintilla, is required to create a case for the jury in a criminal prosecution. It should be noted that the trial judge withheld from the jury the count in the bill charging the defendant with the unlawful possession of liquors for the purpose of sale.
23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, section 1139; 44 C.J.S., Homicide, section 321. Consequently, we must determine whether the State's testimony relating to shoeprints and automobile tracks in the vicinity of Tempting Church and Deep River, either of itself or in combination with the evidence as to motive, reasonably tends to point out the prisoner, Jim Palmer, as the murderer of the deceased, or the defendant, Foxy Palmer, as one who assisted in concealing his corpse. S. v. Heglar, 225 N.C. 220, 34 S.E.2d 76; S. v. Oldham, 224 N.C. 415, 30 S.E.2d 318; S. v. McLeod, 198 N.C. 649, 152 S.E. 895; S. v. Satterfeld, 121 N.C. 558, 28 S.E. 491. In the nature of things, evidence of shoeprints has no legitimate or logical tendency to identify an accused as the perpetrator of a crime unless the attendant circumstances support this triple inference: (1) That the shoeprints were found at or near the place of the crime; (2) that the shoeprints were made at the time of the crime; and (3) that the shoeprints correspond to shoes worn by the accused at the time of the crime.
Thus, in order to successfully prosecute Defendant under § 14–291, the State is required to prove that (1) Defendant acted as an agent in the State (2) for or on behalf of a lottery. See State v. Heglar, 225 N.C. 220, 223, 34 S.E.2d 76, 77 (1945) (reversing trial court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss alleged violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–291 where there was no evidence that defendants “were agents for others in the operation of a lottery”). An agent is typically defined as an individual who is not merely “a subordinate employee without discretion, but ... one ... having some charge or measure of control over the business entrusted to him or some feature of it....” Carolina Paper Co. v. Bouchelle, 19 N.C.App. 697, 699, 200 S.E.2d 203, 205 (1973) (citation and quotation marks omitted), aff'd,285 N.C. 56, 203 S.E.2d 1 (1974).