State v. Heald

9 Citing cases

  1. Hall v. State

    12 A.3d 1123 (Del. 2010)   Cited 6 times
    Recognizing “law enforcement officers are not automatically disqualified from serving as jurors in criminal cases” but holding the juror, a correctional officer, should have been excused because defendant was charged with assault of another inmate in the same facility where the juror worked, incentivizing the juror to convict to “promote a less hostile work environment and the personal safety of the officer.”

    Accordingly, the Superior Court did not commit plain error when it did not remove Juror Number 11 simply because he was a correctional officer. United States v. Morales, 185 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. McCord, 695 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983); Marshall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1966); Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1941); Fordham v. State, 513 So.2d 31 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986); State v. Hill, 174 Ariz. 313, 848 P.2d 1375 (1993); Buchanan v. State, 214 Ark. 835, 218 S.W.2d 700 (1948); People v. Yuen, 32 Cal. App.2d 151, 89 P.2d 438 (1939); State v. Clark, 164 Conn. 224, 319 A.2d 398 (1973); Cash v. State, 224 Ga. 798, 164 S.E.2d 558 (1968); State v. Rowe, 238 Iowa 237, 26 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa, 1947); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1997); State v. Robinson, 353 So.2d 1001 (La. 1977); State v. Heald, 443 A.2d 954 (Me. 1982); Hopkins v. State, 24 Md.App. 53, 329 A.2d 738 (Md.Ct. Spec.App. 1974); Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 405 Mass. 456, 541 N.E.2d 570 (1989); People v. Lauder, 82 Mich. 109, 46 N.W. 956 (1890); State v. Radi, 176 Mont. 451, 578 P.2d 1169 (1978); State v. Lewis, 50 Nev. 212, 255 P. 1002 (1927); State v. Ternes, 259 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1977); Parks v. Cupp, 5 Or.App. 51, 481 P.2d 372 (1971); Commonwealth v. Lee, 401 Pa.Super. 591, 585 A.2d 1084 (1991); State v. Cosgrove, 16 R.I. 411, 16 A. 900 (1889); Bryant v. State, 264 S.C. 157, 213 S.E.2d 451 (1975); Williams v. State, 167 Tex.Crim. 503, 321 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.Crim.App. 1958); State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976); State v. Parker, 104 Vt. 494, 162 A. 696 (1932); McGeever v. State, 239 Wis. 87, 300 N.W. 485 (1941).Lindsay v. State, 97 Fla. 701, 122 So. 1 (1929); Fennel! v. State, 396 P.2d 889 (Okla. Crim.App. 1964); State v. Johnson, 123 S.C. 50, 115 S.E. 748 (1923).

  2. State v. Lowry

    2003 Me. 38 (Me. 2003)   Cited 11 times
    Vacating a judgment where potential jury members indicated during voir dire some experience with violent crimes or the criminal justice system, but were not excused or questioned individually in camera to determine the nature of the experiences

    See also, State v. Chattley, 390 A.2d 472, 476 n. 5 (Me. 1978) ("Defendants used all of their peremptory challenges; their argument is, therefore, not barred by the rule in State v. Albano . . . , which denies a defendant the right to complain of a judge's failure to dismiss a juror for cause if the defendant allows the juror to sit on the jury even though he had not exhausted all of his peremptory challenges." (citation omitted)); 1 DAVID P. CLUCHEY MICHAEL D. SEITZINGER, MAINE CRIMINAL PRACTICE (1993) § 24.3 (citing, among others, State v. Heald, 443 A.2d 954, 956 n. 4 (Me. 1982); State v. Pelletier, 434 A.2d 52, 55 (Me. 1981)). The essence of our trial system is the guarantee of a fair trial by a disinterested jury, each member of which is free from bias and prejudice. . . . To ensure this constitutional right, the Maine Legislature enacted 15 M.R.S.A. § 1259, which provides for challenges for cause of any juror whose indifference a party questions.

  3. People v. Harris

    98 N.Y.2d 452 (N.Y. 2002)   Cited 151 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Describing defendant's murder of three persons in course of robbery

    , 43 P.3d 948, 960 (2002); Green v. Maynard, 2002 WL 856654, *4 (S.C. 2002); North Carolina v. Roseboro, 351 N.C. 536, 528 S.E.2d 1, *7 (2000), cert denied 531 U.S. 1019; California v. Bolin, 18 Cal.4th 314, 315, 956 P.2d 374, 386 (1998), cert denied 526 U.S. 1006 (1999); Oregon v. Barone, 329 Or. 210, 227, 986 P.2d 5, 18 (1999), cert denied 528 U.S. 1086 (2000); Evans v. Mississippi, 725 So.2d 613, 652 (1998), cert dismissed 525 U.S. 1133 [1999]; State v. Hart, 691 So.2d 651, 656 [La 1997]; Louisiana v. Robertson, 630 So.2d 1278, 1280-1281 (1994);Garcia v. Texas, 887 S.W.2d 846, 852 (1994) (en banc), cert denied 514 U.S. 1005 (1995); Colorado v. Prator, 856 P.2d 837, 842 (1993) (en Banc); California v. Johnson, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1210-1211, 842 P.2d 1, 12 (1992), cert denied 510 U.S. 836 (1993); Colorado v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234, 244 (1992) (en banc); Narvaiz v. Texas, 840 S.W.2d 415, 427 (1992) (en banc), cert denied 507 U.S. 975 (1993); Trotter v. Florida, 576 So.2d 691, 693 (1990); Maine v. Heald, 443 A.2d 954, 956 n. 4 (1982); State v. Albano 119 Me. 472, 111 A. 753, 753 (1920); Rodriguez v. Florida, 2002 WL 985438, *2 (Fla App.3d Dis 2002). A decision on whether or not Juror No. 233 should have been excluded for cause must take into consideration the instructions given by the court to the prospective jurors before they were questioned.

  4. State v. Searles

    635 A.2d 940 (Me. 1993)

    The Superior Court (Penobscot County, Kravchuk, J.) granted the State's motion on the ground that a duress defense is unavailing in a situation where the imprisoned defendant could have brought his complaints in a legal proceeding. See State v. Heald, 443 A.2d 954 (Me. 1982). After the bench trial, Searles was convicted and this appeal followed.

  5. State v. O'Hara

    627 A.2d 1001 (Me. 1993)   Cited 11 times

    The mere fact that the jurors stated they could be fair, notwithstanding their familiarity with the law enforcement witnesses, is no substitute for knowing the precise relationship between each juror and each of the prospective witnesses. While it is true, as the State notes, that we have held that a personal, social, or familial relationship with a law enforcement officer will not by itself support a challenge for cause, see State v. Heald, 443 A.2d 954, 956 (Me. 1982), we have never held that such a relationship with a law enforcement officer expected to testify as a witness would not support a challenge for cause. When, as here, members of the jury panel have indicated a familiarity with law enforcement witnesses, the trial court must conduct or permit further questioning concerning the precise nature of potential jurors' relationships with those witnesses. Only after such further questioning will the court have an adequate factual basis to rule on a challenge of those jurors for cause.

  6. State v. Louis

    156 Wis. 2d 470 (Wis. 1990)   Cited 62 times
    In State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the Supreme Court's rationale in Dennis, Frazier and Wood defeated the defendant's analogous claim that law enforcement officials harbor an implicit bias against criminal defendants. 156 Wis. 2d at 481-82.

    The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue raised here have concluded that law enforcement officials should not be per se ineligible to serve as petit jurors. See, e.g., United States v. McCord, 695 F.2d 823, 827-28 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371, 379 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Le Pera, 443 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 1971); Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719, 724 (2nd Cir. 1970); Fordham v. State, 513 So.2d 31, 34-35 (Ala.Ct.App. 1986); State v. Heald, 443 A.2d 954, 956 (Me. 1982); State v. Pawley, 123 Ariz. 387, 599 P.2d 840, 842 (Ct.App. 1979); State v. Radi, 578 P.2d 1169, 1175 (Mont. 1978); State v. Hunt, 37 N.C. App. 315, 246 S.E.2d 159, 163 (1978); State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1324, 1326 (Utah 1976); State v. Clark, 164 Conn. 224, 319 A.2d 398, 400 (1973); Commonwealth v. Colon, 233 Pa. Super. 202, 299 A.2d 326, 328 (1972); Parks v. Cupp, 5 Or. App. 51, 481 P.2d 372, 374 (1971).

  7. State v. McGowan

    541 A.2d 1301 (Me. 1988)   Cited 3 times

    We have repeatedly held that: "Connection with law enforcement by itself does not require a juror's dismissal." State v. Pelletier, 434 A.2d 52, 54 (Me. 1981); see also State v. Chattley, 390 A.2d 472, 477 (Me. 1978). From the record, we find that the trial court adequately inquired into potential juror bias during voir dire, see State v. Heald, 443 A.2d 954, 956 (Me. 1982), and that the court committed no reversible error in its denial of defendant's challenges for cause. See State v. Thibodeau, 524 A.2d 770, 771 (Me. 1987).

  8. State v. Beckett

    172 W. Va. 817 (W. Va. 1983)   Cited 55 times
    Ruling that a "social relationship" with a law enforcement officer who is "actively involved in the prosecution of the case" operates as a per se disqualification

    Most jurisdictions allow law enforcement officers to serve as jurors in criminal trials, absent a showing of actual bias or prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087, 96 S.Ct. 877, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976); Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981); State v. Heald, 443 A.2d 954 (Me. 1982); Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 415 N.E.2d 192 (1981); State v. Ternes, 259 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944, 98 S.Ct. 1524, 55 L.Ed.2d 540 (1978); State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976); Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d 895 (1976). In Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), the Supreme Court concluded that a juror's submission of a job application to the prosecutor's office during the trial of the case, and the failure of the prosecution to disclose this fact during trial was not violative of due process where the defendant was permitted in a post-trial hearing to prove the juror's actual bias.

  9. State v. Williams

    462 A.2d 491 (Me. 1983)   Cited 8 times
    Requiring that an offer of proof demonstrate the admissibility of the proposed testimony

    There is no suggestion that such evidence of mental frustration materially affected the defendant's capacity to form an intent to leave the Correctional Center. See State v. Heald, 443 A.2d 954, 956 (Me. 1982). The entry will be: