Opinion
Supreme Court No. 411, 2000
Date Submitted: June 5, 2001
Date Decided: June 29, 2001
Upon Defendant's Motion to Proceed Pro Se Upon Appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.
Marie O. Graham, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, attorneys for the State of Delaware.
Paul S. Swierzbinski, Public Defender's Office, Dover, Delaware, attorneys for the Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On March 30, 2000, the Defendant was found guilty of Assault in the Second Degree, Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. Subsequent to his trial, the Defendant was sentenced on July 27, 2000, having been declared a habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214, to eight years at Level 5 on the assault in the second degree charge, twenty-two years at Level 5 on the possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony conviction, and one year at Level 5, suspended for one year at Level 3, in connection with the unlawful imprisonment in the second degree charge.
This matter was remanded from the Supreme Court pursuant to Rules 19(c) and 26(d)(iii) for this Court to conduct a hearing on the record to consider the Defendant's request to proceed pro se on his appeal.
On June 25, 2001, this Court conducted an evidentiary hearing wherein the Defendant was present. Representing the Defendant was Paul S. Swierzbinski, Esquire.
Questions were asked of the Defendant as required by Watson v. State, Del. Supr. 564 A.2d 1107 (1989). It was clear from questioning the Defendant that his major complaint was the fact that he perceived a failure to communicate with his attorney which caused him to seek permission to proceed pro se on his appeal. After an extensive inquiry by the Court, the Court concluded that it would provide an opportunity for the Defendant to meet privately with his attorney and suspended the hearing.
Upon reconvening the hearing, the Defendant informed the Court that he wished to withdraw his application to act as his own attorney on appeal and specifically requested that Mr. Swierzbinski represent him in all stages of his appeal.
This Court finds that the Defendant is sincere in his desire to withdraw his request to proceed pro se. Therefore, I conclude that the Defendant's decision to withdraw his request to proceed pro se has been made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. If permitted by the Supreme Court, he should be allowed to proceed with legal representation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.