Nevertheless, we recount this testimony here to point out that the dissent's reliance on cases stating that citizens have special protection against governmental intrusions into their homes is misplaced. See Dissent at 915 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958); State v. Hatcher, 3 Wash.App. 441, 446, 475 P.2d 802 (1970)). ¶ 7 Terrones repeatedly asked Steen for his name and date of birth while he sat in the back of the patrol car.
Nevertheless, we recount this testimony here to point out that the dissent's reliance on cases stating that citizens have special protection against governmental intrusions into their homes is misplaced. See Dissent at 25 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307, 78 S. Ct. 1190, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1332 (1958); State v. Hatcher, 3 Wn. App. 441, 446, 475 P.2d 802 (1970)). Terrones repeatedly asked Steen for his name and date of birth while he sat in the back of the patrol car.
The court held the officers had reasonable cause to believe from what they heard on arrival at the house that destruction of evidence would follow announcement of purpose and demand for admittance and that accordingly, exigent circumstances excused the necessity for announcement of purpose and demand for admittance. State v. Hatcher, 3 Wn. App. 441, 475 P.2d 802 (1970) is a case in which the court affirmed the trial court's order suppressing evidence obtained in executing a search warrant in a manner violative of the Fourth Amendment. The court reviewed the Ker and Young cases and held that there were no exigent circumstances in that case that excused compliance with the "knock and announce" rule.
In Washington, a violation of the rule, unless excused by exigent circumstances ( see State v. Young, supra), requires that any evidence thereby obtained be suppressed. State v. Hatcher, 3 Wn. App. 441, 475 P.2d 802 (1970); State v. Miller, supra; Coleman v. Reilly, 8 Wn. App. 684, 508 P.2d 1035 (1973); State v. Johnson, 11 Wn. App. 311, 522 P.2d 1179 (1974). The State asserts, however, that the presence of the undercover officer inside the premises prior to the entry of the other officers distinguishes this case from prior cases.
Numerous state courts have considered the constitutional issue; the decisions are in conflict, with the Supreme Court of Nebraska's judicial notice position being in the minority.Compare Reynolds v. State, 46 Ala. App. 77, 238 So.2d 557, 559-60 (Ala.Cr.App.) cert. denied, 286 Ala. 740, 238 So.2d 560 (1970); State v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395, 454 P.2d 140, 144-45 (1969); People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586, 63 Cal.Rptr. 10, 12, 432 P.2d 706, 708 (1967); State v. Anonymous, 30 Conn. Sup. 197, 308 A.2d 251, 252 (1973); People v. Ouellette, 78 Ill.2d 511, 36 Ill.Dec. 666, 669-70, 401 N.E.2d 507, 510-11 (1979); State v. Dusch, 259 Ind. 507, 289 N.E.2d 515, 518 (1972); Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. 413, 439 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1982); State v. Daniels, 294 Minn. 323, 200 N.W.2d 403, 410 (1972); Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 240 A.2d 795, 798 (1968); State v. Carufel, 112 R.I. 664, 314 A.2d 144, 147 (1974); Heaton v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 137, 207 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1974); State v. Hatcher, 3 Wn. App. 441, 475 P.2d 802, 804-05 (1970); State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis.2d 615, 348 N.W.2d 512, 519-20 (1984) (all rejecting a blanket rule), with People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 484 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1971); Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A.2d 516, 519-20 (1964); People v. DeLago, 16 N.Y.2d 289, 266 N.Y.S.2d 353, 356, 213 N.E.2d 659, 661 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963, 86 S.Ct. 1235, 16 L.Ed.2d 305 (1966); State v. Meyer, 209 Neb. 757, 311 N.W.2d 520, 524 (1981); State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772, 777-78 (N.D. 1973); State v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Utah 1974) (all upholding a blanket rule). The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry always turns on the facts of a particular case.
" Reynolds v. State, 46 Ala. App. 77, 238 So.2d 557, certiorari denied, 286 Ala. 740, 238 So.2d 560 (1970); State v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395, 454 P.2d 140 (1969); and State v. Hatcher, 3 Wn. App. 441, 475 P.2d 802 (1970), are others in that line of cases. The other line of cases, holding that a blanket rule permitting unannounced entry in narcotics cases does not affront constitutional standards, include People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 484 P.2d 1238 (1971); People v. Hartfield, 94 Ill. App.2d 421, 237 N.E.2d 193 (1968); Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A.2d 516 (1964); State v. Johnson, 102 R.I. 344, 230 A.2d 831 (1967).
No blanket exception exists for narcotics cases, in spite of the relative ease of disposal of drugs. State v. Hatcher, 3 Wn. App. 441, 475 P.2d 802 (1970). In the present case, police observed no such activities at the scene and had no specific information on defendant's likelihood to destroy contraband.
A violation of this rule, unless excused by exigent circumstances, requires that any evidence thereby obtained be suppressed. State v. Johnson, 11 Wn. App. 311, 522 P.2d 1179 (1974); State v. Hatcher, 3 Wn. App. 441, 475 P.2d 802 (1970). The defendant maintains that RCW 10.31.040 applies to the breaking of an inner door for the purpose of making an arrest of additional suspects and that no exigent circumstances existed which would excuse compliance with the statute.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the police acted reasonably in entering the house immediately without first stopping to comply with the knock and wait rule. State v. Hatcher, 3 Wn. App. 441, 475 P.2d 802 (1970) and State v. Johnson, supra, relied upon by the defendant, are distinguishable. In Hatcher, a drug case, the officers viewed the defendant through an open window sitting in a chair asleep.
In Washington, a violation of the rule, unless excused by exigent circumstances, requires that any evidence thereby obtained be suppressed. State v. Johnson, 11 Wn. App. 311, 522 P.2d 1179 (1974); State v. Hatcher, 3 Wn. App. 441, 475 P.2d 802 (1970). In a case similar to the one at bar, State v. Lowrie, supra at 157, the court made the following observation: