State v. Harwood

13 Citing cases

  1. State v. Burnight

    132 Idaho 654 (Idaho 1999)   Cited 272 times
    Holding that a seventeen year old's failure to attack the district court's jurisdiction before his plea on an attempted robbery charge waived his right to raise the issue in later motions or on appeal

    We agree with the State and hold that Burnight, by failing to attack the district court's jurisdiction over him for the attempted robbery charge, waived his right to raise the issue either in later motions to the district court or to this Court on appeal. In so holding, we follow our previous decision, State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228 (1977). We also note that a Rule 35 motion is the improper mechanism for Burnight's challenge to the attempted robbery charge.

  2. State v. Tidton

    99 Idaho 670 (Idaho 1978)   Cited 20 times

    We do not reach a consideration of the merits of appellant's assignments on this issue. This Court held in State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228 (1977), that review of a magistrate's order waiving juvenile jurisdiction must be sought in the district court by way of appeal before charges as an adult have proceeded to trial. See I.C. §§ 16-1801 et seq., particularly § 16-1806 and § 16-1819.

  3. In re Doe

    79 P.3d 165 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003)

    The case did not present the question now before us: whether the State must prove the status of the defendant as an element of the offense where the issue was not raised before trial. The State's contention that the age of the accused is a matter of personal jurisdiction and was waived by Doe's failure to raise the issue prior to the evidentiary hearing is supported by State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228 (1977), and State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 978 P.2d 214 (1999). In Harwood, a juvenile was charged with burglary under the Youth Rehabilitation Act, former I.C. § 16-1801, et seq., which was the precursor to the JCA. The juvenile court granted a petition by the state to waive juvenile jurisdiction, and the case was transferred to the district court where the defendant pleaded guilty. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, the defendant claimed error in the admission of hearsay testimony at the hearing held on the petition for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.

  4. Hamilton v. State

    320 Ark. 346 (Ark. 1995)   Cited 16 times

    The State asserts that this appeal should be dismissed as untimely since Hamilton failed to appeal the circuit court's February 19, 1993, ruling denying transfer of his case to juvenile court. In making this assertion, the State asks us to adopt the rationale of State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228 (1977), in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that a juvenile cannot challenge a trial court's denial of a motion to transfer on direct appeal. We agree with the State's argument, and find persuasive the following language in Harwood:

  5. Dillard v. State

    101 Idaho 917 (Idaho 1981)   Cited 8 times
    Allowing new evidence that rehabilitation centers were no longer available where magistrate court based its decision on the availability of such centers

    "There can be no doubt that the state's `substantial interests' are affected by a denial of waiver. In State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228 (1977), the Court held that appellate review of waiver must be sought before adult charges have proceeded to trial. The Court based it result not only on the fact that a waiver is final termination of juvenile jurisdiction, but also the conclusion that `since substantial rights of a juvenile may be lost by a waiver proceeding it constitutes a critical stage in the proceedings, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), the right to an immediate appeal from the waiver order is evident' ( 98 Idaho at 795, 572 P.2d 1228).

  6. People of Territory of Guam v. Kingsbury

    649 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1981)   Cited 21 times
    Adopting Cox Broadcasting and finding practical finality when an issue could not be raised in a later appeal

    See cases cited in first sentence of footnote 3 supra.See State v. Stanley, 60 Haw. 527, 592 P.2d 422, 425-26 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871, 100 S.Ct. 149, 62 L.Ed.2d 97 (1979); State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228, 1230 (1977); People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal.3d 698, 135 Cal.Rptr. 392, 557 P.2d 976, 983-85 (1976), overruled on another ground sub nom. People v. Green, 27 Cal.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468 (Sup.Ct. 1980) (en banc); Aye v. State, 17 Md. App. 32, 299 A.2d 513 (1973); State v. Briggs, 245 Or. 503, 420 P.2d 71, 73 (1966); State v. Loray, 46 N.J. 179, 190, 215 A.2d 539, 545 (1965).

  7. State v. Kavajecz

    139 Idaho 482 (Idaho 2003)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that touching or kissing of the chest area of a minor child is not lewd conduct as defined under I.C. § 18-1508

    The record shows that Kavajecz himself requested the waiver to district court and that he desired to forego the hearing and findings of fact required by I.C. § 20-508, apparently to save the court time and to ensure his ability to have a trial by jury, a right not afforded in cases brought under the JCA. Kavajecz did not challenge the waiver prior to trial in the district court (and indeed stipulated to the waiver) and raises the issue for the first time on appeal. This Court has held in State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 978 P.2d 214 (1999), and in State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228 (1977), that a juvenile defendant who fails to challenge a district court's jurisdiction over him prior to trial waives this right on appeal. We find these cases applicable here. Because Kavajecz did not object to the district court's jurisdiction prior to entering a plea or proceeding to trial, he waived such a right and the issue cannot be raised here.

  8. State v. Howerton

    174 W. Va. 801 (W. Va. 1985)   Cited 15 times
    In State v. Howerton, 174 W. Va. 801, 807, 329 S.E.2d 874, 880 (1985) we referred to "a tacit admission by silence where some accusation is made in the presence of and directed at the defendant which would ordinarily call for a denial or a response and the defendant remains silent", but we contrasted this with an adoptive admission "where the party by words or conduct signifies his acquiescence or approval of an out-of-court statement."

    requires that a petition for appeal must be presented to this Court within forty-five days from entry of the transfer order, or the right of appeal and the right to object to the transfer order shall be waived and may not thereafter be asserted. We, therefore, hold that a juvenile defendant's failure to comply with W. Va. Code, 49-5-10(f), relating to a direct appeal of a transfer to the criminal jurisdiction of the circuit court, forecloses our considering his objection as to the transfer hearing on his subsequent criminal appeal. Our statute is in accord with the general rule independently fashioned by courts that an appeal of a juvenile transfer must be made prior to the criminal trial and, if it is not, the validity of the transfer cannot be challenged as a part of the subsequent criminal appeal. People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal.3d 698, 557 P.2d 976, 135 Cal.Rptr. 392 (1976); State v. Stanley, 60 Haw. 527, 592 P.2d 422, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871, 100 S.Ct. 149, 62 L.Ed.2d 97 (1979); State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228 (1977); People v. Goodman, 41 N.Y.2d 888, 362 N.E.2d 615, 393 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1977). W. Va. Code, 49-5-10(f), provides, in pertinent part:

  9. State v. Hood

    102 Idaho 711 (Idaho 1981)   Cited 300 times

    In State v. Machen, 100 Idaho 167, 595 P.2d 316 (1979) the defendant, who was older than Hood and had a substantial prior record, was sentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years for felony escape. As I said in State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 796, 572 P.2d 1228, 1231 (1977) of that juvenile's sentence on his first felony conviction: "Even assuming that juvenile procedures had theretofore failed to help him find himself, and conceding that the public is entitled to some respite from his taking ways, I submit that a commutation of his sentence to county jail time was highly in order.

  10. State v. Bowcutt

    620 P.2d 795 (Idaho 1980)   Cited 8 times

    For a youthful offender of but nineteen years, I would have thought that on his first trip to the main yard a sentence of two to three years maximum very well might have served the various societal interests as does the heavier sentence of nine years maximum. And I tend to agree with his counsel that a nine year sentence for the crime committed is considerably higher than is ordinarily meted out to the youthful offender who is going to experience his first taste of prison life. See, for example, State v. Kerrigan, 98 Idaho 701, 571 P.2d 762 (1977), where Judge Maynard of the Second District awarded a five year sentence to a twenty year old for a crime of violence and armed robbery, and State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228 (1977), where Judge Prather of the First District awarded a five year tern to a youth who was guilty of burglary at age seventeen. Nonetheless, as defense counsel may well take note, the Court's opinion today discloses that a meaningful sentence review was indeed made, and went well beyond observing that the sentence was within the statutory limits.