Opinion
ID No. 9808012408.
Submitted: October 22, 1999.
Decided: January 20, 2000.
UPON DEFENDANT'S AMENDED PRO SE MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF. SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 20th day of January, 2000, upon consideration of Defendant's pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief, it appears to this Court that:
1. Richard C. Harvey, Sr. (Defendant) has filed this pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Defendant requests the dismissal of the original indictment and immediate release based on fourteen (14) grounds. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
2. On August 16, 1998 Defendant was arrested for Reckless Endangering First Degree, Criminal Mischief, Disorderly Conduct, and two counts of Violation of Probation. A jury trial on one count of Criminal Mischief (felony) was held on January 25, 1999 through January 26, 1999. The Defendant was found guilty of Criminal Mischief (misdemeanor). On January 26, 1999, Defendant was sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of $50.00 plus an eighteen percent (18%) surcharge for the victim compensation fund. The Defendant was placed in the custody of the Department of Correction at supervision level 5 for a period of 10 days, including credit for any time previously served. This sentence was suspended for 1 year at supervision level 2. On October 6, 1999 Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief alleging fourteen (14) grounds.
3. Before addressing the merits of any claim raised in a motion seeking postconviction relief, the Court must first apply the rules governing the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Rule 61(d)(4) provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified." Claims for postconviction relief which are entirely conclusory may be summarily dismissed on that basis.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (199) ( citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)).
Super Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4); See e.g., Jordan v. State, Del. Supr., No. 270, 1994, Walsh, J. (August 25, 1994) (ORDER); State v. Brittingham, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. 1N91-01-1009-R1, Barron, J. (December 29, 1994) (ORDER) at 3 ( citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556) (holding that conclusory allegations are legally insufficient to warrant postconviction relief).
4. Ground one of Defendant's motion is based on a "denial of right to confrontation" and "due process of law." Defendant states that the court "refused to allow any evidence pertaining to the government informants — alleged victim's credibility and therefore, movant argues that he was denied an effective defense."
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief at back of page 1.
Id.
5. In Grounds two, three, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, and fourteen of the motion, Defendant contends that there was a "denial of due process and equal protection of laws." Defendant argues in ground two that the court "denied movant civil rights by arbitrarily refusing to hear and grant movants "numerous motions to dismiss.'" Defendant states in ground three that "the court arbitrarily and capriciously denied movants motion for a new trial." Defendant contends in ground five that "the court granted Defendant's motion to sequester prosecutions witnesses. It changed such accordingly." In ground six of his motion, Defendant states that the court denied him due process and equal protection when the court "entered it's original order of conviction, it erred . . ., the subsequent order of `modification' . . . violated movants rights. . . ." In ground seven, Defendant contends that violations of a sequestration order, the courts "arbitrary" denial of the motion to dismiss amounted to a denial of his right to an "impartial jury and fair trial." Ground eight of Defendant's motion states that the court denied movant his civil rights by "arbitrarily refusing to approve movant his constitutional and statutory right to present evidence favorable to his defense." In ground nine of his motion, Defendant states that he was not accorded his right to represent himself. Ground ten of Defendant's motion states that the court allowed into evidence a "highly prejudicial photograph." In ground eleven of his the motion, Defendant argues that his rights were violated because the court "on it's own . . . sua sponte stopped movant's line of questioning and instructed [him] at side bar to purse another line of questioning." Ground twelve of Defendant's motion states that he was denied his civil rights because the "order of conviction, sentencing, resentencing and VOP are not indorsed by a judge of Superior [Court] and therefore should not have been enforced or reinforced as they were." In ground thirteen of the motion, Defendant contends that the court "arbitrarily vacated [his] pro se status and authorized the P.D. to proceed." In ground fourteen, Defendant argues that he was denied his rights "because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and enter a judgment of conviction against the movant."
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at back of 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at back of 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
6. Ground four of Defendant's motion asserts that he was denied "due process, equal protection of laws and confrontation." Defendant further asserts that the court "arbitrarily denied movants rights by refusing to allow him to recall witnesses in his case in chief."
Id. at back of 1.
Id.
7. Defendant's above allegations of a "denial of right to confrontation — due process of law," the "denial of due process and equal protection of laws," and the "denial of due process, equal protection of laws and confrontation" are all conclusory. Defendant proffers no factual support for the numerous, repetitive, and lengthy allegations. Defendant merely claims in a conclusory manner that he was denied certain civil rights. The Court finds these contentions vague and entirely conclusory, warranting summary dismissal.
See n. 2.
8. For the reasons stated, Defendant's pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.