Opinion
No. 3-370 / 02-0638
Filed July 10, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark D. Cleve, Judge.
Napoleon Hartsfield appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction for conspiracy to deliver crack cocaine in violation of Iowa Code sections 703.1, 706.1, and 706.3 (2001). AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Napoleon Hartsfield, Fort Madison, for appellant pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, William Davis, County Attorney, and Kelly Cunningham, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Napoleon Hartsfield appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction for conspiracy to deliver crack cocaine in violation of Iowa Code sections 703.1, 706.1, and 706.3 (2001). He contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and his trial counsel was ineffective. In addition to those claims raised by counsel, Hartsfield also raises several pro se claims. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings. On July 31, 2001, at approximately, 3:30 p.m., undercover Officers Gilbert Proehl and Jeff Collins were driving through downtown Davenport when surveillance officers notified them that a male individual, later identified as Hartsfield, might be involved in prostitution or selling drugs. The officers drove to the street corner where Hartsfield was standing and pulled over. Officer Proehl called out to Hartsfield. Hartsfield, who was accompanied by a female, replied there were too many people in the car for "his girl." Officer Proehl then asked where "James," a known drug dealer was, and Hartsfield responded "no one would date two guys." Officer Proehl said he was not interested in a date, but he was looking to buy a "half." Hartsfield informed officers he would arrange for the delivery of the drugs and also told them not to deal with anyone else unless they wanted to get "ganked."
The term "half" refers to an amount of crack cocaine.
The term "ganked" means to receive fake crack cocaine.
Hartsfield went to a payphone and made some phone calls. When he came back to the officers' vehicle, he informed Officer Proehl he had called James's brother and the crack cocaine would be in good condition and he could inspect it before he made the purchase. Then Hartsfield instructed the officers to drive to a certain area and pull over. About thirty minutes later, a jeep belonging to James Thornton arrived in the area. Hartsfield approached the vehicle and had a conversation with the occupants. Next Hartsfield walked back to the officers' vehicle and asked Officer Proehl to get out of the car. Officer Proehl exited the vehicle, and Hartsfield told him that the men in the jeep would not give him the rock unless they got paid. Hartsfield stated he only had thirty dollars and he needed an additional twenty dollars. Hartsfield gave Officer Proehl his shoes as collateral for the twenty dollars. Hartsfield got into the jeep, and the men left the area.
The jeep appeared to be driving toward Centennial Bridge and Rock Island, Illinois. Officer Proehl instructed officers in the area to stop the car before it left the jurisdiction so the occupants could be identified. Officers from the gang unit stopped the jeep for a seat belt violation. The officers identified James Thornton as the driver, Roosevelt Thornton as the passenger, and Hartsfield as the backseat passenger. The officers obtained consent to search the jeep and found no contraband. Officers allowed the occupants to go. At approximately 4:30 p.m., Officers Proehl and Collins observed Hartsfield walking in the same area where he had previously made the phone calls. Officer Proehl waved Hartsfield over to their vehicle and asked him about the money. Hartsfield stated he had received Proehl's rock but had to swallow it when police initiated a traffic stop. He further stated that Roosevelt Thornton swallowed four bags of cocaine. Hartsfield also indicated that the police had taken his identification and money and he promised to pay them back. Subsequently, Hartsfield was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant.
On October 18, 2001, Hartsfield was charged by trial information with conspiracy to deliver crack cocaine in violation of Iowa Code sections 703.1, 706.1, and 706.3. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The district court sentenced Hartsfield to a five-year indeterminate term of incarceration. Hartsfield appeals.
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Hartsfield contends the district court erred in finding sufficient evidence that he entered into an "agreement" to deliver crack cocaine. We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for errors at law. State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2001). A verdict of guilty is binding on appeal unless no substantial evidence exists to support it, or it is clearly against the weight of the evidence. State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). Substantial evidence means evidence that could convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Iowa Code section 124.401(1) makes it a crime "for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance . . . or conspire with one or more other persons to manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance . . . ." Iowa Code section 706.1 defines the crime of conspiracy:
1. A person commits conspiracy with another if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime which is an aggravated misdemeanor or felony, the person does either of the following:
a. Agrees with another that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct constituting the crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit the crime.
b. Agrees to aid another in the planning or commission of the crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit the crime.
2. It is not necessary for the conspirator to know the identity of each and every conspirator.
3. A person shall not be convicted of conspiracy unless it is alleged and proven that at least one conspirator committed an overt act evidencing a design to accomplish the purpose of the conspiracy by criminal means.
4. A person shall not be convicted of conspiracy if the only other person or persons involved in the conspiracy were acting at the behest of or as agents of a law enforcement agency in an investigation of the criminal activity alleged at the time of the formation of the conspiracy.
The critical issue in this case is whether the State presented sufficient evidence of the agreement element of the offense. Our supreme court has described an agreement as a `"concert of free wills,' `union of the minds of at least two persons,' and `a mental confederation involving at least two persons."' State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 741-42 (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted). The conspiracy does not depend on the fulfillment of the agreement, only that there is an agreement. Ross, 573 N.W.2d at 914. Both direct and circumstantial evidence may be used to prove such a meeting of the minds. Casady, 597 N.W.2d at 804-05; State v. Mapp, 585 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1998). Circumstantial evidence includes the declarations and conduct of the alleged conspirators and all reasonable inferences arising from such evidence. Casady, 597 N.W.2d at 805. Moreover, "the agreement may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. All legitimate inferences arising reasonably and fairly from the evidence may be indulged in to support the verdict." State v. Ruiz, 496 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992).
In the present case, we acknowledge there is no direct evidence that Hartsfield agreed to deliver crack cocaine. However, in considering the surrounding circumstances, we find there is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Hartsfield did conspire to deliver crack cocaine. Hartsfield informed Officers Proehl and Collins he would facilitate the drug deal. Then he went to a pay phone and contacted James Thornton, a known drug dealer. Shortly thereafter, a jeep driven by James Thornton arrived in the area. Hartsfield approached the jeep and appeared to be having a conversation with the Thorntons. After this conversation, he returned to the officers' vehicle and obtained twenty dollars from them for the "rock." Then Hartsfield got into the Thorntons' jeep, and they headed toward Rock Island, Illinois. After being stopped by police, Hartsfield returned to the area where he initially had spoken with the officers. He told them he had swallowed the rock because police initiated a traffic stop and Roosevelt Thornton swallowed four bags of crack cocaine. He indicated that police had taken his money, however, he intended to pay them back. From this record, we conclude Hartsfield's conviction is supported by substantial evidence, and affirm the district court on this issue.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Our review of an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo. State v. Bergmann, 600 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 1999). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). A defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel when (1) the defense attorney fails in an essential duty and (2) prejudice results. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be disposed of if the defendant fails to prove either prong. State v. Cook, 565 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1997).
Ordinarily we preserve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal for postconviction proceedings to allow full development of the facts surrounding counsel's conduct. State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817, 833 (Iowa 1997). "Even a lawyer is entitled to his day in court, especially when his professional reputation is impugned." State v. Coil, 264 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1978). We will resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal when the record is adequate to decide the issue. State v. Arne, 579 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Iowa 1998). We deem this record sufficient.
Hartsfield claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to references of pimping under Iowa Rules of Evidence 5.402 (relevancy), 5.403 (undue prejudice), 5.404 (character and other bad acts evidence inadmissible to prove character), 5.608 (evidence of character and conduct of witness), and 5.609 (impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime). The State contends evidence of pimping was admissible because it was part of the circumstances of the case not evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. See Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d at 83 (stating "evidence immediately surrounding the offense is admissible in order to show the complete story of the a crime, even when it shows commission of another crime."); State v. Lockheart, 410 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Iowa Ct.App. 1987) (noting "when acts are so clearly related in time and place and so intimately connected that they form a continuous transaction, the whole transaction may be shown to complete the story."). We agree. Furthermore, the evidence of pimping was not "wholly independent" of the crime for which Hartsfield is on trial. See State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 1994) (holding "[e]vidence of other offenses should never be admitted when the other offense is committed wholly independent of the one for which the defendant is on trial"). We note, even if defense counsel had objected, the district court would not have abused its discretion in admitting evidence of pimping or in concluding its probative value was not "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice" under rule 5.403. Therefore, we deny Hartsfield's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In his pro se brief, Hartsfield raises several additional claims. After carefully reviewing the record, we find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we affirm Hartsfield's conviction and sentence.