Thus, a sufficient attack on the constitutionality of the ordinance was raised in the BZA. Moreover, in State v. Hartrampf, 273 Ga. 522, 523 ( 544 S.E.2d 130) (2001), which was decided just six months ago, we held that § 134-346 violates the Georgia Constitution because it "operates to create the situation prohibited by OCGA § 32-6-83; assuming that a sign has been damaged and, under the ordinance is in a condition so as not to be repaired, the ordinance effects its removal without compensation." Here, Cobb County revoked Outdoor's permit in reliance on § 134-346, contending that the sign, as the result of an Act of God, was in a condition such that repair was prohibited.
But Vann points us to no evidence in the record that he conducted any inspection of the mobile home at issue pursuant to the Uniform Act or the Minimum Fire Safety Standards Code. Finally, as for the ordinances of Augusta–Richmond County and its adoption of the International Property Maintenance Code, we note that our Constitution authorizes only the General Assembly to immunize public officers and employees from liability “for injuries and damages caused by the negligent performance of, or negligent failure to perform, their ministerial functions,” Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX(d), and no local ordinance can supersede the Constitution. See State v. Hartrampf, 273 Ga. 522, 523–524, 544 S.E.2d 130 (2001). Accordingly, if Vann is charged with negligence in the performance of a ministerial duty, Augusta–Richmond County cannot cloak him with immunity, and if he is not so charged, the doctrine of official immunity is sufficient to protect him.