Opinion
No. 1-1050 / 01-0821.
Filed March 27, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, CARLYNN D. GRUPP, Judge.
Kevin Al Hart appeals from his convictions for driving while barred and possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) following bench trial. AFFIRMED.
Russell Schroeder, Jr. of Schroeder Law Office, Charles City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Cristen Odell, Assistant Attorney General, Paul L. Martin, County Attorney and Carlyle Dalen, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by MAHAN, P.J., and MILLER and HECHT, JJ.
Kevin Al Hart appeals from his convictions for driving while barred and possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) following bench trial. He contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Kevin Al Hart was stopped by Iowa State Trooper Ryan Moore on September 6, 2000 at approximately 10:45 p.m. while he was driving his vehicle northbound on Highway 65, a four-lane highway. Trooper Moore testified at the suppression hearing that Hart's vehicle first came to his attention when it crossed the dividing line into the other lane and then corrected back. Moore stated he then activated his in-car video camera and followed Hart for approximately another quarter mile. Because Hart continued to weave within his own lane Trooper Moore stopped the vehicle. After the stop Moore proceeded to search the vehicle as well as Hart and his passenger. Hart was arrested and charged with operating while intoxicated (second offense), in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (1999), driving while barred, in violation of Iowa Code section 321.561, and possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(5) and 124.206(4)(b).
Hart filed a motion to suppress alleging the stop was without probable cause and no reasonable grounds existed for the officer to believe criminal activity was taking place. Therefore, he argued the subsequent warrantless search violated both his federal and state constitutional rights. The trial court held a hearing on Hart's motion. Trooper Moore testified for the State and Hart
testified on his own behalf. The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding Hart's driving was "sufficiently unusual to justify the officer's reasonable belief that criminal activity may be afoot."
Hart waived jury trial. The parties stipulated that the court take judicial notice of the minutes of evidence, and that if called the witnesses would testify as set forth in the minutes. By agreement the court also received and considered the Iowa Department of Criminal Investigation's laboratory report and Hart's driving record. The driving while intoxicated charge was dismissed. The district court found Hart guilty as charged on Count IV (driving while barred) and Count V (possession of methamphetamine) and sentenced him to fifteen days in jail on each count, to run concurrently. Hart appeals from his convictions, contending the court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officer did not have sufficiently specific and articulable cause to reasonably believe criminal activity was afoot in order to justify the investigatory stop.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a person's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. We review this constitutional question de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the record. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). "We give deference to the district court's fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings." Id. The adverse ruling on Hart's motion to suppress preserved error for our review. State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998).
The rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1694, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961).
III. MERITS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in a prosecution, no matter how relevant or probative the evidence may be. State v. Manna, 534 N.W.2d 642, 643-44 (Iowa 1995).
The Fourth Amendment requires a police officer must have reasonable cause to stop an individual for investigatory purposes. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. Tompkins, 507 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). An automobile stop is subject to these Fourth Amendment protections and will be upheld only when it is reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95 (1996).
When a stop is challenged on the basis that reasonable cause did not exist, the State must show that the stopping officer had
"specific and articulable cause to support a reasonable belief that criminal activity may have occurred." . . . If the State fails to meet its burden, the evidence obtained as a result of the stop must be suppressed.State v. Lamp, 322 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Iowa 1982) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2000).
The only issue on appeal is whether Trooper Moore, based on his observations of Hart's driving, had specific and articulable cause to support a reasonable belief criminal activity may have occurred. We determine whether a police officer's observations of a vehicle weaving within its own lane of traffic give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify an investigatory stop based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Iowa 1997).
As set forth above, Moore testified at the suppression hearing that he saw Hart cross the dividing line into the other lane and then correct back. Trooper Moore then turned on his in-car camera and observed further "brief weaving within the lane" which was recorded on his videotape. We agree with the district court that Moore's description of Hart's driving as "brief weaving" is consistent with the driving reflected at various points on the videotape footage from Moore's camera.
We conclude the facts and circumstances surrounding the stop of Hart's vehicle provided reasonable suspicion for the belief that criminal activity was afoot. Trooper Moore testified he observed Hart cross the dividing line into the other lane, come back into his own lane, and then continue to weave within his own lane. Although the videotape was not turned on in time to show Hart crossing the dividing line, what it does show is consistent with the periodic weaving described by Moore. Based upon these facts and circumstances we find the stop of Hart's vehicle was justified. See Otto, 566 N.W.2d at 511.
We agree with the district court that the method in which Hart was operating his vehicle and the time and place in question was sufficiently unusual and erratic to justify the officer's reasonable belief criminal activity may have been occurring. We conclude the district court correctly denied Hart's motion to suppress and accordingly affirm Hart's convictions.
AFFIRMED.