State v. Harrison

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Inman

    275 Or. App. 920 (Or. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 26 times
    Discussing pretext call made by eleven-year-old sexual assault victim to her abuser, despite the officer's admission that they “‘kind of felt bad while [they] were doing it,' but he believed that the pretext call ‘was necessary to try to get as much evidence as we could.'”

    We have, on occasion, declined to treat vouching as plain error where it was more indirect or implied. One witness, for example, stated, “ ‘I believe the statistic at Liberty House is 96 to 98 percent of the time when a child makes a disclosure about abuse, there's truth to it,’ ” but he “stopped short of stating that [the victim] was like the 96 to 98 percent of Liberty House complainants whose reports were truthful.” State v. Harrison, 267 Or.App. 571, 575, 577, 340 P.3d 777 (2014). There was no objection to that testimony at trial and, on appeal, the defendant argued that the court should have struck the testimony sua sponte.

  2. State v. Doran

    325 Or. App. 220 (Or. Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    The lack of objection in such instances prevents clarification of the testimony, and therefore, generally presents a reasonable dispute as to whether the witness impermissibly vouched. State v. Harrison, 267 Or.App. 571, 576-77, 340 P.3d 777 (2014), rev den, 357 Or. 164 (2015).

  3. Bogard v. State

    2019 WY 96 (Wyo. 2019)   Cited 28 times

    While that is the view of the majority of the jurisdictions to have addressed the issue, other jurisdictions have reached the opposite conclusion when the statistical evidence has no link to the victim. See Alvarez–Madrigal v. State , 71 N.E.3d 887, 890–93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) ; State v. Harrison , 267 Or.App. 571, 340 P.3d 777, 779–81 (2014) ; State v. Morales-Pedrosa , 369 Wis.2d 75, 879 N.W.2d 772, 777–80 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016). We have yet to address this specific issue and will not do so here.

  4. State v. Coffelt

    332 Or. App. 787 (Or. Ct. App. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    See State v. Cox, 337 Or. 477, 500, 98 P.3d 1103 (2004), cert den, 546 U.S. 830 (2005) (declining to exercise discretion to correct plain error and explaining that, had the defendant timely objected to witness testimony at trial, "the state * * * could have chosen to forego the testimony and avoid the issue"); see also State v. Harrison, 267 Or.App. 571, 577, 340 P.3d 777 (2014), rev den, 357 Or. 164 (2015) (explaining that, where there was "a reasonable dispute as to whether [the witness] impermissibly vouched for" the alleged child victim, "the trial court did not plainly err by not sua sponte striking the disputed testimony"); State v. Wilson, 266 Or.App. 481, 495, 337 P.3d 990 (2014), rev den, 356 Or. 837 (2015) (where the witness "was not clearly vouching for [the victim's] credibility in accusing [the] defendant of sexual abuse, * * * the trial court did not plainly err in failing to strike the testimony sua sponte"). Accordingly, we reject defendant's first assignment of error.

  5. State v. Murphy

    319 Or. App. 330 (Or. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 16 times
    Declining to exercise discretion to correct the trial court's plain error where the vouching testimony, which was brief, was erroneously admitted in a bench trial, was not mentioned by either party, and the court's decision "made clear that it had made its own credibility determinations" and did not rely on the challenged evidence

    Conversely, if a witness's testimony was ambiguous—such that the witness may or may not have been vouching—there is no plain error in not having stricken the testimony sua sponte , in part because the lack of objection prevented clarification of the testimony. See, e.g. , State v. Harrison , 267 Or. App. 571, 577, 340 P.3d 777 (2014), rev. den. , 357 Or. 164, 351 P.3d 52 (2015) (where there was "a reasonable dispute as to whether [the witness] impermissibly vouched for" the alleged child victim, "the trial court did not plainly err by not sua sponte striking the disputed testimony"); State v. Wilson , 266 Or. App. 481, 495, 337 P.3d 990 (2014), rev. den. , 356 Or. 837, 346 P.3d 496 (2015) (where the witness "was not clearly vouching for L's credibility in accusing defendant of sexual abuse, *** the trial court did not plainly err in failing to strike the testimony sua sponte "). And, if the witness unambiguously did not vouch, obviously there is no error, plain or otherwise, in not striking the testimony as vouching.

  6. State v. Morales-Pedrosa

    369 Wis. 2d 75 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 14 times
    Distinguishing Brooks and Snowden on ground that generalized statement that 90 percent of children claiming to have been abused are telling the truth was "less obviously objectionable than testimony that ‘99.5%,’ ‘98%,’ or even ‘92–98%’ are telling the truth"

    Additionally, McGuire never suggested B.M. was like the generalized ninety percent nor connected the statistic to her report of abuse or the likelihood she was telling the truth. See State v. Harrison, 267 Or.App. 571, 340 P.3d 777, 780–81 (2014) (In plain error context, court stated the challenged evidence was “not clearly vouching” or otherwise impermissible, noting the testimony of the state's expert witness that “96 to 98 percent of the time when a child makes a disclosure about abuse, there's truth to it ... stopped short of stating [the victim] was like the 96 to 98 percent of ... complainants whose reports were truthful,” and further stating “it is not apparent [the expert] even indirectly connected the statistic ... to [the victim's] report of abuse or its purported veracity.”)