Opinion
Case No. 20020025-CA.
Filed June 19, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick.
Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Greenwood.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Johnny Harris (Defendant) appeals a jury conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-1316(2) (1998).
On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict. "Th[is] court's power to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence is limited." State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292, ¶ 13, 13 P.3d 604 (quotations and citations omitted).
[W]e do not sit as a second trier of fact: It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops.
State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ¶ 67, 27 P.3d 1115 (quotations and citation omitted). "`We will reverse a jury verdict only when . . . we find that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.'" State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, ¶ 7, 54 P.3d 645 (quoting Silva, 2000 UT App 292 at ¶ 13) (additional quotations and citations omitted). A review of the evidence presented in this case reveals that "`some evidence'" was presented to support the jury verdict, Mead, 2001 UT 58 at ¶ 67 (citation omitted), and the verdict was not "`plainly unreasonable and unjust.'" Hardy, 2002 UT App 244 at ¶ 7 (citation omitted).
At trial, Officer David Malley (Malley) testified that he pursued a vehicle that failed to stop when he attempted to initiate a traffic stop. Malley testified that when the car eventually stopped, he witnessed the driver and two passengers flee, and that one of the passengers hesitated before running, allowing Malley to get a better look at the man. Malley radioed dispatch with information about the men. Shortly thereafter, Defendant and Andy Rasabout (Rasabout) were stopped about a block and a half from the scene, by Officer Steve Cutler (Cutler), based on dispatch's description of the men.
Rasabout testified that he was a passenger in the vehicle and that Defendant was the driver, that he and the other occupants of the vehicle fled because Defendant told them the car was stolen, and that he fled with Defendant. His testimony was consistent with Cutler's testimony that the two men were together when he stopped them. Cutler also testified that both men were breathing hard and had perspiration on their faces.
Finally, Malley testified that when he arrived to identify the two men, he instantly recognized Rasabout as one of the passengers. He also testified that, based on his memory and the description he gave dispatch, he was "pretty certain . . . 80 to 85 percent probability" that Defendant was the driver of the car.
Because "[i]t is within the exclusive province of the jury to judge the credibility of the witness[es] and the weight of the evidence," Hardy, 2002 UT App 244 at ¶ 11 (first alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted), this court will not disturb the jury verdict in cases such as this where "some evidence" was presented from which the jury could find the requisite elements of the crime. Mead, 2001 UT 58 at ¶ 67 (quotations and citation omitted). We affirm.
WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Presiding Judge, and Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge.