Rather, the Court's concern centers on whether the State has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant unequivocally consented to the search of his room.See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242 (Del.Super.Ct. 1993).See Harris, 642 A.2d 1242 citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1973).
Consent must be "`unequivocal and specific' and `freely and intelligently' given." Harris, 642 A.2d 1242.Id. at 1245-46.
But we find no support for the notion that invocation of the exception is only appropriate under those circumstances.642 A.2d 1242, 1251 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993).Id., 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405.
Following Matlock, courts have consistently recognized the principle that persons sharing premises may nonetheless retain areas or objects within their exclusive control that are not subject to search based on consent of one of the co-occupants. See 3 LaFave, supra at § 8.3(f), p. 738; United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978); State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242, 1248 (Del.Super.Ct. 1993); State v. Williams, 48 Or.App. 293, 616 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1980). David contends that the tapes here fell within this exception to that doctrine.
1988). But see State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242, 1246-47 (Del.Super.Ct. 1993). The officers in this case could not recall if they actually engaged in any conversation with Reinier before they stepped onto the porch, but felt she invited them into the porch because it was cold outside and she opened the door wide in response to their knock.
Cook v. State, 374 A.2d 264, 267-268 (Del. 1977). State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242 (Del. 1993). Taylor v. State, 784 A.2d 914, *9 (Del. 2000)(TABLE)(citing Reynolds v. Reynolds, 237 A.2d 708, 711 (Del. 1967)).
Id.State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242 (Del.Super. 1993) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).State v. Huntley, 777 A.2d 249, 257 (Del.Super. 2000) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227).
Similarly, it has been recognized that a parent does not possess the actual authority to allow a search of an adult child's locked toolbox kept inside premises shared by parent and off-spring. ( State v Harris, 642 A2d 1242 [Del Super 1993].) In fact, in certain situations, a parent may not even have actual authority to allow the police to search a closed but unlocked bedroom used solely by an adult child in the parent's home, where the police are aware that the child is in fact an adult and there is no indication that the bedroom is used by anyone other than the child.
The defendant in this case is an adult child who maintains a bedroom in his mother's house and frequently stays there. Even where a parent of an adult child has the authority to consent to the search of a room, that authority does not extend to containers therein as to which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, unless it is shown that the parent also had joint access to and control over the container. See, e.g., United States v. Block, 590 F.2d at 542: State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242, 1248 (Del.Super.Ct. 1993); State v. Pinegar, 583 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Mo.Ct.App. 1979). The Court stated:
On the other hand, had Pratt left his door unlocked or provided his mother a key, there would be little doubt that Ms. Pratt would have had actual common authority. See Clutter, 914 F.2d at 778 (minor children had common authority to consent to inspection of their parents' open bedroom); United States v. Cork, 18 Fed.Appx. 376, 383, 2001 WL 1069814 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2001) (unpublished) (homeowner had common authority over unlocked bedroom shared by her nephew); State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242, 1247 (DeLSuper.Ct. 1993) (mother with a key to her son's locked bedroom possessed common authority over the room). The two cases cited for the finding of actual common authority, United States v. Gillis, 358 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2004) and Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), provide no support for that proposition.