Opinion
I.D. No. 9909012973.
Submitted: December 14, 2007.
Decided: January 2, 2008.
On Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Denied.
This 2nd day of January, 2008, upon consideration of the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Clinton Harris ("Harris"), it appears to the Court that:
1. Harris was arrested on September 16, 1999. On November 8, 1999, the State indicted Harris on charges of Rape in the Second Degree and Discharging a Firearm from a Dwelling.
2. The Court set a trial date for January 3, 2001. On that date, Harris pleaded guilty to one count of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree. The judge also ordered a pre-sentence investigation.
3. Harris was scheduled to be sentenced on March 16, 2001. Upon defendant's request, the judge granted. The docket contains the following entry: "Defendant needs more time. Defendant wants to w/plea [withdraw plea]."
Docket 20.
4. Apparently the case then "fell through the cracks." For some reason, no activity occurred in Harris' case until October 22, 2007, when a summons was mailed to Harris advising him that he was to be sentenced on November 2, 2007. Harris and his counsel appeared at the sentencing, at which time Counsel requested leave to file a motion to dismiss based upon a denial of defendant's "speedy sentencing" rights. The Court granted Harris's request.
5. Harris has now filed a motion to dismiss wherein he contends that the six and one-half year delay in his sentencing violates his right to "speedy trial" under Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution. Harris submits that this Court should apply the four factor test applicable to claims of a denial of a speedy trial as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo and recognized by the Delaware Supreme Court in Middlebrook v. State. Should the Court find the "speedy trial" clause inapplicable, Harris argues that his failure to be sentenced promptly following his guilty plea violates his right to due process. While Harris requests that this Court dismiss the conviction against him, he also asks that the Court hold a hearing to determine the reasons for the delay in sentencing, as well as the prejudice that Harris has suffered.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. . . ." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution is similar: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right . . . to have . . . a speedy and public trial. . . . " Del. Const., art. I, § 7.
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
802 A.2d 268 (Del. 2002).
6. In response, the State agrees that the four-factor test of Barker, as adopted by Boyer v. State, is the applicable test to determine Harris's speedy sentencing rights were violated. Applying the four factors, the State contends that Harris caused the delay of six years since the State promptly scheduled Harris's sentencing for six weeks after his guilty plea. The State notes that Harris could have requested sentencing if he had experienced anxiety but chose not to do so. The State also points out that Harris been at liberty during this period. These facts, the State argues, fail to demonstrate substantial prejudice.
829 A.2d 935 (Del. 2003) (Table).
7. Where a defendant alleges that his rights to speedy sentencing have been violated, Delaware Courts have evaluated the claim using the same test as that required when a defendant alleges a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Unlike a claim brought by an accused of a violation of the right to a speedy trial, which involves "[t]he interest in maximum speed consistent with fairness, in fresh memories likely to approach full accounts of the facts, in prompt vindication and relief of the innocent, and in swift punishment of the guilty," a speedy sentencing claim involves the rights of a convicted defendant. Nonetheless, assuming the Sixth Amendment requires speedy sentencing, the Court must analyze any delay in sentencing by "consider[ing] the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant, looking primarily at (1) the length of the delay, (2) the cause of the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his rights, and (4) any prejudice to the defendant because of the delay." None of these factors alone is conclusive; rather, the Court must consider these factors together with the surrounding circumstances. An analysis of a claim of a violation of a defendant's right to speedy sentencing under the Delaware Constitution parallels that under the Federal Constitution.
See Key v. State, 463 A.2d 633, 636 (Del. 1983) ("[A]ssuming that the sixth amendment requires speedy sentencing, an allegedly unconstitutional delay is examined in the same way as an asserted denial of the right to speedy trial."). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial is applicable through sentencing. See Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2007).
Boyer v. State, 829 A.2d 935, at *2 (Del. Aug. 4, 2003) (Table). The Boyer Court did note, however, that "the continuing public interest in promptly disposing of the Court's business and that swift punishment is 'of broad public moment.'" Id.
Key, 463 A.2d at 636. (citing Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).
Id.
Id. at 638.
8. In Key v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court explained how a court should analyze the delay:
The State may assert a variety of reasons for delay, but a deliberate attempt to impair or harass the defense or to gain some unfair tactical advantage rarely, if at all, justifies any postponement. . . . However, an event over which the prosecution has no control, e.g., the disappearance or illness of an important witness, supports an appropriate rescheduling of the proceedings. Between these extreme situations lie instances of negligence, overcrowded courts, or excessive caseloads on prosecutors.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Key Court also noted that "a defendant does have some responsibility to call attention to what he views as an unfair postponement." If the defendant does not protest the delay, it "will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial".
Id. at 637.
Key, 463 A.2d at 637 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
9. Importantly, when applying the four factors to a convicted defendant, the defendant must show substantial prejudice to his rights:
[O]nce a defendant has been convicted it would be the rarest of circumstances in which the right to a speedy trial could be infringed without a showing of prejudice. Moreover, the necessity of showing substantial prejudice would dominate the four-part balancing test. This is so because of the traditional interests the speedy trial guarantee is designed to protect: (1) prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. . . . Many of those interests diminish or disappear altogether once there has been a conviction. Because the rights of society proportionately increase, the prejudice claimed by the defendant must be substantial and demonstrable.
Bodnari v. State, 839 A.2d 665, at *3 (Del. Dec. 3, 2003) (Table) (citing Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 256 (10th Cir. 1986)).
10. Assuming that the Sixth Amendment does indeed guarantee the right to speedy sentencing, the Court concludes that Harris has failed to show substantial prejudice warranting a dismissal of his conviction. Although the first factor — the length of the delay — weighs in his favor because it was almost six and one-half years before his sentencing hearing was scheduled, the other three factors weigh strongly against him. Specifically, under the second factor, Harris himself was the cause of the delay. The docket reveals that the defendant requested a continuance, which the Court granted, specifically because of his request to withdraw his guilty plea, relief that was never pursued by him. As he did not, in the past six and one-half years, ever file a formal motion, Harris admits that the third factor weighs against him because he did not assert his right to a speedy sentence. As recognized in Key, Harris's failure to protest the delay "make[s] it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial".
Key, 463 A.2d at 637 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
11. Finally, and most importantly, under the fourth factor, Harris has failed to establish demonstrable and substantial prejudice that warrants a dismissal. The Court is not persuaded that a six and a half year period between conviction and sentencing is presumptively prejudicial, especially considering that, in the Boyer case, the Supreme Court did not consider a nine-year period presumptively prejudicial. Harris claims that he suffered substantial and demonstrable prejudice because he had to remain under the supervision of pre-trial services during this period and was required to report to an officer once a month. The Court does not consider this inconvenience to be substantial, considering the potential of a prison term for the offense. Harris should have been incarcerated on March 16, 2001 as a result of his conviction. Instead, he has been at liberty. Nor does his guilty plea affect his right to file a timely appeal. Although the Court recognizes that the uncertainty of a conviction without a sentence may have burdened his employment opportunities and personal life, Harris himself fomented that uncertainty by deliberately avoiding mention of the delay either to his attorney or to the Court.
See Boyer, 829 A.2d at *3 (refusing to accept defendant's argument that a nine year delay between a defendant's arrest and sentence constitutes "a presumption of prejudice").
Harris has requested a hearing to determine the reason for the delay, as well as to determine the amount of prejudice he has suffered. As explained above, the docket reflects that Harris, who pleaded guilty and admitted to committing the crime, requested the continuance and was the reason for the delay. Harris has also failed to show any evidence of substantial prejudice in his motion warranting a hearing. Accordingly, the Court declines Harris a hearing.
State v. Miller, 1991 WL 89785, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. May 1, 1991).
12. Moreover, even if the Court were to analyze Harris's claim as a violation of his right to due process, dismissal is not the appropriate remedy. In State v. Miller, the Court analyzed a defendant's claim of a violation of his right to speedy sentencing by applying the four-factor analysis in Barker. The Court suggested, however, that a due process analysis might be more appropriate than a speedy trial analysis under Barker. If due process principles were to be applied, the Court noted that the defendant "would be required to show greater fault and prejudice to establish that [the] delay violated his right to due process of law." Since Harris has failed to show substantial prejudice under the Barker test, the Court finds that Harris has failed to demonstrate the greater prejudice and fault required to establish a violation of his right to due process.
1991 WL 89785 (Del.Super.Ct. May 1, 1991).
Miller, 1991 WL 89785 at *1.
Id. (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977)).
13. For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. A Sentencing hearing will be scheduled promptly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.