Further, it is a basic proposition of law that "[a] statute should be construed so as to give effect to the legislative intent, while keeping in view the object of the statute." Stephen Reney Memorial Fund v. Old Saybrook, 4 Conn. App. 111, 113, 492 A.2d 533 (1985); State v. Harris, 14 Conn. App. 244, 250, 540 A.2d 395 (1988). Our construction of § 22a-19(a) does this. "A statute should be construed so as to have meaning, so that the statute makes common sense, and so that there are no bizarre results."
Finally, we note that, by virtue of its short duration, the petitioner's ninety day term of imprisonment would not have permitted him successfully to invoke General Statutes 54-82c. See State v. Harris, 14 Conn. App. 244, 249-50, 540 A.2d 395 (1988). Jury selection for the joint trial of the petitioner and Couture began on September 29, 1981. Jury selection continued on sixteen separate dates thereafter, concluding on November 5, 1981.
Indeed, unless "a defendant is . . . serving a criminal sentence there is no rehabilitation process" with which to be concerned. State v. Harris, 14 Conn. App. 244, 249, 540 A.2d 395 (1988). Here, the prosecutor failed to demonstrate any nexus between Simmons' views about rehabilitation and her possible approach to the defendant's trial.
Testimony at the petitioner's habeas trial suggested that the petitioner was technically released from prison on his prior sentence on July 10, 1984, because of good time credits that should have been credited to him. If that were true, the petitioner would not have any speedy trial claim under 54-82c because he would then have been being held after that date on a pretrial detainer. State v. Harris, 14 Conn. App. 244, 249-50, 540 A.2d 395 (1988). In its December 21, 1990 memorandum of decision, the habeas court, after concluding that there was a reasonable and necessary continuance, also stated: "Further, the petitioner was released from prison on July 10, 1984, so 54-82c probably did not apply. He was held after that date on a (pretrial) detainer."
The rationale of affording speedier trials to those serving criminal sentences than to those not yet incarcerated has been previously explored by this court. See State v. Harris, 14 Conn. App. 244, 249, 540 A.2d 395 (1988); State v. Foshay, 12 Conn. App. 1, 530 A.2d 611 (1987). The rationale has also been considered by other courts.
If, however, a defendant has no immediate interest in institutional rehabilitation programs because he is no longer serving a term of imprisonment, he is not within the class of defendants that the statute was designed to protect. State v. Foshay, supra, 12-13; see also United States v. Dobson, 585 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 899, 99 S.Ct. 264, 58 L.Ed.2d 247 (1978); State v. Harris, 14 Conn. App. 244, 249, 540 A.2d 395 (1988). Several Connecticut cases have discussed the consequences of the status of defendants attempting to invoke the protection of detainer statutes.
For that matter, even a prisoner who initially satisfies the requirements of § 54-82c (a) during a term of imprisonment but is released prior to the expiration of the statutory 120 day period acquires the status of a pretrial detainee upon his release and is no longer entitled to the benefit of the statute. State v. Harris, 14 Conn. App. 244, 249, 540 A.2d 395 (1988). Thus, unless Robinson fully complied with § 54-82c (a) 120 days prior to his April 19, 2002 discharge, he cannot claim the benefit of the statute.
State v. Almgren, 12 Conn. App. 364 (1988) State v. Harris, 14 Conn. App. 244 (1988) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85 (1991)
The speedy trial provision of General Statutes Section 5n 54-82c shall apply only to those whose rehabilitation would be upset by pending charges. State v. Harris, 14 Conn. App. 244, 250, 540 A.2d 395 (1988). The federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that, even though the basis for a parolee's detention is the underlying sentence from which he has been paroled, until such time as the parole violator is recommitted after a hearing and his incarceration thereby made certain and fixed as to duration, no term of imprisonment can be said to have commenced or resumed within the terms of the federal counterpart to General Statutes Section 54-186.