When a criminal defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect; see General Statutes § 53a-13 ; the court holds a hearing to assess that individual's mental status and to determine whether confinement or release is appropriate. See State v. Harris , 277 Conn. 378, 382–83, 890 A.2d 559 (2006) ; see also General Statutes § 17a-582 (a) and (e) ; State v. Kelly , 95 Conn. App. 31, 33–34, 895 A.2d 801 (2006). If the acquittee fails to meet his burden of proof that he should be discharged, the court must commit the acquittee to the jurisdiction of the board for a term not exceeding the maximum sentence that could have been imposed had there been a criminal conviction.

Most prominently, the system applicable to acquittees accords a central role to the board, an entity with no civil counterpart. See State v. Harris, 277 Conn. 378, 384–85, 890 A.2d 559 (2006). The board is an administrative body consisting of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, a probation expert, a layperson, an attorney who is a member of the state bar, and a layperson with experience in victim advocacy.

The acquittee additionally claims that the court improperly admitted the board's May 4, 2021 ''Report to Court Re: Application for Discharge'' as evidence because it (1) contains inadmissible hearsay and (2) violates his due process rights. In his appellate brief, the acquittee acknowledges that State v. Harris, 277 Conn. 378, 394, 890 A.2d 559 (2006) (holding that board's report did not contain inadmissible hearsay, and its admission did not violate due process), and State v. Warren, 100 Conn.App. 407, 424, 919 A.2d 465 (2007) (same), are binding on this court. He claims that ''[t]his issue is being raised for the sake of future review'' by our Supreme Court.

Whether the department violated the petitioner's procedural due process rights presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., State v. Harris , 277 Conn. 378, 393, 890 A.2d 559 (2006). It is well established that "[t]he habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. ... The application of the habeas court's factual findings to the pertinent legal standard, however, presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to plenary review."

He nonetheless contended that our decision in his first appeal did not bar consideration of this claim on remand because both the trial court's decision granting his first motion to dismiss and this court's reversal of that decision were limited to constitutional concerns relating solely to the lack of mandatory periodic judicial review for acquittees. While the defendant's second motion to dismiss was pending, this court issued its decision in State v. Harris, 277 Conn. 378, 890 A.2d 559 (2006). In Harris, we concluded that the trial court properly had denied a motion to strike the board's report, which was submitted in response to the state's petition for continued commitment, because, contrary to the acquittee's claim, the dangerousness standard that the board applies is not functionally different from the standard that applies in civil commitment proceedings.

.See General Statutes § 17a-582; State v. Harris, 277 Conn. 378, 382–83, 890 A.2d 559 (2006) (after acquittee has proven defense of mental disease or defect, he or she may be committed to jurisdiction of board for maximum term of commitment not to exceed maximum sentence that could have been imposed had that individual been convicted); State v. Foster, 217 Conn. App. 476, 506 n.1, 289 A.3d 191 (Seeley, concurring) (same), cert. granted, 346 Conn. 920, 291 A.3d 1041 (2023); see generally State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 519–20, 847 A.2d 862 (review of statutory commitment scheme for acquittees as set forth in General Statutes §§ 17a-580 through 17a-603), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S. Ct. 424, 160 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2004).Our Supreme Court has observed that, "[a]lthough the purpose of an order of commitment issued as a result of an insanity acquittal is significantly different from that of a prison sentence imposed as a result of a criminal conviction … the effect of such a commitment on the acquittee is no less a deprivation of liberty than that of a prison sentence,"

Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 17a–581–2 (a)(6). “ ‘Imminent’ is defined as ‘ready to take place; esp: hanging threateningly over one's head....’ ” State v. Harris, 277 Conn. 378, 389, 890 A.2d 559 (2006), quoting Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1993).“The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness.

Id., 831 n.3. Regardless, the differences in the statutory scheme contained in subsection (c) compared to subsection (g) has implications as the court is not solely relying on the reports of neutral physicians, but rather taking the record as a whole into account. State v. Harris, 277 Conn. 378, 385 n.12, 890 A.2d 559 (2006). Hopkins v. O'Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) cited General Statutes § 17a-498 in the context of General Statutes § 17a-502(d), which provides that if any person is detained and committed under an emergency certificate, the committed individual may request a hearing, which " shall be held within seventy-two hours of receipt of such request . . . At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that there is probable cause to conclude that the person is subject to involuntary confinement . . . the court shall order that such person's detention continue for the remaining time provided for emergency certificates or until the completion of probate proceedings under 17a-498."

On January 26, 2006, the PSRB filed a Memorandum of Law in opposition to the Acquittee's Motion to Strike. The PSRB then filed a Supplemental Memorandum on March 14, 2006, attaching the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the State v. Harris matter, reported at 277 Conn. 378 (2006). The acquittee then filed a Supplemental Memorandum regarding its Motion to Strike on April 7, 2006.

Thus, "the confinement of insanity acquittees, although resulting initially from an adjudication in the criminal justice system, is not punishment for a crime." Payne, 215 Conn. at 683; see also State v. Harris, 277 Conn. 378, 394 (2006) ("the primary purpose of continued commitment proceedings is to protect society and to treat the acquittee's mental illness, not to punish the acquittee"). Those acquitted by reason of insanity or mental illness effectively opt out of the criminal justice system in favor of a system designed to treat their mental illness such that they may eventually rejoin society as healthy individuals.