Opinion
I.D. No. 0609011259.
Submitted: May 15, 2007.
Decided: May 31, 2007.
UPON CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT'S PRO SE MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA.
DENIED.This 31st day of May, 2007, it appears to the Court that:
1. On April 2, 2007, Devin L. Harris ("Harris") pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree. At that time, the Court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and scheduled sentencing for June 8, 2007. Harris now presents to the Court a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11 § 831.
See Docket 11.
3. Harris claims he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because he was "highly intelligently manipulated into making an unwanted decision" and was "totally misled and misbriefed [sic]" by his counsel. He further claims that his counsel persuaded him "or broadsided" him into pleading guilty when, in fact, he is not guilty of robbery in the second degree.
See id.
3. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32(d) permits the Court, in its discretion, to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing for "any fair and just reason." The "fair and just" standard places the burden upon a defendant to establish that "the guilty plea was not voluntarily made, or that it was entered by reason of mistake of the defendant as to his legal rights." "If such circumstances be proved, the application should be readily granted; otherwise, it should be denied."
Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503, 504 (Del. 1969).
State v. Insley, 141 A.2d 619, 622 (Del. 1958). See also State v. French, 2004 WL 838849, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Apr. 16, 2004).
5. Here, Harris has not met his burden. A review of the transcript from the plea colloquy reveals that Harris voluntarily admitted guilt to the charges of robbery in the second degree, acknowledged that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation, and confirmed that neither his attorney nor the State forced or threatened him to plead guilty. Those admissions were clear and unequivocal. Further, a review of the signed Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form shows that Harris acknowledged that he was freely and voluntarily deciding to plead guilty, that he was satisfied with the representation provided by his attorney, and that neither his attorney nor the State threatened or forced him to plead guilty or promised him a specific sentence. There being an absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Harris is bound by the representations he made at the plea colloquy and on the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form. Therefore, the Court finds that Harris entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, and that his plea was not entered because of his mistake as to his legal rights.
5. Based on the foregoing, Harris' pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.