Objective falsity as proof of knowledge arises when actual falsity is established and defendant's awareness of it is inescapable and self-evident. State v. Haines, 18 N.J. 550 (1955); State v. Harris, 132 N.J.L. 54 (Sup.Ct. 1944), aff'd 132 N.J.L. 343 (E. A. 1945); see also, State v. Fuchs, 60 N.J. 564 (1972); State v. Borrell, 18 N.J. 16 (1955). That doctrine, however, is not available in this case.
Further, the indictment for false swearing is concerned with a statutory offense. The indictment in the present case was in the statutory language and explicitly apprised the defendant of the offense charged. It is in these respects adequate under the principles embodied in State v. Harris, 132 N.J.L. 54, 57 ( Sup. Ct. 1944). Cf. State v. Morris, 98 N.J.L. 621, 623 ( Sup. Ct. 1923), affirmed per curiam 99 N.J.L. 526 ( E. A. 1924). The essence of constitutional right in relation to the sufficiency of an indictment is that the accused be "informed by the indictment in certain, definite and understandable terms of the crime charged to him." State v. Grothmann, 13 N.J. 90, 97 (1953).
The former Supreme Court twice gave comparable interpretation to the statute. State v. Ellenstein, 121 N.J.L. 304, 322 ( Sup. Ct. 1938); State v. Harris, 132 N.J.L. 54 ( Sup. Ct. 1944). The trial judge charged the jury consistently with those legal principles and the correctness of the charge is not questioned. The verdict was of guilt. The proofs, with their prima facie significance and the admissions by the accused, amply sustain the jury verdict.
The grounds upon which that attack is made here, as below, are (1) that the indictment is duplicitous in that it charges several distinct offenses in a single count; State v. Clement, 80 N.J.L. 669; 77 Atl. Rep. 1067; State v. Bolitho, 103 N.J.L. 246, 263; 136 Atl. Rep. 164; affirmed, 104 N.J.L. 446; 146 Atl. Rep. 927; (2) that it is "uncertain and ambiguous" in that it makes no specific reference to any "particular act done or perpetrated by any one individual defendant;" (3 and 4) that it fails to charge a crime although it is argued that the indictment embraces acts of misfeasance and non-feasance. Thus here too the complaint in fact is not that the indictment does not charge a crime but rather that it charges too many in one count. The state on the other hand defends the denial to quash (for applicable rules of law, see State v. Harris, 132 N.J.L. 54) and the legality of the indictment on the grounds, in substance, that the indictment clearly, definitely and precisely charges the one crime of non-feasance for criminal neglect of official duties imposed on all defendants, R.S. 2:160-1, and that while the divers acts of neglect charged "constitute distinct offenses against the law," they are nonetheless "cognate" to the one charge of non-feasance ( Cf. State v. Bolitho, 103 N.J.L. 261), and that the divers acts charged are more in the nature of a "bill of particulars" of the various acts of official misconduct specifically charged. State v. Bolitho, Id. (at p. 263).
(Emphasis supplied). In State v. Harris, 132 N.J.L. 54, 59 (Sup.Ct. 1944), aff'd 132 N.J.L. 343 (E. A. 1945), for example, defendant was convicted of falsely testifying that he had "graduated from the University of Chicago Law School." Rejecting his argument on appeal that the record lacked evidence that he knew his testimony was untrue the court said: "Surely no one better than the defendant knew * * * that he swore falsely."
His failure to disclose the contract in the affidavit cannot be construed as anything but deliberate and, hence, willfully false swearing. State v. Harris, 132 N.J.L. 54 ( Sup. Ct. 1944). The appellant next argues that the fact that the space after the word "EXCEPTING" remained blank rendered the affidavit incomplete.
Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of indictment No. 985-51 do not charge the defendant with having willfully swore falsely or with having done so intentionally and with knowledge of the falsity and therefore none of them will afford the basis of a valid conviction. Contrast indictments in State v. Ellenstein, 121 N.J.L. 304, 321 ( Sup. Ct. 1938); State v. Harris, 132 N.J.L. 54 ( Sup. Ct. 1944), affirmed 132 N.J.L. 343 ( E. A. 1945); State v. Kowalczyk, supra. It is observed that it is alleged in counts 5, 6, and 7, that the defendant "did then and there willfully swear falsely" in the particulars stated.
The indictments recite these words almost verbatim and consequently are sufficient to withstand an attack based upon the failure to allege the details of the notary's authority and the facts showing that he acted within his authority. ( State v. Harris, 132 N.J.L. 54 ( Sup.Ct. 1944); State v. Joseph L. Sigretto Sons, 127 N.J.L. 578, 581 ( Sup. Ct. 1942); State v. Ellenstein, 121 N.J.L. 304, 325 ( Sup. Ct. 1938)). If the details are desired by the defendants avenues of discovery are open to them.