Opinion
CR960104271T
01-09-2017
State of Connecticut v. Charles Harris
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Filed January 24, 2017
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE
Frank A. Iannotti, J.
By a motion to correct an illegal sentence, dated July 8, 2016, the defendant, Charles Harris, moves this court to correct his previously imposed twenty year sentence on the ground that it violates his right against double jeopardy. In the defendant's direct appeal; State v. Harris, 49 Conn.App. 121, 714 A.2d 12 (1998); the court summarized the following underlying facts: " The defendant was a leader of a gang that engaged in illegal drug trafficking in a public housing project on Olson Drive in Ansonia. The victim, Timothy Hopkins, began selling drugs in this housing project in June 1994, in direct competition with the defendant's gang. The defendant decided to scare the victim away from his territory by having a fellow gang member shoot the victim in the buttocks. On June 28, 1994, the defendant ordered one gang member, Damon Spencer, to carry out the threat and handed him a .357 magnum pistol. Spencer refused to comply with the defendant's order because criminal charges were already pending against him in another matter. The defendant then ordered another gang member, Terron Lopes, to carry out the threat and handed him the same gun. Lopes was hesitant to comply with the order, but eventually relented after he was threatened and coerced by the defendant . . .
Along with his motion, the defendant submitted a signed note to the judicial clerk stating that he does not want an attorney to represent him regarding this proceeding and chooses to represent himself.
" On the day following the shooting, the police questioned Lopes about the incident and showed him the gun. Lopes denied any knowledge of either the incident or the gun. After the defendant became a suspect in the incident, he began to pressure Lopes into accepting full responsibility for the shooting. On July 1, 1994, Lopes surrendered to the police and took sole responsibility for the shooting. Lopes was then charged with murder. On April 6, 1995, Lopes gave a statement to an inspector from the office of the state's attorney that inculpated the defendant in the shooting. Lopes stated that the defendant had coerced him into shooting the victim and taking sole responsibility for the shooting . . .
" On June 29, 1994, the police arrested Spencer in connection with the shooting. Spencer gave a statement when he was arrested that inculpated the defendant as the person who solicited both Lopes and him to shoot the victim. On July 8, 1994, Spencer gave the police another statement in which he again inculpated the defendant as the mastermind behind the shooting. In his second statement, Spencer stated that both he and Lopes feared the defendant, and that this fear caused Lopes to protect the defendant in his dealings with the police . . .
" The defendant was charged on May 10, 1996, with conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-48 and 53a-54a(a), and murder as an accessory in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-8(a) and 53a-54a(a). After an eight day jury trial, the defendant was found not guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and murder as an accessory, but was found guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree as an accessory in violation of § § 53a-8 and 53a-55(a)(1)." Id., 123-25.
In his motion to correct, the defendant argues that the trial court " transformed" the accessory to manslaughter charge into an accessory to murder charge. Specifically, he argues that the court instructed the jury that both accessory to manslaughter and accessory to murder required intent to cause death. Moreover, because he was " acquitted" of the element of intent to cause death when the jury found him not guilty of accessory to murder, his conviction of accessory to manslaughter violates double jeopardy because both charges were the " same offense" under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).
On October 11, 2016, this court heard arguments on the defendant's motion. Thereafter, on October 20, 2016, the defendant filed a brief in support of his motion to correct. He again argued that the court sentenced him under a " pretext" of the lesser included offense of accessory to manslaughter after the court essentially instructed the jury that both accessory to murder and accessory to manslaughter required an intent to cause death. The defendant asks the court to " eliminate" his sentence and grant a new trial.
On November 15, 2016, the state filed a motion to dismiss the defendant's motion on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the state argues that the defendant's motion essentially amounts to an attack on the validity of his conviction. On November 30, 2016, in an amended reply, the defendant argues that the state has " attempted to create a smoke screen by not addressing the substance of [his] claim, " and that the state's return in his habeas proceeding and the state's response in its motion to dismiss " [point] the finger at each other."
Practice Book § 43-22 provides: " The judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an illegal manner." " [J]urisdiction of the sentencing court terminates once a defendant's sentence has begun, and, therefore, that court may no longer take any action affecting a defendant's sentence unless it expressly has been authorized to act." Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 30, 37, 779 A.2d 80 (2001). Our Supreme Court identified four common-law exceptions to the general rule cited above, which are embodied by § 43-22. A trial court has jurisdiction to consider: (1) whether the sentence was within the permissible range for the crimes charged; (2) whether the sentence violated double jeopardy; (3) whether the computation of the sentence's length as to concurrent or consecutive time is illegal; and (4) questions as to which sentencing statute was applicable. See State v. Lawrence, 281 Conn. 147, 156-57, 913 A.2d 428 (2007). " [I]f a defendant's claim falls within one of these four categories the trial court has jurisdiction to modify a sentence after it has commenced . . . If the claim is not within one of these categories, then the court must dismiss the claim for a lack of jurisdiction and not consider its merits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. St. Louis, 146 Conn.App. 461, 467, 76 A.3d 753, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 961, 82 A.3d 628 (2013). " In order for the court to have jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal sentence after the sentence has been executed, the sentencing proceeding, and not the [proceedings] leading to the conviction, must be the subject of the attack. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Casiano, 122 Conn.App. 61, 68, 998 A.2d 792, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 931, 5 A.3d 491 (2010).
Under § 43-22, the court does not have jurisdiction simply because a defendant frames his claim as falling within one of the four exceptions. In State v. Wright, 107 Conn.App. 152, 944 A.2d 991, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 933, 958 A.2d 1247 (2008), the court addressed the issue of whether a collateral attack on a conviction, framed as a double jeopardy violation, is properly addressed in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant in that case made a similar argument as the defendant here in that the error occurred during the jury's deliberation and subsequent conviction and thus violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Id., 155. " Although the defendant has framed his issue in terms of a double jeopardy violation, he actually is claiming that because his conviction . . . is illegal, his sentence is necessarily illegal." Id., 156. The court thus held that " the defendant's claim that his sentence is illegal because it violates his constitutional protection against double jeopardy is actually a claim of an improper conviction, which is, in reality, a collateral attack on his conviction and does not fall within the purview of Practice Book § 43-22." (Footnote omitted.) Id., 157. See also, State v. Robles, 169 Conn.App. 127, 131 n.7 135, 150 A.3d 687 (2016) (dismissal of motion to correct was proper when defendant's claims, as alleged, challenged sentence but at their essence, attacked conviction).
In the present case, even though the defendant characterizes his argument as a double jeopardy violation, the essence of his argument challenges not the sentencing procedures or the sentence itself, but rather the jury instructions and ultimate conviction. He argues that his sentence violates double jeopardy because the jury necessarily found him guilty of accessory to manslaughter because of the trial court's instruction that such charge required the intent to cause death. Thus, the focus of the defendant's challenge is what transpired during trial, not at sentencing. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.