Opinion
I.D. No. 0305005293
Submitted: June 21, 2010.
Decided: July 8, 2010.
Upon Defendant's Third Motion for Postconviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.Stephen M. Walther, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Lynn Harris, Jr., Smyrna, Delaware, Pro Se.
ORDER
This 8th day of July, 2010, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant, Lynn Harris, was convicted on February 19, 2004, following a bench trial in this Court of Attempted Robbery First Degree, Conspiracy Second Degree and Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony. On April 23, 2004, Defendant was sentenced to ten years at Level V followed by three years of probation.
Harris v. State, 2005 WL 850421 (Del. Supr.) (holding that defendant failed to establish the affirmative defense of renunciation, that the police had probable cause to stop defendant and that Miranda warnings were not required).
2. Defendant appealed his case to the Delaware Supreme Court and his conviction was affirmed on April 11, 2005. On March 22, 2006, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, which was denied on June 13, 2006.
Id.
Harris v. State, 2006 WL 1679455 (Del. Super.) (holding that defendant's claims are completely conclusory), aff'd, 2006 WL 2714447 (Del. Supr.).
3. On May 6, 2009, Defendant filed a second motion for postconviction relief, which was denied on July 8, 2009.
Comm'r's Findings of Fact and Recommendations at 2.
4. On March 19, 2010, Defendant filed a third motion for postconviction relief. In his first, second and third motions for postconviction relief, Defendant raises the same issues of law: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the State failed to prove the required elements of Attempted Robbery First Degree beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the police lacked reasonable suspicion when they stopped Defendant as he walked down the street.
5. Before the Court can address the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether Defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. If a procedural bar exists, the Court need not consider the merits of a defendant's postconviction claim, unless a colorable claim exists pursuant to 61(i)(5).
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Id.
6. Once again, Defendant has failed to overcome the procedural hurdles established by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i). Rule 61(i)(1) applies because Defendant filed this motion more than three years after his conviction became final. The mandate in connection with Defendant's direct appeal was issued on April 11, 2005; this motion was filed on March 19, 2010. Accordingly, Defendant's motion is time-barred because it falls outside the three-year limit.
7. Additionally, and alternatively, Defendant has restated issues that were previously raised and adjudicated on direct appeal, and in doing so, Defendant's ability to relitigate these issues is foreclosed under Rule 61(i)(4), which states that "any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated . . . in a postconviction proceeding . . . is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice."
8. Finally, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under Rule 61(i)(5). Defendant's argument that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated are without merit and conclusory. The exception established by Rule 61(i)(5) is narrow and should only be applied in limited circumstances. Defendant has failed to present a colorable claim and only speculates that a different result could have been obtained. Defendant's conclusory allegations fail to invoke the exceptions established by Rule 61(i)(5). 9
Id. at 555.
Defendant's motion for postconviction relief fails to allege any appropriate ground for relief and is procedurally barred by Rule 61. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for postconviction relief is
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.